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Dedication to Dr. Marilyn Fernandez 
 
It is with great collegial affection and gratitude that the Department of Sociology 
dedicates this issue of the research annual Silicon Valley Notebook to Professor 
Marilyn Fernandez.  Dr. Fernandez, who will be retiring at the conclusion of the 2018-
2019 academic year, has been a major contributor to the Department of Sociology 
throughout her years and Santa Clara.  Among Dr. Fernandez’s many other 
contributions, she was singularly responsible for launching Silicon Valley Notebook 
and has guided its development ever since.  It is therefore quite fitting that the volume of 
Silicon Valley Notebook should be dedicated to Dr. Fernandez.    
To inspire and edit a research journal devoted to publishing work of students in a 
discipline and at a university (which is similar to what Emile Durkheim had intended 
when he first established L’Année Sociologue), a person must have many qualities 
including commitment to students, excellent command of written language, and facility 
in helping people articulate a thesis, marshal and assess evidence, and hone logical 
arguments.  It also helps to be an outstanding researcher who can serve as a good role 
model.  Dr. Fernandez is a first rate researcher who has helped shaped current 
sociological understanding of a number of important empirical topics, including domestic 
violence and social mobility in the 21st century.  And as a methodologist, her 
collaborative work (along with Dr. Stephen Fugita) yielded what is certainly one of the 
most careful longitudinal research studies to explore complex relationships between 
behavioral and attitudinal factors over a long course of time.  Her other methodological 
contributions include (along with Dr. Charles Powers) development of new 
methodological approach for quantifying and measuring meso-level features of 
organizational structure and culture. 
As a teacher, mentor, and editor, as well as in her own research, Dr. Fernandez 
has demonstrated extraordinary methodological versatility.  She has, furthermore, 
consistently stressed the necessity of keeping theoretical premises at the center of the 
research design process, the necessity of selecting methodological strategies 
appropriate to the topic being studied, and the desirability of employing multi-method 
research design (informed by a combination of quantitative, qualitative, and historical 
inquiry) whenever it is practical to do so.  All these qualities of mind and intellectual 
approach have helped to make Dr. Fernandez an excellent role model for Santa Clara 
students for almost three decades, with her serving as editor or associate editor of 
Silicon Valley Notebook for the majority of those years. 
Marilyn Fernandez has been more than a researcher at Santa Clara.  She has 
also been a deliberative and effective contributor within the department and on campus, 
serving three different tours of duty in the demanding job of department chair.  Arguably 
her most important new initiative in her years as chair, and certainly the initiative which 
Professor Fernandez cared about most, was launching Silicon Valley Notebook as a 
vehicle of professional socialization, to provide many students with a meaningful 
opportunity to benefit from steady guidance while honing their research and writing 
skills, and to encourage students to engage in meaningful professional work informing 
sociological understanding of important topics.   
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Many of us who have worked with Dr. Fernandez feel we are better people as 
well as more fully prepared as professionals as a result.  We ask that, whether or not 
you have worked on a previous issue of Silicon Valley Notebook, you take this 
moment to think about Dr. Fernandez, and consider sending her any personal 
comments you might wish to share (mfernandez@scu.edu).   
Dr. Fernandez remains dear to the hearts of many who have been have been 
associated with the department since her arrival at Santa Clara University in 1992.  The 
department is profoundly grateful for all of her many contributions and is profoundly 
lucky to count her as a member and a colleague.  And we all know we can look forward 
to more informative research and thoughtful analyses in the future, as Dr. Fernandez 
turns her attention to studying and writing about the sociological processes which unfold 
people make major life-stage transitions.   
 
 
Dr. Charles Powers 
Professor 
Department of Sociology 
Santa Clara University 
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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR OF 
Silicon Valley Notebook, Volume 17 
Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, Professor of Sociology 
 
The Sociology Department at Santa Clara University is proud to present, in this volume 
of Silicon Valley Notebook, four research papers written by students from the class of 
2019. As in the past years, the substantive, theoretical, methodological, and applied 
content of the Sociology curriculum at SCU are reflected in these papers. Originally 
prepared as part of the Research Capstone course (Sociology 121), the student authors 
further refined their work during the following quarter for inclusion in this volume.  
 
Taken together, the authors addressed a classic sociological issue, the tensions 
between social structure and personal agency in exploring the boundary limits of 
environmental issues, community ownership, institutional trust, and socioeconomic 
success. Each student used a mixed methods research design integrating survey and 
qualitative analyses. They conducted rigorous quantitative analyses of national 
secondary survey data to test predictions grounded in sociological theoretical traditions 
and reflected on their potential social applications. Narrative interviews with sources 
knowledgeable about their respective topics and content analyses of documents were 
used to supplement their quantitative findings. 
 
Student authors in the first set, “Class and Race Boundaries of Community Challenges”, 
explored the socio-economic boundaries of carbon footprints and community ownership. 
Erin Jessica Ronald starts this section with her paper “Creating Low-carbon 
Communities: Evaluating the Role of Individual Agency and Systemic Inequality in San 
Jose, CA.” The respective roles that human agency and systemic inequalities 
(dimensions of Gidden’s Structuration model) played in carbon emissions was the 
central theme. Concentrated wealth intensified the propensities of upper class and 
dominant race groups to create larger carbon footprints while individual and 
demographic agency played minor roles, mainly in less wealthier communities. She 
used the 2016 SDG San Jose Dashboard data of city blocks and 2013 ACS survey, 
supplemented with interviews with eight climate action-oriented community engagement 
professionals in the South Bay, to illustrate the need for customizing interventions to 
communities with varied socioeconomic and racial concentration. Elizabeth Namakula 
Kamya rounds off the section with her paper titled, “A Community to Call Mine: 
Supportive Community Environment and Citizen Actions?” She identified the social 
class boundaries of strategies for improving resident attachment using the 2010 Soul of 
The Community Survey as well as narrative insights from community development 
professionals and community initiatives. Taking ownership of their communities meant 
having a supportive social fabric to residents of thriving communities (supporting 
Solari’s Affluent Neighborhood Persistence Model) while residents in poorer 
communities prioritized political action and a strong social fabric (per D’Maggio and 
Powell’s New Institutionalism). Her scholarly contributions to the boundary limiting 
conditions of community development also highlighted the need for tailored community 
strategies. 
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Shifting the focus internationally is Noor Darwish in her paper titled, “The Middle 
Eastern Societies: Institutional Trust in Political Turmoil and Stasis’. She documented 
the political boundaries of citizen trust surpluses and deficits in institutions in the North 
African and Levantine regions in the Middle East. Her analyses of the 2016 Arab 
Barometer, supplemented with qualitative insights from two Middle East scholars and 
content analyses of journalistic accounts, revealed the trust deficit caused by 
governmental dysfunction, balancing out the trust surplus created by government 
functionality. Trust deficits were particularly acute in North Africa, a region rife with 
political turmoil, in contrast to the Levantine region with its political stasis amidst 
economic inequality. Weber’s political legitimacy along with Mosca’s elite theory offered 
the theoretical foundation for her analyses of the contested citizen-government 
relationships. 
 
Finally, Anna Paris Heider, in her longitudinal examination of the socioeconomic 
success of Americans in their youth and in early adulthood, identified some racialized 
limits of home and school resources for success theorized by Bourdieu, Coleman, 
Lareau, and Massey and Denton. For her analyses of the “Racialized Resource 
Models of Socioeconomic Success: A Mixed Methods Analysis of White and African 
American High School Students,” she used the 2002-2012 NELS survey data, in 
which 16,197 10th graders were followed up over the course of ten years. The 
statistical findings, along with narrative commentaries from education professionals 
and content analyses of journalistic/documentary evidence, pointed to racialized 
resource pathways to success. While resources in the home, and to a lesser extent in 
the school, were critical to the early educational success of both blacks and white 
youth, black young adults, unlike whites, could rely only on their home socioeconomic 
resources for their later socioeconomic success.  
 
As a collection, the student research presented in this volume, continue to exemplify the 
evidence based social science curriculum offered by the Department of Sociology at 
Santa Clara University. The social issues and their boundary limits explored have 
important policy and programmatic implications. These applications resonate with the 
University’s mission to prepare students, of competence, conscience, and compassion, 
who will help fashion a more just, humane, and sustainable word. 
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Creating Low-carbon Communities  
Evaluating the Role of Individual Agency and Systemic Inequality in San Jose, CA 
  
 
By 
Erin Jessica Ronald1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Mitigating climate change is a profound and complex global challenge that requires 
immediate reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Cities produce 70% of these 
global emissions, making them critical sites for solving the climate crisis (Churkina 
2016). Yet, while cities produce intense emissions, they can also be laboratories for 
change. Change can be initiated at the municipal level, with top-down policy solutions 
and/or it can manifest through mass behavior change. No matter who the primary 
initiator of change is, addressing climate change involves a bottom up approach to 
communities changing behaviors and reducing their carbon footprint. However, the 
ability of individuals to reduce their carbon footprint is both enhanced and limited by 
their own individual agency as well as structural forces, and both must be evaluated 
when identifying steps to create low-carbon communities. 
 
                                                        
1 Acknowledgements: I would like to foremost express appreciation to my professor Dr. Marilyn 
Fernandez for guiding me through this project, as well as my capstone cohort and the SCU Sociology 
Department for their support and community. I would also like to extend gratitude to the interviewees that 
shared with me their stories, and visions for a better future. 
ABSTRACT. Following a scholarly need to test compelling community level 
sociodemographic representations of environmental behaviors and outcomes, a 
sequential mixed method approach was used to evaluate the connections of 
human agency and systemic inequalities with carbon footprints. Statistical 
analyses of the 2016 SDG San Jose Dashboard data of city blocks and 2009 - 
2013 ACS survey data were supplemented with interviews with eight climate 
action-oriented community engagement professionals in the South Bay. 
Boundary limiting socioeconomic conditions for systemic inequalities and human 
agency, dimensions of Gidden’s Structuration model, were specified. Partially 
supporting structural inequality theories, socioeconomic resources, primarily, 
and to a lesser extent dominant race concentration, were associated with larger 
carbon footprints, particularly when wealth was concentrated. Both human (time 
driven alone) and demographic (senior and mid-aged blocks) agencies were 
also in part at play in shrinking or even enlarging carbon footprints, in wealthier 
communities. These findings not only contributed to the literature on climate 
action, but also highlighted the need for targeted interventions in communities of 
different socioeconomic standing. 
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Carbon footprints include direct emissions created through burning fuel as well as 
indirect emissions generated by energy used and created from activities and resources 
consumed. However, there is a scholarly gap in understanding how community carbon 
footprints are shaped by individual agency and or systemic inequality. Findings from this 
study will extend the literature on climate action and provide additional insights into 
successful measures for community level change to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Environmental scholars, in their explorations of sustainable choices and behaviors, 
have focused, even if separately, on the place of human agency, in its many 
dimensions, as well as structural circumstances, to understand the environmental 
options available to the individual as well as communities. Their findings can be 
categorized into two broad themes: options and actions that stem from human agency 
as well as community structures. Human agency environmental scholars examined 
preexisting socio-demographic characteristics as they dictated environmentally friendly 
choices and the need for targeted interventions to overcome the human barriers. 
Another stream in the environmental scholarship embedded individual behaviors in the 
broader community, with a focus on the importance of social practices in cultural and 
political contexts, the role of community social capital in changing behavior, and the 
need to design structural interventions to address barriers.  
 
Human Agency in Sustainable Lifestyles 
 
Human agency for environmental change is foremost rooted in individual’s concerns for 
the environment, their corresponding behaviors, and the outcomes that stem from these 
behaviors. However, the connection among these three concepts is complex. As noted 
in the reviewed literature, there is a disconnect among concerns, behaviors, and 
outcomes, which can be partially understood by examining socioeconomic and 
demographic features of families and households. 
 
Environmental Concerns, Behaviors, and Outcomes 
 
There is a complex set of connections between orientation that people have towards or 
away from sustainable choices and environmental outcomes, which requires that 
socioeconomic, demographic, and personal motivational factors be understood. For 
example, in Hal and Allen’s (2014) secondary data analysis of surveys of the Scottish 
population with 944 males and 933 females, energy use increased with income and 
number of children in the household. However, higher education did not necessarily 
affect energy consumption behavior, despite the more educated identifying themselves 
as environmentalists. The educated environmentalist model was also confirmed by 
Patel, Modi, and Paul (2017), in their multivariate analysis of micro-level behaviors 
(ascertained using a questionnaire survey) of a “convenience sample of 256 
consumers” (p. 192). Married and “mid-age” consumers in the Patel et al. study were 
more likely to display pro-environmental behaviors, especially if they were highly 
11
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educated. However, engagement in pro-environmental behaviors did not necessarily 
effect overall consumption. Relationships of more energy use with more income, 
children, and older age groups were documented by Abrahamse and Steg (2011) in 
their study of energy consumption in 199 randomly sampled Dutch households.  In fact, 
they found these socio-demographic variables to be better predictors of energy use than 
the established psychological variables of “tradition/security, power/achievement, and 
openness to change” (p. 38). In sum, in this stream of scholarship, scholars illustrated 
life circumstances that create inconsistent (pro and anti) pre-dispositions towards 
environmental behaviors.  
 
Socioeconomic circumstances of households have been useful in reconciling the 
disjuncture, noted above, between environmental concerns, behaviors, and carbon 
footprint outcomes. Using a multivariate regression analysis of 1203 households in the 
Providence of Alberta, Kennedy et al. (2013) offered insights into the “differential 
impacts of education and income on attitudes and behaviors” (p. 224). Those who had 
higher levels of education typically cared more about the environment and were more 
likely to engage in pro-environmental behaviors, while their less educated counterparts 
were less aware of environmental issues. Yet, higher education also generated more 
income which was associated with a larger carbon footprint. In other words, those who 
are “more educated and affluent, and may in some cases actually engage in more PEBs 
[pro-environmental behaviors2] also produce larger emissions” (p. 228). The authors 
hypothesized that affluent individuals engaged in low-impact pro-environmental 
behaviors in order to compensate for the large carbon footprint created by their other 
lifestyle choices. In other words, the large negative impact of high SES lifestyle choices 
and consumption significantly outweigh any positive impacts created by “private sphere 
PEBS in which these well-educated, more affluent households engage” (p. 230). 
Regardless, there is still a small, but significant ways in which individual’s pro-
environmental knowledge, concerns, and behaviors can reduce overall carbon footprint. 
 
Scholars have further specified the socioeconomic boundaries of the disconnect 
between pro-environmental concerns and reduced greenhouse gas emissions 
outcomes. For example, Wilson, Tyedmers, and Spinney (2013) analyzed 
socioeconomic and well-being status of 1,971 households living in Nova Scotia, Canada 
using multivariate analyses and found that indirect greenhouse gas emissions jumped 
significantly at higher income levels, while direct greenhouse gas emissions were 
decoupled from income. They hypothesized that such income shifts occurred because 
there is a limit on the amount that members of households can consume, and once 
basic needs have been met, income can then be directed towards “buying the bigger 
home, traveling more, or having more electronic gadgets, thus explaining the jump at 
higher income levels” (p.888). Younger and married households also had lower carbon 
footprints while affluent households produced higher greenhouse gas emissions. 
Interestingly, those who were more affluent, and correspondingly produced more 
emissions, were not any happier or healthier than their less affluent counterparts. That 
household incomes dictate carbon footprints, regardless of environmental concerns, is 
                                                        
2 Elaboration of the acronym added by authors in brackets. 
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critical in understanding the complex ways in which individual agency does or does not 
influence greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Engaging the Public in Environmental Practice 
 
The environmental concerns-behavior-outcomes disconnect has critical implications for 
how to engage individuals in sustainable practices. Critical to the process of citizen 
engagement in creating low-carbon communities is the dual need for improving citizen’s 
understanding of climate change as well as their capacity to take action. For example, in 
a stratified random sampling of 589 residents from six wards on the south coast of 
England, Whitmarsh (2009) found a duality in public understanding of climate change. 
While most of these respondents knew climate change was happening, few considered 
it a personal risk and understood the impacts of climate change in only a removed, 
general sense. Only a small percentage associated climate change with personal 
energy use, and most focused on the structural incentives that the government could 
provide to encourage pro-environment action, rather than their personal responsibility. 
 
In an article published two years later, Whitmarsh and her colleagues (2011), in their 
survey of over 551 citizens in two UK cities on their abilities and motivation to reduce 
emissions, continued to observe similar disconnections. UK citizens were very aware of 
climate change, but often misunderstood its main causes and the effect they, as 
individuals, had on the natural world. Instead they associated climate change with 
activities that they could not control and those removed from their personal life, 
disregarding critical individual actions such as the reduction of meat consumption, 
travel, and shopping. Like other researchers, reviewed above, Whitmarsh and her 
colleagues highlighted a serious value-action gap; their UK respondents were quite 
knowledgeable about climate change but took few personal actions or responsibility to 
address the climate problems. To bridge this gap and to inspire grassroots action, it is 
important, they said, to address structural factors, such as enhancing the “availability 
and attractiveness” (p. 63) of low-carbon options, as well as highlighting the personal 
benefits of actions, and anchoring options within “pre-existing cognitive frameworks” (p. 
58). In both sets of the Whitmarsh studies, the general public’s understanding of climate 
change was found to be very limited and most inaction came from a lack of personal 
connection to environmental problems. 
 
Unlike the prolific human agency-sustainability research in Europe and even emerging 
societies, there was not similar US scholarly attention discernible to the author. In a 
survey study of 802 respondents in the United States conducted for the Annual 
American Climate Perspectives Survey, it was found that there was a, “waning urgency 
for climate change solutions” (American Climate Perspectives 2018:2) among women 
over 50 years of age compared to previous years. However, within this group, minority 
women were the most concerned. Latinx women reported the “highest sense of urgency 
for reducing pollution” (p. 2), along with “higher agency in their [personal] ability to 
reduce it” (p. 2). This group also discussed climate challenges more frequently with their 
social groups, though African American women were most active in contacting voted 
officials to make changes, such as increasing the walkability and bikeability of 
13
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neighborhoods. While women were more engaged in sustainable actions than men, 
Latinx and African American women drove the majority of the engagement as white 
women reported the lowest levels of climate engagement out of survey participants. In 
other words, engagement in environmental behaviors, along with concern for the 
environment, was driven heavily by minority women. 
 
 
Structural Facilitators and Barriers to Sustainability 
 
Though the majority of scholars reviewed above focused on individual behaviors and 
the importance of personal environmental motivation, others have addressed the 
structural factors that facilitate or impede, as the case might be, pro-environmental 
orientations and actions. Social networks, shared understanding, and community 
interventions are some of the structural facilitators of environmental actions that have 
been considered. However, even when a community is pro-environment in their 
thinking, the absence of effective technological options as well as weak political 
leadership and support impede meaningful progress. 
 
Structural Facilitators of Sustainable Lifestyles  
 
The critical role of social structure, particularly social capital, the networks and 
connectedness in a community, in understanding environmental behaviors in a 
community, was the focus of Sungchul and Hyeongsik’s (2017) research. Using a 
“spatially stratified, random sampling telephone survey” (p. 293) of 1,324 individuals 
along the Han river in China and multilevel regressions, Sungchul and Hyeongsik 
discovered that social capital embedded in networks, through increasing the flow of 
“local-specific” (p. 305) information, encouraged pro-environmental actions inside and 
outside the home. Others, as Heiskanen et al. (2009), through their in-depth case 
studies of four emerging low-carbon communities, elaborated on the structural nexus of 
environmental challenges. They concluded that no matter the scale of the community, it 
was shared “interests, practices and structures” (p. 7593) that were crucial to the 
creation of low-carbon communities. Having a community that is inclusive and had a 
shared idea of place, provided the social infrastructure for cooperative community 
resource management and sustainable behaviors.  
 
Research by Jiang, Dong, Zhu, Alimujiang, Zhang, and Ma (2018) further support the 
need for community and structural interventions to shape environmental choices, 
particularly in regard to institutional encouragement and priority setting. In their analysis 
of electricity data from a survey of 191 students from Fudan University in China, Jiang 
et al. found that both external social conditions and intrinsic motivation shaped behavior 
needed for engagement in low carbon communities. In short, community and external 
initiatives are needed to support the creation of social capital that can shape individuals’ 
pro-environmental beliefs and motivations. 
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Structural Barriers to Environmental Interventions 
 
No matter the citizens’ dispositions towards environmental behaviors, large barriers can 
still exist at the community levels, inhibiting effective transitions to lower carbon 
footprints. In a study of over 100 governmental and non-governmental energy-use 
intervention programs in Australia, Moloney and her team (2009) found that while 
attitudinal resistance can be a barrier to adopting energy efficient technologies, the lack 
of energy efficient technology was an even more serious barrier even for those with 
strong pro-environmental attitudes. This underscored the need for a context-specific 
“socio-technical approach” (p. 7614) that addresses both limited availability of energy 
efficient technology and attitudinal barriers for the success of community and 
government initiatives. Socio-cultural factors, specifically “structural/operational, 
regulatory/ legislative, cultural/behavioral, and contextual factors” (Burch 2009:7584) 
can also function as barriers, holding communities back from environmentally conscious 
decisions. Burch’s analysis of three cities in the British Columbia, Canada, offered 
instructive illustrations of political leadership. Those with a conservative policy hindered 
communities in their environmental progress, while strong leadership created ambitious 
policy and dictated success. Political leadership must be combined with technological 
advances and a large organizational capacity to involve citizens. When innovative 
technologies are combined with initiatives to engage citizens, what was once cultural 
and contextual barriers can be overcome to aid a community in the transition to a 
smaller carbon footprint. 
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 
Researchers, whose work was reviewed above, emphasized the importance of 
considering both human agency and structural factors in understanding as well as 
addressing environmental concerns and behaviors, but not outcomes. There were at 
least two sets of constraints in these studies. The first was that the recorded self-
reported values and behaviors analyzed were explicitly connected to environmental 
issues. Scholars suggested that data collected from individuals, not primed for 
environmental values, might offer more accurate portrayal of human agency and 
structural forces. Second, few researchers have weighed the relative influences of 
individual actions and structures on carbon footprint outcomes, a critical component in 
creating environmental programs. 
 
In the research presented in this paper, I used a variety of data sources to ascertain 
individual actions as well as community characteristics that could have environmental 
consequences. For example, in the American Community Survey conducted by the US 
Census Bureau (a data source used in this analysis), respondents were not primed to 
report questions about “environmental behavior,” thereby minimizing a potential 
environment related bias. Using data that was not explicitly collected to measure 
environmental impact can improve the accuracy of individual behavior. In this study, I 
also focus specifically on a comparative evaluation of structural and human agency 
15
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factors that directly influence carbon emission outputs of communities, a topic that has 
received limited attention in previous research.  
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
To expand our understanding of community carbon footprints, I used city blocks in San 
Jose, CA as a case study in which to explore the respective influences of human 
agency and systemic inequalities on community level carbon footprints. San Jose was 
an ideal site because of its participation in the USA Sustainable Cities Initiative. The 
initiative supported, “SDG [Sustainable Development Goals] achievement strategies in 
three US cities by building on ongoing municipal sustainable development planning 
efforts” (SDSN 20173) Collaboration with universities was a critical part of the process in 
developing these strategies in cities. A partnership between the City of San Jose, 
Stanford University, and San Jose State generated the data on carbon footprints for 
block groups in San Jose. 
 
There is agreement in the scholarly circles that carbon footprints are both products of 
individual/household choices and/or systemic pressures that limit consumption choices. 
A comparison of the respective roles of systemic inequalities and human agency 
(individual actions and demographic agency) can provide insight into their respective 
influences on high carbon footprints. Results from such an analysis can inform evidence 
based approaches intended to target individual as well as community environmental 
practices. To investigate how carbon footprints were shaped in San Jose, CA area, the 
formal research question was posed as: What are the relative impacts of individual 
agency and systemic inequalities on carbon footprints in San Jose blocks, 
disaggregated by the communities’ socioeconomic wealth? Carbon footprints 
represented the dependent concept while individual agency and systemic inequalities 
were independent concepts. The analysis was additionally disaggregated by the 
socioeconomic status of communities. Though it is well known that socioeconomic 
standing influences carbon footprint, evaluating the human agency-structures dynamics 
separately in low income, middle class and upper class4 statuses helps to highlight the 
effects of wealth concentration or lack thereof.  
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The analysis of carbon footprints can be theorized through both structural and 
individualistic perspectives. Both systemic inequalities and individual agency (actions 
and demographies) influence choices communities are able to make, constraining or 
empowering choices that create either sustainable or unsustainable behaviors. Giddens 
suggested that both structure and agency are equally important in influencing the action 
                                                        
3 http://unsdsn.org/news/2017/05/02/building-an-sdg-data-dashboard-for-san-jose-california/  
4 Throughout this paper, the terms upper class, middle class, and lower class will be used 
interchangeably with terms low SES, middle SES and high SES. The blocks were evenly disaggregated 
into thirds representing lower class, middle class and upper class. 
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of an individual in his theory of Structuration (Oppong 2014). No doubt, an individual’s 
choices are constrained through structural forces. For example, Power’s concept of 
market adjustment (Powers 2006) is useful in explaining how unequal access to 
resources compel those in poverty to affordable choices, and primes the elite to 
increase consumption. However, individuals are still able to have agency for their own 
consumption, albeit within the constraints imposed by the greater structural forces. 
When they exercise their agency, they are often guided by their core beliefs and values. 
Mead’s (1934) Core-Self and Stern and his colleague’s Value-Added Theory (1999), 
framed within a symbolic interactionist paradigm, captured well this notion of self-
agency in individual behavior. 
 
Structural Inequalities 
 
Powers had posited that even though mainstream economic thinking assumes that the 
free market will create “efficient utilization” of resources to meet the needs of the 
individual, this is not entirely true. Capitalism is traditionally seen as a tool to combat 
inequality, as “the invisible hand” is expected to serve the common good. However, 
forces, such as protectionist policies and the lack of discretionary income for the poor, 
prevents the capitalist market from creating “socially rational” (Powers 2006) outcomes. 
In fact, as the level of inequality in a society increases, the market typically adjusts in 
favor of the few, taking resources away from many (poor) and instead providing luxuries 
for a few. In other words, relative poverty pushes people to the most affordable options, 
while wealthier people are able to make extravagant choices, engaging in excessive 
consumption, and resulting carbon footprints since it is within their means.  
 
Moreover, societies are stratified by more than just class inequalities. Racial and class 
inequalities are often intertwined, even though both operate independently to promote 
and limit the life options people have and choices they can make. On the one hand, 
racial inequality operates like the caste system, a “ritualized, body of customs, 
endogamous and hereditary, which circumscribed contacts and mobility by race” 
(Conyers, 2002:252). But scholars have also seen racial inequality as capitalistic 
relations, creating a split labor market where, for example, black and white workers 
work against each other, lowering the cost of goods. In this colonial model of class-
racial inequality, black or minority groups are the oppressed nation(s), represented by 
the “black ghetto” (p.253), controlled by a white ruling class that continues the 
oppression by using the colony as a form of cheap labor. “Political oppression, self-
determination, and liberation” (p. 253) are key elements of a class based racialized 
society. These histories of oppression have been theorized to manifest in the ways that 
minority groups choose to consume, in ways that distinguish themselves from the 
dominant groups. If consuming and living a high carbon lifestyle is symbolic of dominant 
power, then minority groups, because of their potential awareness of their history of 
oppression, may choose to avoid dominant choices. Their history of oppression may 
also make minority groups more aware and empathetic of environmental justice issues 
because they are disproportionately affected by environmental degradation.  
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Drawing from the structural class and racial inequality perspectives, it was expected that 
systemic inequalities in San Jose blocks will have stronger net impacts in creating larger 
carbon footprints than individual actions or demographic agency (Hypothesis #1). And in 
a class based racialized society, class inequalities were predicted to have a stronger 
impact, than race inequalities, in increasing emissions (Hypothesis #1A). 
 
Human Agency, Core Self Concept, and Value-Belief-Norm Theory 
 
However, as Giddens postulated, even within the constraints posed by societal 
systems, individuals are still able to exercise their own agency. In his concept of core-
self, Mead (1934) and other sociologists in the Iowa school of self-concept, also saw 
individual actions as an outcome of their core belief and values. These beliefs are 
deeply engrained within the individual and are continually inserted into their interactions 
with others. In the Iowa school model, one’s core-concept, or idea of self, shapes 
interaction in a stable and predictable direction. Stern elaborated on Mead’s theory as 
he applied the values, beliefs and norms inherent in self-concept to environmentalism. 
Value-Belief-Norm Theory (VBN) (Stern et al. 1999) framed individuals as consciously 
having the ability to regulate their impact on the world. In the VBN framework, pro-
environmental behaviors are created by the, “acceptance of particular personal 
values…and from beliefs that actions initiated by the individual can help alleviate the 
threat and restore the values” (Wynveen et al. 2015: 86). Like Core Self-Concept 
theorists, VBN proponents claimed that individual values are stable and applied 
throughout an individual’s life, shaping their, “environmental worldview” (EWV) (p. 86). 
On balance, individuals, informed by a core sense of self, values and norms, are able to 
have and exercise agency to control and mitigate their environmental footprints. 
Following these understandings, it was predicted that agency, both individual actions 
and demography, will have a stronger net impact in reducing high carbon footprints than 
systemic inequality (Hypothesis #2). 
 
Boundary Limiting Conditions 
 
In order to specify further the contexts in which human agency and structural 
inequalities might operate in impacting carbon footprints, boundary limits (Powers 2012: 
76) of their impacts were also considered. Since socioeconomic status has been known 
to have significant influence on consumption, thereby increasing carbon footprints, the 
wealth status of communities was considered. In addition to focusing on the entire San 
Jose area, the effects of agency and structure were re-tested separately, in low 
socioeconomic status (SES), medium socioeconomic status, and high socioeconomic 
status communities, to assess whether concentration of wealth in blocks pointed to a 
major boundary limit. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
A mixed methods approach was used to test the comparative relevance of individual 
agency and systemic forces to climate footprints in San Jose. Quantitative secondary 
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data on carbon footprints per census block were drawn from the SDG San Jose 
Dashboard (Ouyang 2016). Additional quantitative secondary data from the 2009-2013 
American Community Survey (ACS) were relied on to measure community-level forces 
that might influence carbon emissions (Department of Commerce 2013). Qualitative 
primary interviews with experts in the field of sustainability and climate change 
mitigation conducted provided examples, context and possible solutions, grounding the 
statistical results. 
 
Secondary Data Source  
 
The San Jose Dashboard (SDG) served as the primary source of estimates of carbon 
emissions for 524 census block groups in San Jose. The emissions were categorized by 
energy, goods, food and transportation. In the SDG Dashboard, data on expenditures 
and resources consumed were gathered from available geospatial and census datasets. 
These pieces of information were totaled to represent carbon emissions per block. 
 
To supplement the carbon emission data, other relevant block level community 
information was gathered by the author from the 2009-2013 ACS. ACS data are 
collected on a yearly basis, principally by the United States Department of Commerce 
and the Census Bureau from a 1% sample of the U.S population. For this paper, 
information on socio-demographic and sustainable choice behaviors came from the 
2009-13 ACS. The SDG and ACS datasets were merged to investigate the research 
question and corresponding hypothesis.5 
 
Primary Qualitative Interviews 
 
The statistical analysis of the combined ACS and SDG San Jose Dashboard was 
elaborated on with qualitative interviews with eight professionals knowledgeable about 
climate mitigation and environmental community action. These eight interviewees, who 
were found through LinkedIn search engine and snowball sampling methods, were 
interviewed over the phone for approximately 25-45 minutes each. They were asked 
questions about on ways to overcome the challenge of engaging community members 
in environmental action. The interviewee consent form and protocol are available in 
Appendix A. 
 
Interviewee #1 is a Program Director of a local environmental non-profit organization 
that focuses specifically on energy and climate, leading programs on green energy in 
the home, electric vehicles, and recognizing businesses that go above and beyond to 
implement sustainability. Additional insights were added from the Co-founder 
(Interviewee #2, Co-founder) of an initiative at a Global Business Consulting Firm and 
Incubator, supporting cities and local governments to adopt the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals and accelerate actions to help meet the Paris Climate Agreement. 
                                                        
5 The original collector of the data, San Jose SDG Dashboard, and U.S. Census Bureau or the relevant 
funding agencies bear no responsibility for use of the data or for the interpretations or inferences based 
on such uses. 
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In this position, the Co-founder worked with both the city of San Jose and Stanford 
University to help grow community engagement in the city’s climate action plan (titled 
“Climate Smart San Jose”). They also helped to created playbooks for residents and 
building owners, assisting the city in community engagement strategic planning, and 
helping to mobilize resources for these initiatives. The third Interviewee is the Executive 
Director of a Community Climate Neutrality Initiative (Interviewee #3, Executive 
Director), a nonprofit that aims to help its city reach carbon neutrality in 10 years. The 
Climate Director at the City of San Jose, a fourth interviewee (Interviewee #4, Climate 
Director for San Jose), provided a municipal perspective. This interviewee discussed 
their work in implementing the Climate Smart San Jose Plan, providing strategic 
guidance, and obtaining funding from partners in order to create initiatives for residents.  
 
Other professional interviewees included environmental leaders in the community. A 
longtime volunteer and leader for a grassroots initiative (Leadership Team for 
Grassroots Initiative) was the fifth interviewee. This interviewee created this 
organization over ten years ago, aiming to inspire action to increase community 
sustainability. The Leadership Team member now leads advocacy campaigns and 
initiatives to engage residents. An ex-Executive Director of an environmental non-profit 
(Interviewee #6), who now serves as a consultant to the organization (Special Project 
Consultant), was also able to provide insights, specifically on the topic of energy 
conservation. This interviewee helps to engage residents in behavior change, and has 
decades of experiences in energy conservation, and engagement of businesses and 
community members. The seventh professional interviewee (Interviewee #7) is an 
engineer, architect, and professor, who works on creating sustainable buildings and 
sites (Urban Systems Analyst and Scholar). He has helped to start an urban systems 
graduate program, leading community-based partnerships with cities to meet 
environmental challenges, and specifically connect them to the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals. Finally, the current committee chair (Interviewee #8) for a large 
environmental conservation non-profit focusing on land use (Land-use Expert) shared 
his long experiences working in biking and pedestrian non-profits and advocacy groups.  
 
 
DATA ANALYSES: SURVEY and QUALITATIVE INSIGHTS 
 
To analyze the quantitative data and answer the posed research question, three levels 
of data analysis were used, first for the entire city of San Jose, and then for three 
groups of blocks separated by their aggregate SES. Descriptive analysis provided a 
baseline environmental story of San Jose’s blocks. Initial relationships between 
systemic inequality, individual agency and high carbon footprints were then explored 
using bivariate correlational analysis. These relationships were then retested in the 
multivariate analysis to estimate the net influences of systemic inequalities versus 
individual agency on high carbon footprints and to specify the socioeconomic conditions 
in which these environmental dynamics operate. 
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Operationalization and Descriptive Analyses  
 
Individual agency and systemic inequalities each are expected to uniquely influence 
levels of carbon footprints. Individual agency was defined as the choices that individuals 
and households make, consciously or unconsciously, to lower the emissions they 
produce. Demography is an additional force in human decisions, and is treated as a part 
of individual agency. However, systemic inequalities within which humans are confined, 
also determine the choices they make, and consequently the emissions they produce. 
 
Several patterns were noted in the descriptive analysis of San Jose’s blocks. Overall, 
there were fairly high levels of emissions produced in blocks (Table 1.A). There were 
also moderate levels of systemic inequality in blocks, in terms of socioeconomic 
resources and dominant race composition (Table 1.B). Besides, households in San 
Jose blocks registered low levels of sustainable choices (low proportion of solar use and 
sustainable commute modes to work) and moderate levels of unsustainable choices 
(lengthy times driven alone to work Table 1.C). Finally, while there was an equal 
distribution of males and females in the blocks; they also had a more youthful than older 
population (Table 1.D).  
 
As noted earlier, the city blocks were evenly disaggregated into thirds representing 
lower class, middle class and upper class. It is noteworthy that systemic wealth and 
dominant race concentration were the most pronounced in the wealthiest communities. 
Differences in human agency, be it individual or demographic, by SES standing of 
blocks were mixed, in expected and paradoxical ways.  
 
High Carbon Footprint 
 
To represent total carbon emissions, or carbon footprint, Scope Two and Three 
emissions were used. Scope Two includes emissions purchased and controlled by an 
outside organization, namely electricity emissions. Scope Three emissions are other 
indirect emissions which includes food emissions, transportation emissions and the 
emissions created by the consumption of goods (US EPA 2017). Scope Two and Three 
emissions were presented in Table 1.A. Together, Scope Two and Scope Three 
emissions, represent the total amount of CO2 emissions produced for each block. The 
average SJ city block had a moderate carbon footprint of 8,226.75 pounds of CO2 on 
average (with a range from a minimum of 1406.50 pounds of CO2 to a high of 15,425 
pounds of CO2) (See Table 1.A). 
 
More specifically, there was a moderate amount of electricity emissions produced 
annually in San Jose, an average of 6,031.04 pounds of CO2 (emissions ranging from 
1,134-11,634 pounds of CO2 annually). Transportation emissions were also fairly 
moderate, with an average of 14,625.64 pounds of CO2 annually out of all sectors, 
(ranging from 2,406 pounds of CO2 to 28,622 pounds of CO2). It is interesting to note 
that the Transportation emission sector produced the most emissions out of all sources. 
The Land-use Expert (Interviewee #8) corroborated this fact, describing the large 
contribution that car congestion makes to carbon emissions. This is particularly bad in 
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San Jose due to the large urban sprawl in and outside the city. The Urban Systems 
Analyst and Scholar (Interviewee #7) additionally emphasized this point, describing the 
extended commutes that most Silicon Valley professionals have to engage in getting to 
work, driving from homes in the suburbs to company city headquarters. There were also 
moderate amounts of goods emissions, with an average of 5,249.26 pounds of CO2 
produced annually (these emissions ranged from 834-11,664 pounds of CO2) but, were 
the lowest of all sources. Food emissions were also reasonably moderate, an average 
of 7,001.09 pounds of CO2 produced annually (with a range of 1,252 pounds of CO2 to 
12,892 pounds of CO2).] 
 
TABLE 1.A. High Carbon Footprint 
SDG Dashboard for San Jose, 2016 (n=523) 
Concept Dimensions Indicators  Values Statistics 
    Total Low SES Medium 
SES 
High SES 
High 
Carbon 
Footprint 
 
Scope 2 Electricity 
Emissions 
(lbs of 
CO2) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min-
Max 
 
6031.04 
(1552.11 
1134-
11634 
4621.39 
(993.07) 
1134-
8135 
 
6222.79 
(1190.64) 
3689-9752 
7253.89*** 
(1152.19) 
4573-
11634 
 Scope 3 Transport
ation 
Emissions 
(lbs of 
CO2) 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min-
Max 
 
14625.64 
(3870.84) 
2406-
28622 
10564.6 
(2103.45) 
2406-
18080 
 
14931.02 
(2001.61) 
8585-20603 
 
18391.44*** 
(2419.98) 
14343-
28622 
  Goods 
Emissions 
(lbs of 
CO2) 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min-
Max 
 
 5249.26  
(1504.016) 
834-11664 
 
3690.50 
(802.529) 
834-5927 
 
5333.19 
(688.61) 
2760-7058 
6727.13*** 
(1031.28) 
5038-
11664 
  Food 
Emissions 
(lbs of 
CO2) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min-
Max 
 
7001.09  
(1635.89) 
1252-
12892      
 
5448.22 
(1043.99) 
1252-
9349 
7210.38 
(1175.426) 
4564-10464 
 
8348.85*** 
(1145.49) 
5611-
12892 
 Index of 
High Carbon 
Footprints1 
 Mean 
(SD) 
Min-
Max 
 
8226.75  
(2080.38) 
1406.50-
15425.75 
8226.75 
(2080.38) 
1406.50-
15425.75 
8424.35 
(1193.61) 
5022.50-
11902.50 
10180.33*** 
(1311.42) 
7558.50-
15425.75 
1 Index of High Carbon Footprints = Electricity Emissions + Transportation Emissions + Goods Emissions + Food  
  Emissions. Possible range: 1406.50-15425.75. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .797** to .993** at 
  the .000 significance level. 
 
Many South Bay climate professionals, including the Leadership Team for Grassroots 
Initiative, Urban Systems Analyst/Scholar, and the Land-use Expert verified the large 
carbon footprint of San Jose. The often-repeated reason for these high emission levels 
was the large levels of wealth present in the city, which drives a society of consumption; 
wealth permits citizens to own large homes in the suburbs far away from amenities to 
which they have to drive to access (Interviewee #5, #7, #8). 
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A disaggregation of each carbon emission indicator by lower class, middle class, and 
upper class communities revealed a linear relationship between carbon footprints and 
their socioeconomic standing. The wealthiest blocks were responsible for the highest 
amount of carbon emissions for both Scope 2 and Scope 3 dimensions. The poorest 
blocks had the lowest and the middle group fell in between. 
 
Systemic Inequalities 
 
Systemic inequalities were hypothesized to influence block group’s carbon behavior. 
This concept was represented on a community/block by the per capita income, high 
educational attainment, and percentage of white households to non-white households 
(dominant racial concentration). Overall, San Jose city blocks had fairly low levels of 
socioeconomic status (𝑥=1,456,282.68) compared to the overall range (0-8,265,753.47) 
on the Socioeconomic Status Index (See Table 1.B). The dominant racial composition 
was also moderate, suggesting that blocks are reasonably racially diversified 
(𝑥=48.49%, range of 0%-97.87%). 
 
TABLE 1.B. Systemic Inequality 
American Community Survey, 2009-2013 
Concept Dimensions Indicators  Values Statistics 
    Total Low SES Medium 
SES 
High SES 
Systemic 
Inequality  
Socio- 
Economic 
Status 
Per Capita 
Income-
Past Twelve 
Months 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min-
Max 
 
$34178.2 
(16469.7) 
6253-
131809 
 
18647.9 
(5348.9) 
6253-
55673 
32121.87 
(6022.8) 
13167-
49860 
 
51796*** 
13958 
32227-
131809 
 
  
 
 
 
Percent 
High 
Education 
Attainment 
per capita1 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min-
Max 
 
35.29% 
(19.02) 
0- 
90.2 
 
170.96 
(114.75) 
655-
394.16 
394.115 
(186.68) 
74- 
1090 
 
678.6*** 
(422.63) 
192- 
3489 
 
  Index of 
Socio-
economic 
Status1 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min-
Max 
1,456,283 
(1315238) 
0-
8,265,753 
140653.7 
(780783) 
0- 
293385 
561457 
(156760) 
297021.9
-847487 
1483919*** 
(569644) 
848059.4-
4132876.7 
 Dominant 
Racial 
Compositi
-on3 
 
Percent of 
White 
Households 
to Non-White 
Households 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min-
Max 
 
48.49% 
(20.52) 
0- 
97.87 
 
39.72 
(14.889) 
0- 
80.63 
 
48.7188 
(20.664) 
6.57-
86.68 
 
57.2055*** 
(21.549) 
4.23- 
97.87 
1 High Educational Attainment was categorized as percent Bachelor Degrees, Masters Degrees, Professional 
  Degrees, and Doctoral degrees. 
2 Index of Socioeconomic Status = Percentage High Education * Estimate per capita income in the past  
  twelve months in 2013 infla. Possible range: 0 - 8,265,753.47 Correlations among these  
  indicators were .799** at a .00 significance level. 
3 Dominant Racial Composition is the ratio of white households to non-white households = number of white  
   households per block divided by non-white households. 
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The low socioeconomic status in San Jose’s blocks was mainly due to the fairly low 
average income of $34,178.20 (ranging from $6,253 to $131,809) per block (Table 
1.B.). However, though the average income was low, residents in the average San Jose 
block had a moderate level of educational attainment; percentage above a college 
degree was 35.29% ranging from 0-90.17%. Together, these two variables represented 
the moderate Socioeconomic Standing of blocks and are a significant part of systemic 
inequalities that might influence household decisions. Yet, the wide gap between very 
high and very low economic well-being in San Jose were underscored by some of the 
professional interviewees. The Urban Systems Analyst and Scholar elaborated on the 
class tension stating that the incredible poverty in San Jose is often “masked by how 
wealthy other people are” (Interviewee #7), and depending on the measure of well-
being, this inequality can be easily ignored. Predictably, socioeconomic status, in 
education and income, was concentrated in the wealthy (𝑥 = 51796; range of 32227-
131809) and less so in the poor communities (𝑥 = 18647.9; range of 6253-55673).  All 
the professional interviewees concurred, naming wealth driven consumption as the 
major reason for large carbon footprints. 
 
The predominance of whites over other non-white groups is an additional systemic 
inequality; while the individual resident typically does not have much control over, it 
systemically influences people’s consumption and carbon footprints. The dominant 
racial composition linearly varied by the wealth of blocks. That is, the wealthier blocks 
had higher concentration of whites/non-whites (𝑥 = 57.2%; range = 4.23% - 97.87%) 
than the poorer blocks (𝑥 = 39.72; range = 0 - 80.63).   
 
Individual Actions as Agency 
 
It is theoretically axiomatic that even when subjected to systemic inequalities, 
individuals and households have agency to make choices that can lower their carbon 
footprint. This is can be seen through actions taken by individuals or households and 
their demographics. The three measures chosen to represent the extent of sustainable, 
or unsustainable, choices made by households were: the proportion of households in a 
block that used solar energy (of all energy sources available), the percent of sustainable 
modes of transportation to work, and the amount of time to work by those who drive 
cars in single occupancy. Environmentally relevant demographies considered in this 
analysis were the age and gender composition of blocks.  
 
Sustainable Household Choices. The proportion of households that heated their homes 
with solar energy in the average San Jose block was low (𝑥 = 0.17 with a range from 0-
.93); that is, households were less likely to choose solar energy or had the ability to 
make the solar choice of all the energy choices they had (Table 1.C.). The percent of 
sustainable transportation to work, another sustainable choice, was also low in San 
Jose. The percentage of households that used sustainable modes of transit for their 
commute was fairly low (𝑥 = 34.01, with a range from 0-147.62). Most used high carbon 
emission methods such as driving a car alone. These findings were also reinforced in 
the professional interviews. In the words of the Executive Director of a Community 
Climate Neutrality Initiative (Interviewee #3), for most regular people, making 
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environmental choices, even when it is to save money, is a “research project.” Even if 
people “lean green”, said this environmental leader, there is frequently a lack of time 
and awareness to make sustainable choices.  
 
A third, and more pointed, indicator used to measure the prevalence of unsustainable 
choices in transportation to work was single occupancy drivers (as a proportion of all 
drivers) driving for longer periods. The opposite of carpooling for shorter times which 
were designated as sustainable choices. The average San Jose Block had households 
with more sustainable commutes than not; the mean time driven to work alone was 
600.22 on a range of 0-2285.88. And even though taking sustainable modes of 
transportation to work was not widespread, block residents who had high levels of 
sustainable commutes to work were less likely to drive to work alone for a significant 
amount of time (r=-.175***). 
 
TABLE 1.C. Individual Actions: Sustainable Choices 
American Community Survey, 2009-2013 (n=518-523) 
Concept Dimensions Indicators  Values Statistics 
    Total Low SES Medium SES High SES 
Individual 
Actions  
Sustainable 
Choices 
 
Proportion 
of Solar 
Energy 
Use1 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min-
Max 
 
.0006 
(.0044) 
0-.06 
 
.0004 
(.003) 
0-.03 
.0002 
(.002) 
0-.01 
 
 
.0012 
(.00693) 
0-.06 
 
  Percent 
Sustainabl
e Transport 
to Work2 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min-
Max 
34.01 
(15.81) 
0-147.62 
 
39.517 
(18.409) 
5.3-147.6 
 
32.6466 
(13.7) 
0-76.8 
30.244*** 
(13.714) 
0-78.32 
 Unsustainable 
Choices 
Time 
Driven 
Alone3 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min-
Max 
600.21 
(308.6) 
0-2286 
 
575.886 
(286.8) 
0-1570.9 
 
601.086 
(285.7) 
108-1968.7 
623.975 
(350.106) 
154-2286 
1 Proportion of Solar Use = Solar Energy/Total Energy. 
2 Percent Sustainable Transportation to Work= ((Estimate Carpooled in a car truck or van + Estimate 2 person  
  carpool in a car truck or van + Estimate 3 person carpool in a car truck or van + Estimate 4 person carpool in a car  
  truck or van Estimate 5-6 person carpool in a car truck or van + Estimate 7 person carpool in a car truck or van +  
  Estimate public transportation excluding taxicab + Estimate bicycle + Estimate walked + Estimate other means +  
  Estimate worked at home)/Total Transportation). 
3 Time Driven Alone = Single Occupancy and Distance of Drive to Work measured as (Estimate drove alone in a car 
   truck or van / Estimate Total Transportation) * Estimate Total Travel Time. 
 
 
There was a mixed picture that emerged when differences in sustainable choices by 
community wealth were examined. Wealthier communities were more likely to use solar 
(𝑥 = .0012 versus 𝑥 = .0004 in the poorest blocks) but less likely to use sustainable 
transportation to work (wealthy 𝑥 = 30.244 versus 𝑥 = 39.517 in the poorest blocks) and 
drive long distances to work alone (wealthy 𝑥 = 623.975 versus poor blocks 𝑥 = 
575.886), though the community difference were not always statistically significant. The 
Executive Director of a Community Climate Neutrality Initiative and the Climate Director 
for San Jose illustrated this paradox; “there are progressive green people with lots of 
money who can afford to buy Tesla and solar, they can help drive the [environmental] 
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movement” (Interviewee #3). Low income households, on the other hand, often live in 
energy inefficient houses with high energy and utility bills (Interviewee #3) as they don’t 
have the resources to make the needed change (Interviewee #4) to sustainable 
choices. Limited resources also prevent members of low-income households from 
driving, and make them more likely to use public transportation to work, a sustainable 
transportation choice. 
 
Demography as Agency.  In addition to sustainable choices that people can adopt, 
demography can also be a source of agency in reducing or increasing carbon footprints. 
Specifically, women (Hal and Allen 2014) and consumers aged 35-50 (Patel et al. 2017) 
have been known to make more environmentally friendly decisions than men. In San 
Jose, the blocks had primarily young residents, below the age of 35 (47.81% young, 36% 
middle age and 16.08 senior). Besides, blocks with older residents had more 
socioeconomic resources than the more youthful blocks. However, there were no 
noticeable differences in block wealth status by gender composition of blocks, which was 
roughly equal.  
TABLE 1.D. Demographic Profile of San Jose Blocks 
American Community Survey, 2009-2013 (n=518-523) 
Concept Dimensions Indicators  Values Statistics 
    Total Low SES Medium SES High SES 
Age 
  
 
Young 
Blocks 
Percent 
aged 0-
341 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min-Max 
. 47.81 
(10.48) 
17.56-93.3 
53.794 
(9.319) 
28.4-93.3 
47.5984 
(9.47) 
17.8-74.7 
42.05*** 
(9.3) 
17.6-72.8 
 
 
 
Mid-age 
blocks 
 
 
Senior 
Blocks 
Percent 
Ages 35-
592 
 
Percent 
Aged 60+3 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min-Max 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min-Max 
36.1 
(6.92) 
5.6-55.9 
 
16.08 
(7.37) 
0-51.9 
33.0479 
(6.956) 
5.6-55.3 
 
3.1582 
(6.107) 
0-39.2 
35.5717 
(6.307) 
14-49.47 
 
16.8299 
(7.533) 
2.9-51.9 
39.7*** 
(5.863) 
20.66-5.09 
 
18.3*** 
(7.5) 
1.7-44.7 
Female 
Gender 
Compos
-ition 
 Percent 
Female 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min-Max 
 
49.8% 
(5.08) 
25-65 
49.48% 
(5.1) 
25-61 
49.87% 
(5.4) 
26-64 
50.17% 
(4.8) 
36-65 
1 Percent aged 0-34 (Young Blocks) = ((Estimate Male Under 5 years + Estimate Male 5 to 9 years + Estimate Male   
  10 to 14 years + Estimate Male 15 to 17 years + Estimate Male 18 and 19 years + Estimate Male 20 years + 
  Estimate Male 21 years + Estimate Male 22 to 24 years + Estimate Male 25 to 29 years + Estimate Male 30 to 34  
  years + Estimate Female Under 5 years + Estimate Female 5 to 9 years + Estimate Female 10 to 14 years +  
  Estimate Female 15 to 17 years + Estimate Female 18 and 19 years + Estimate Female 20 years + Estimate  
  Female 21 years + Estimate Female 22 to 24 years + Estimate Female 25 to 29 years + Estimate Female 30 to 34  
  years) / Total Population). 
2 Percent Ages 35-59 = ((Estimate Male 35 to 39 years + Estimate Male 40 to 44 years + Estimate Male 45 to 49 
   years + Estimate Male 50 to 54 years + Estimate Male 55 to 59 years + Estimate Female 35 to 39 years + Estimate 
   Female 40 to 44 years + Estimate Female 45 to 49 years + Estimate Female 50 to 54 years + Estimate Female 55 
   to 59 years) / Total Population). 
3 Percentage Senior = ((Estimate Male 60 and 61 years + Estimate Male 62 to 64 years + Estimate Male 65 and 66 
  years + Estimate Male 67 to 69 years + Estimate Male 70 to 74 years + Estimate Male 75 to 79 years + Estimate 
  Male 80 to 84 years + Estimate Male 85 years and over + Estimate Female 60 and 61 years + Estimate Female 62 
  to 64 years + Estimate Female 65 and 66 years + Estimate Female 67 to 69 years + Estimate Female 70 to 74 
  years + Estimate Female 75 to 79 years + Estimate Female 80 to 84 years + Estimate Female 85 years and over) /  
  Total Population). 
4 Female Gender Composition = Estimate Female / Total Population. 
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Bivariate Analysis 
 
In order to test the preliminary empirical relationships between Systemic Inequalities, 
Individual Agency and High Carbon Footprints, bivariate analyses were conducted. As 
noted below, not only were there multiple connections that structural and human agency 
had with carbon footprints, but these connections varied across the communities divided 
by wealth (Table 2 in Appendix B).  
 
Overall, the wealthier (r=.790***) and more white dominated (r=.417***) a block in San 
Jose was, the more carbon emissions they produced. Driving alone on a longer 
commute also contributed to the high emission levels (r=.106***), even if to a lesser 
extent than structural sources. On the other hand, the more sustainable commute 
choices to work made (r=-.238***), the fewer emissions blocks produced. Finally, the 
more mid age (r=.379***), senior (r=.313***), or female (r=.088*) a block was, the higher 
the carbon footprint. That is, in blocks that had more mid age individuals, seniors, and 
women there were more unsustainable choices made. 
 
Other relationships among the structural and individual agency indicators worth noting 
were as follows. The higher socioeconomic status of a block, the more likely they were 
to be white (r=.345***) and to use solar (r=.109**), but less likely to use sustainable forms 
of transportation (r=-.213***). Blocks that were predominately white were less likely to 
use unsustainable forms of transportation (r=-.112**) but less likely to drive long 
distances to work alone (r=-.178***). Understandably, those who drove longer periods of 
time alone to work were less likely to commute using sustainable methods (r= -.175***). 
And mid age (r=-.234***) and senior aged block groups (r=-.186***) were also least likely 
to use sustainable modes of transportation to work. 
 
More poignant were the differences in racial composition and demographies by wealth 
standing of blocks.  The more wealth was concentrated in blocks, the more carbon was 
emitted. For example, the SES-carbon footprints connection was the strongest in high 
SES blocks (r=.544***), followed by mid-SES (r=.481***) and low SES (r=457***) blocks. 
Additionally, there were parallels, even if not linear, in the wealth and dominant race 
composition in blocks. The medium SES blocks had the highest white concentration 
(=.457***) followed by the high SES blocks (r=.199**). But, race and SES were not 
connected in the poorest blocks. Interestingly, demography had the potential for agency 
in carbon footprints only in the medium and low SES communities. The more senior 
aged residents there were in medium SES blocks (r=.198**) and low SES blocks 
(r=.235**), the larger the block’s carbon footprint. Additionally, concentration of mid-aged 
individuals in low SES blocks (r=.244***), the higher the carbon emissions.  
 
In sum, these bivariate findings indicated that systemic inequalities might have a greater 
impact on high carbon footprints than individual agency. And that the wealthier the 
communities, the bigger the carbon impacts of structural inequalities. On the other 
hand, demographic agency might be more relevant to carbon emissions in the poorer 
communities. The robustness of these potential relationships with carbon footprints 
were tested using multivariate analysis and are presented in the next section. 
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Multivariate Analyses 
  
To isolate the unique effects of structural inequalities and individual agency on carbon 
footprints, two sets of one-step multivariate analyses were conducted. In the first set, 
the net comparative effects of systemic inequalities and individual agency on carbon 
footprints were assessed for the entire sample. In the second set, the net effects on 
carbon footprints were disaggregated by the SES concentrations in blocks to pinpoint 
the boundary limits of the wealth concentration and carbon footprint relationship,  
 
As seen in Table 3, systemic inequalities were the strongest predictors of high carbon 
footprints. For example, the wealthier and educated residents of a block were, the larger 
was their carbon footprint (β=.651*** in Total Sample).  Similarly, even if to a lesser 
extent, concentrations of whites in blocks were associated with larger carbon footprints 
(β=.180***), apart from the wealth of their residents.  
 
As for individual agency factors, whether measured in actions or demography, their net 
effects in enlarging, or shrinking, as the case may be, carbon footprints were smaller 
than the structural impediments and inconsistent at best. Longer commute times to 
work, and that too, in single occupancy vehicles, had the net effect of enlarging carbon 
footprints (β=.145***) but home solar use or commutes using sustainable modes of 
transportation did not register an impact. And, of the demographic agencies, age 
composition of blocks was the only factor that was relevant. For example, mid-aged 
blocks (β=.096***) and senior-aged blocks (β=.114***) had net higher carbon footprints 
than youthful blocks. In other words, blocks with younger residents, on balance, made 
more environmentally friendly choices than older resident blocks. 
 
It is widely known, in both the practice and scholarly communities, that socioeconomic 
standing is the prime driver of large carbon footprints. A fine grained boundary analyses 
of the wealth limits of structural inequalities and individual agency on carbon footprints, 
separately in the lower class, middle class, and upper class blocks, revealed several 
interesting patterns. While socioeconomic status remained a strong predictor of high 
carbon footprints, irrespective of the socioeconomic foundation of blocks, the impacts of 
money and education in raising carbon footprints was most concentrated in the upper 
class blocks (Beta =.550***) and fairly equal between middle class (Beta =.324***) and 
lower class (Beta = .366***). Interestingly, dominant racial concentration was the most 
influential predictor of bigger carbon footprints (surpassing wealth concentration) in 
middle class blocks (Beta= .477***) but was not the case in the poorest blocks. Upper 
class blocks, in addition to their wealth, added to their carbon footprints with their 
dominant race concentration (Beta .228***).  
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TABLE 3. Regression Analysis of the Relative Impacts of Systemic Inequality and Individual 
Agency on High Carbon Footprints; Beta (β) Coefficients1 
SDG Dashboard for San Jose and American Community Survey 2009 - 2013 
 Beta Coefficients 
 Total sample Low SES Medium SES High SES 
Systemic Inequality: 
Socioeconomic Status 
 
.651*** 
 
      .366*** 
 
 .324*** 
 
  .550*** 
White to Non-White  
   Concentration 
.180***   -.025 .477*** .228*** 
Individual Actions as  
Agency: 
Proportion of Solar  
    Use 
Percent Sustainable 
    Transit to Work 
 
 
-.032 
 
-.006  
 
 
-.026 
 
.094 
 
 
 
.033 
 
.106 
 
 
-.003 
 
-.025 
Time Driven Alone 
 
Demography as 
Agency:  
    .144***  .139 
 
   .194** 
 
.129 
 
Mid aged blocks   .095*** .179* .089 -.124 
Senior aged blocks   .113*** .162*    .205*** -.098 
Female blocks .034 .100 .074 .019 
Model Statistics: 
Constant  
 
 3076.627*** 
 
2224.190* 
 
2941.338*** 
 
87222.690*** 
Adjusted R2    0.673*** .239** .447*** .342*** 
DF 1 & 2  8 & 514 8 & 164 8 & 165 8 & 165 
***p≤.001; **p≤.01; *p≤.05  
1 Index of High Carbon Footprints = Electricity Emissions + Transportation Emissions + Goods Emissions + 
   Food Emissions. Possible range: 1406.50-15425.75.; 
  Index of Socioeconomic Status = Percentage High Education * Estimate Per capita income in the past twelve  
  months in 2013 infla. Possible range: 0-8,265,753.47; 
  Percent White to Nonwhite = White households per block/non-white households. Possible range: 0 - 97.87; 
  Proportion of Solar Use = Solar Energy/Total Energy. Possible range: 0-.06; 
  Single Occupancy and Distance of Drive to Work= (Estimate Car truck or van Drove alone / Estimate Total  
  Transportation) * Estimate Total Travel Time Possible range: 0-2286; 
  Percent Mid Aged Blocks = Men and women aged 35-59; 
  Percent Senior Aged Blocks = Men and women aged 60 and above; 
  Female Blocks= Proportion of self-identifying females. 
 
 
 
As for human agency, whether individual actions or demography, it was not only less 
relevant (than wealth) in its net contribution to bigger carbon footprints, its potency was 
evident only when wealth was not too concentrated (particularly not in the wealthiest 
blocks). For example, when blocks had medium wealth, solo driving time to work (Beta= 
.194**) and concentration of senior aged residents (Beta = .205***) raised emission rates. 
The poorest blocks also created more emissions when their residents were senior-aged 
(Beta= .162*) or middle-aged (Beta=. 164*).  
 
It was also possible to identify additional conditions of wealth concentration (or lack 
thereof) under which the structure versus human agency dynamics in carbon emissions 
played out (Table 3). For one, when wealth was the most concentrated, in high SES 
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blocks, it was the only predictor of carbon emissions; human agency did not factor in at 
all. On the other hand, when wealth was the least concentrated (as in low SES blocks), 
socioeconomic standing, followed by older age compositions were the main emission 
contributors. However, there was a different combination of structural and human 
agency contributors to high carbon emissions when there was a medium amount of 
wealth concentration in blocks. For example, not only did Mid-SES blocks produce 
more emissions when they had dominant race concentration (even more than wealth) 
but time driven alone to work and presence of seniors in their midst added some to 
their carbon footprints.  
 
The professionals interviewed for this paper offered valuable ground-level insights into 
the wealth-high emissions paradox outlined in the statistical findings reported above. 
Many spoke to contradictions between lifestyles enabled by wealth and environmental 
motivations for reducing emissions. Speaking about how wealthier and predominantly 
white communities might create high carbon footprints, the Program Director of an 
environmental nonprofit (Interviewee #1) noted that in the outreach programs she 
conducted, people who came to engage with and learn about sustainable and cost-
saving behaviors were typically either already low energy users, or seniors with fixed 
incomes, “who were watching their bill” (Program Director). In contrast, engaging and 
maintaining the attention of a majority of other groups, particularly high-income 
individuals, in sustainable behaviors was difficult, as wealthier individuals can afford 
more utilities and higher levels of consumption. Since finances are not pressing for 
wealthier households they do not regularly think about possible savings, and some may 
not be aware of personal consumption levels, particularly with energy. Besides, for 
consumers without cost concerns, a desire to maintain a certain lifestyle often 
outweighs environmental impacts.  
 
The idea that consumption, is the “biggest problem” when it comes to carbon footprints 
was underscored by one of the professional interviewees who is a Leadership Team 
Member for Grassroots Initiative (Interviewee #5). That is, even if people are 
environmentally motivated, life styles made possible by wealth can stand in the way. 
Some of the other environmental professional interviewees offered specific illustrations 
of wealthy life styles creating high carbon emissions while triumphing pro-environmental 
motivations. In the experience of the Urban Systems Analyst and Scholar (Interviewee 
#7), consumption stems from wealth and associated privileges of education and time, 
and with this, comes the ability to do a lot more. One can be more selective with where 
they live, they can afford to buy a car and expand the boundaries of where they go. If 
wealth gives residents the freedom to travel, they “will get on the freeway to drive home 
to the suburbs away from the city, investing in a single-family size home and filling that 
home with lots of stuff”. But, even if high income individuals are “interested in 
environmental issues” and can even afford to make changes, said Interviewee #6, an 
Energy Conservation Special Project Consultant, it is difficult to engage these 
households in sustainable behaviors. As the Leadership Team Member for Grassroots 
Initiative noted, much of the high value placed on environmental issues “is just talk” 
(Interviewee #5). The Co-founder of a Global Business Incubator (GBI, Interviewee #2) 
also underscored the wealth-carbon footprints contradictions while speaking about the 
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difficulties in engaging high-income households in sustainable behaviors.  A unique 
approach that includes incentives, restrictions, and a new emission mentality must be 
used to address these barriers (See the Lessons in Environmental Practice section 
below for more details).  
 
A contrasting scenario about carbon emissions in low-income communities was painted 
by many in the interview community. Low income households, they noted, were 
significantly more motivated to reduce costs. In fact, “households in East Palo Alto [a 
lower income community] spend 20% of their income on utilities, compared to 7% in 
Palo Alto” (Program Director, Interviewee #1), and are much more likely to feel the 
negative effects of environmental degradation. These stressors render lower income 
communities to be more motivated to cut costs and protect the environment, thereby 
reducing their carbon footprints. Low income communities are also more likely to be 
communities of color, they noted, supporting the regression findings about the 
connections between minority race composition and lower emissions.  
 
Yet, even though low-income communities might be more motivated to reduce carbon 
footprints by their limited disposable income and a corresponding desire to save money, 
the interviewees emphasized the difficulties of reaching low income areas in their 
environmental practice. Poor communities do not have resources to implement 
sustainable alternatives (per the Co-founder, Interviewee #2), and are less likely to trust 
programs originating from people outside their community (Program Director, 
Interviewee #1). In the final analyses, even with fewer resources to implement eco-
efficient changes, low income communities have smaller carbon footprints, both opined, 
compared to wealthier communities which either are unaware of, or disconnected from, 
environmental issues. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this concluding section, empirical and theoretical findings were synthesized and 
suggestions for environmental practice were recommended based on the study findings. 
Further, suggestions for future research were proposed to advance the field of climate 
science and action. 
 
Empirical Summary 
 
Analysis of data from the 2009-13 ACS and 2016 SDG San Jose Dashboard and 
narrative commentaries provided critical insights into the unique effects of individual 
agency and systemic inequality on high carbon footprints in San Jose, CA. As 
expected, socioeconomic wealth of blocks, specifically measured by income and 
education, had the greatest impact on their high carbon footprints. The wealth-high 
emission connection was the most pronounced when wealth was concentrated as in 
the high SES blocks. To a lesser extent, concentration of dominant (white contrasted 
with nonwhite) households in blocks were also associated with high emissions, 
particularly when there was medium to high wealth concentration. While human agency 
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was overall less relevant (than class or racial structures) in creating large carbon 
footprints, they were particularly important when wealth was not concentrated. For 
example, driving longer distances to work in single-occupancy cars led to bigger carbon 
footprints only in medium SES blocks. Similarly, older blocks (with more seniors or 
middle-aged residents) produced more carbon emissions in low and medium SES 
blocks. Qualitative commentaries from eight professional interviewees corroborated 
these findings; high income, thereby usually whiter, communities have higher carbon 
footprints. However, they also emphasized the challenges faced by low income 
communities to engage in sustainable practices, even though their carbon footprint was 
typically lower than in wealthier areas. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
Theoretically speaking, wealth concentration was an important moderator of the 
respective roles that structure and human agency played in carbon footprints (Figure 
1). There was empirical support for the structural inequality perspective (Hypothesis #1) 
as seen in the strong connections between socioeconomic wealth and high carbon 
footprints, followed by dominant racial composition, particularly when wealth was 
concentrated. Following systemic inequality predictions, Hypothesis #1A was also 
supported, as class inequalities had a stronger impact than race inequalities in 
enlarging carbon footprints. However, there was not much direct support for Mead’s 
Theory of Core Self-Concept or Stern’s Value-Based Norm Theory (Hypothesis #2), as 
sustainable choices were not significant predictors of carbon footprints. The limited role 
played by individual agency in carbon emissions did not fully support Gidden’s theory of 
structuration as the influence of individual agency, albeit modest, was second to that of 
systemic inequalities.   
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Figure 1. Empirical Model of the Impacts of Systemic Inequality and Individual Agency on High 
Carbon Footprints; Beta (β) Coefficients1 
SDG Dashboard for San Jose (2016) and American Community Survey (2009 - 2013) 
 
1. Refer to Table 3 for index coding. 
 
 
Lessons in Environmental Practice 
  
The privilege-high carbon emissions connections documented in this research 
underscored the need to create targeted solutions to reduce carbon footprints. As such, 
the privilege disparities in emissions, at the structural and agency levels, could be 
valuable to organizations that work to create solutions on both the macro and micro 
 
Systemic Inequality: 
Powers + Conyers 
 
High 
Carbon 
Footprints 
Socioeconomic 
Status 
Dominant 
Racial 
Composition 
Low SES 
Medium SES 
High SES 
Total Sample 
 
Total β=.651*** 
Low SES β=.366*** 
Medium SES β=324*** 
High SES β=.550*** 
Total β= 
Demography:  
 
Mid aged 
Blocks 
Senior aged 
Blocks 
Female Blocks 
Total β=.095*** 
Low SES β=.179* 
 
Total β=.113*** 
Low SES β=.162* 
Medium SES β=.205*** 
 
Individual Agency: Mead + 
Stern 
 
Proportion of 
Solar Use 
Percent 
Sustainable 
Transportation 
Time Driven 
Alone 
Total β=.180*** 
Medium SES β=.477*** 
High SES β= .228*** 
 
Total β=.144*** 
Medium SES β=.194** 
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levels. The programmatic discussion, of challenges and solutions, below relied on the 
valuable experiences of practitioners interviewed for this project. 
 
Macro Level Challenges and Solutions  
 
Similar to the statistical findings, the professional interviewees were almost unanimous 
in their educated opinion that a significant portion of challenges in reducing 
consumption and carbon footprints stem from the macro level. Drawing from their 
experiences on the ground, they discussed macro policy issues and challenges, be they 
setting and enforcing environmental policies or reducing inequalities. 
 
Policy Solutions. Before any sustainable changes can be introduced, said the Urban 
Systems Analyst (Interviewee #7, there must be a “democratic [governance] structure 
where [macro] stakeholders hold themselves accountable to hitting targets, and 
milestones to meet goals”. Beyond the governance structure, politicians must be ready 
to set targets specifically for carbon reduction, something sorely lacking in America’s 
current political system. However, with targets in place, mandatory policy changes and 
pressures will be needed if we are to reduce the collective carbon footprint. Foremost, 
carbon and consumption taxes can be implemented to create pressure on individuals 
and corporations to reduce consumption and mandate reductions (Interviewees #5, #7, 
#8). These taxes can be used to pressure industries to change their production patterns 
and create more sustainable options (Interviewee #4). These prescriptions to reduce 
unsustainable behaviors must be coupled with incentives, said the Co-founder 
(Interviewee #2); incentives could be tax breaks for residents engaging in environmental 
behaviors, such as driving electric vehicles and upgrading to energy efficient appliances 
and machines (Interviewee #2). Broader structural changes are also needed to allow 
sustainable options to be the easiest choice that residents can make. The Executive 
Director of Community Climate Neutrality Initiative (Interviewee #3) underscored the 
need for cities to “step up and change zoning, as well as power procurement.” Both the 
Executive Director and the Urban Systems scholar added that cities must also change 
their building policies, retrofit affordable housing, invest in public transportation and 
electric vehicles, (Interviewee #3), to “solve regional issues” (Interviewee #7).   
 
Macro Level Inequality Challenges and Solutions. Inequality, be it socioeconomic and 
racial, was a running theme in this research on carbon footprints. Low income 
households are trapped without the resources to make environmental changes, nor do 
they have the privilege of time to think about environmental choices. While limited in 
their ability to exercise agency, it is these groups that are impacted most by climate 
change. In juxtaposition, high income households and corporations drive climate 
change through excessive consumption, whether that be of land or natural resources. 
This growing gap between the rich and poor only continues to escalate, as does the 
United States carbon footprint. Several professional interviewees also identified social 
and racial inequality as part of the problem. In fact, the Co-founder and Climate Director 
for San Jose, both who work on Climate Smart San Jose, the climate action plan to 
help the city of San Jose reach carbon neutrality, stated that plans to change cities 
“must address inequality in regard to race and income” (Interviewee #4, Director of 
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Climate Change). However, addressing inequality is not part of the environmental 
solutions currently being considered. The Director stated that the city currently does not 
“dive into income and racial inequality” when working on climate solutions. Climate 
Smart San Jose, “is not designed to explicitly address the issue of equity in San Jose” 
(Climate Smart San Jose 2018 p. 105).  Instead, it is left to be covered in San Jose’s 
General Plan, a plan for overall city development, removed from climate action 
solutions.  
 
To their credit, officials within the environmental department focus more on “meeting 
people where they are at through outreach” (Interviewee #4). This means directing 
individuals with high socioeconomic status towards more eco-efficient options provided 
by technology (Interviewee #4) but not necessarily changing consumption patterns.  
 
Micro Level Challenges and Solutions 
   
On the individual level too, interviewees emphasized the challenges in creating more 
sustainable changes. In many communities there is limited environmental progress, 
whether it is because people are often too busy to make sustainable changes or that 
residents do not always think collectively, nor can they easily see a collective impact on 
environmental progress (Special Project Consultant, Interviewee #6). However, macro 
structures will not change, unless “consumers demand it,” said the Climate Director for 
San Jose (Interviewee #5). To this Director, who works to create a policy link between 
communities and cities, policies for change will not work unless they have support from 
constituents. In other words, stakeholder engagement is key, specifically that of 
community grassroots organizations.  
 
On balance, the leaders of the environmental community interviewed for this paper, be 
they the Program Director (Interviewee #1, Co-founder (Interviewee #2), Climate 
Director for San Jose (Interviewee #4), Leadership Team Member for Grassroots 
Initiative (Interviewee #5, or Urban Systems Analyst and Scholar (Interviewee #7), all 
emphasized the importance of programs that focus on community engagement, 
collective choices and neighborhoods associations. Enhancing social capital through 
friendly competitions, community-based decision-making, and peer-to-peer information 
exchange, they felt, could facilitate pro-environment behavior-change programs such as 
driving electric vehicles, upgrading to energy efficient appliances and machines, 
switching to solar, and overall reducing energy consumption.  
 
However, based on the boundary setting limits of wealth identified in this analysis, 
engaging low income communities will require a significantly different approach than 
engaging high income communities. In order to inform and equip low income 
communities with resources that initiate change, community leaders must lead the 
process, and initiate peer-to-peer information exchange, said the Program Director at a 
local environmental non-profit (Interviewee #1). This Director has seen this method be 
particularly successful in the context of community house parties hosted dually by a 
community leader with an environmental program leader.  
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Yet, the professionals were quick to point out that initiatives intended to reduce 
consumption in a capitalistic society, which is “based around consumption” (Climate 
Change Director, Interviewee #4) pose a significant challenge. The Director, along with 
others, emphasized the importance of connecting environmental values with human 
values, showing how the two are inextricably intertwined. In San Jose’s climate action 
plan (“Climate Smart San Jose”) this mindset is emphasized through the promotion of 
the “Good Life.” In this document, a connection is made between happiness and 
sustainability, helping people to understand and accept the benefits sustainable actions 
can have on their whole life. Some benefits include urban walkability, multi-use 
development, apartment living, being close to work, adopting a healthy, and plant-
based diet. Making this connection helps individuals to “identify with what they want 
their life to look like” (Interviewee #4) and in doing so reduces their environmental 
impact.  
 
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
          
Despite these valuable empirical, theoretical, and practical findings, like most research, 
this study did not offer a complete analysis on factors that influence high carbon 
footprints in San Jose, CA. The study had a narrow scope, and did not evaluate other 
factors, such as airplane travel, access to transit nodes, waste generated, etc. that 
could influence carbon footprints. Most significantly, the data used to measure carbon 
emission output per block group were extrapolated from available geospatial data. No 
doubt, it is also almost impossible to perfectly track all carbon emissions created by 
block group activities. 
 
In this analysis, 67% (Adjusted R2=0.673***) of high carbon footprints (and much less in 
the poorest communities (Adjusted R2 = .239**) was explained by structural and human 
agency factors. Future research could be more comprehensive by evaluating factors 
that directly measure environmental choices and emissions. For example, the 
Leadership Team Member for Grassroots Initiative stated that cities do not take into 
account total consumption when measuring carbon footprint. Often, analysis is limited to 
energy use, waste, transportation, and water, not on high-carbon activities, “such as 
meat, purchasing clothing or flying” (Interviewee #5). This evaluation leads to a “skewed 
perception of carbon footprints” (Interviewee #5). The importance of establishing a good 
baseline measurement was also emphasized by the Urban Systems Analyst and 
Scholar, stating that is necessary to use these “key environmental metrics” (Interviewee 
#5) in order to reliably predict carbon emission outcomes (Interviewee #7). Measuring 
these factors is difficult, but critical for future researchers to look at to secure a complete 
and accurate measurement of carbon footprints. Additional research should also 
continue to explore systemic inequality. Evaluating the current availability of 
infrastructure in communities, such as recycling or composting services as well as 
distance to transit nodes (Interviewee #2), will be critical. Such evaluative assessment 
will be critical for the discussions of effective structural changes in land-use policy that 
has to be built on a more accurate portrayal of resident ability to make sustainable 
choices. The be more effective, these structural changes will also have to take into 
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consideration the links of wealth and racial inequality with carbon footprint; that is, 
systemic environmental changes will have to enhance equality and environmental 
sustainability.  
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
  
Appendix A: Interview Protocol and Consent Forms 
Consent Letter 
  
Dear____: 
I am a Sociology Senior working on my Research Capstone Paper under the direction of Professor Marilyn 
Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. I am conducting my research on 
community carbon footprints in San Jose.     
 
You were selected for this interview, because of your knowledge of and experience working in the area of 
sustainable development, and environmental community action. 
 
I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to questions about factors that influence 
community environmental actions. The interview will last about 20 minutes. Your participation in this study is 
voluntary. You have the right to choose to not participate or to withdraw from the interview at any time. The 
results of the research study may be presented at SCU’s Annual Anthropology/Sociology Undergraduate 
Research Conference and published (in a Sociology department publication). Pseudonyms will be used in 
lieu of your name and the name of your organization in the written paper. You will also not be asked (nor 
recorded) questions about your specific characteristics, such as age, race, sex, religion. 
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please email me at erinjronald@gmail,com or Dr. 
Fernandez at  mfernandez@scu.edu 
 
Sincerely, 
Erin Ronald 
  
Please send an electronic message denoting consent, or electronically sign below. By signing below or 
providing an email, you are giving consent to participate in the above study. 
______________________      ____________________                                           ____________ 
Signature                                  Printed Name                   Date 
  
If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have 
been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of 
Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591. 
  
Guideline Interview Questions 
Supplemental Qualitative Interviews for Thesis Sociology 195, Fall 2018 and Winter 2019 
Interview Date and Time:  
Respondent ID#:  
1. What is the TYPE Agency/Organization/Association/Institution where you learned about (and/or  
worked) with this issue? 
2. Can you tell me about your position? 
3. How long have you been in this position and in this organization? 
4. Based on what you know of climate mitigation, how do you get people to adopt pro environmental 
behavior that actually reduces their carbon footprint?  
5. In your opinion what are some factors that contribute to high carbon footprints in San Jose? 
6. I found that carbon footprints are higher in areas where there are concentrations of high 
socioeconomic status and white communities. Has this been true in your experience? 
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7. Is there anything else about this issue/topic I should know more about? 
 
Thank you very much for your time. If you wish to see a copy of my final paper, I would be glad to share it 
with you at the end of the winter quarter. If you have any further questions or comments for me, I can be 
contacted at eronald@scu.edu Or if you wish to speak to my faculty advisor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, she 
can be reached at mfernandez@scu.edu. 
  
 
 
 
Appendix B 
  
TABLE 2A. Bivariate Analyses: All Blocks and High SES Blocks 
Correlation Matrix: Indices of High Carbon Footprint, Socioeconomic Status, White to Non-white 
Concentration, Proportion of Solar Use, Percent Sustainable Transit to Work, Time Driven Alone, Mid-age 
Blocks, Senior-Aged, and Female Blocks 
SDG Dashboard for San Jose and 2009 - 2013 American Community Survey (n=517-523)1, 2 
  A B C D  E F G H I 
A. Index of High Carbon 1.0 .54***  .2**  .04  -.15   .09 -.001 .03 -.001 
B. Socio-economic Status .79*** 1.0 .12  .09  -.06  -.04  .14  .17*  -.002 
C. White to Non-white 
concentration 
.42*** .35*** 1.0 
  
.14  -.1  -.38***  .2*** .34***  .14 
D. Proportion of Solar Use .06 .11** .08 1.0 .11 -.09  .09  .07 .06 
E. Percent Sustainable 
Transit to Work 
-.24*** -.21*** -.11** .05 1.0 .02   -.24*** -.01 -.08 
F. Time Driven Alone .11*** .05 -.18*** -.03 -.18*** 1.0 -.28***  -.42***  -.16* 
G. Mid-age Blocks .38*** .39*** .17*** -.08  -.23*** -.09 1.0 -.78***  -.25*** 
H. Senior-aged Blocks .31*** .29*** .20*** .03 -.19*** -.260** -.75*** 1.0 .16*** 
I. Female Blocks .09* .05 .04 .04 -.10* -.07 -.16*** .06 .16*** 
***p≤.001; **p≤.01; *p≤.05 
1 Index of High Carbon Footprints = Electricity Emissions + Transportation Emissions + Goods Emissions + Food  
  Emissions; Possible range: 1406.50-15425.75; 
  Index of Socioeconomic Status = Percentage High Education * Estimate Per capita income in the past twelve months 
  in 2013 infla; Possible range: 0-8,265,753.47; 
  Percent White to Nonwhite = White households per block/non-white households. Possible range: 0 - 97.87; 
  Proportion of Solar Use = Solar Energy/Total Energy; Possible range: 0-.06; 
  Single Occupancy and Distance of Drive to Work= (Estimate Car truck or van Drove alone / Estimate Total  
  Transportation) * Estimate Total Travel Time Possible; Possible range: 0-2286; 
  Percent Mid Aged Blocks = Men and women aged 35-59/total population in a block; 
  Percent Senior Aged Blocks = Men and women aged 60 and above/total population in a block; 
  Female Blocks= Proportion of self-identifying females/total population. 
2  Correlations above the diagonal of 1.0 refer to High SES blocks ; Below 1.0 refer to All blocks. 
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TABLE 2B. Bivariate Analyses: Medium (below the diagonal) and Low (above the diagonal) SES 
Correlation Matrix: Indices of High Carbon Footprint, Socioeconomic Status, White to Non-white 
Concentration, Proportion of Solar Use, Percent Sustainable Transit to Work, Time Driven Alone, Mid-age 
Blocks, Senior-Aged Blocks and Female 
SDG Dashboard for San Jose and 2009 - 2013 American Community Survey (n=517-523)1, 2 
  A B C D  E F G H I 
A. Index of High Carbon 1.0 .46*** -.06 -.04 -.07 .14 .24*** .24** .10 
B. Socio-economic Status .48*** 1.0 .02 -.04 -.16* .20** .26*** .21** -.02 
C. White to Non-white concentration .53*** .24*** 1.0 -.13 .004 .03 -.09 -.16* -.15 
D. Proportion of Solar Use .04 .009 -.05 1.0 .05 .95 .54 .10 .66 
E. Percent Sustainable Transit to 
Work 
.04 -.16* -.02 .02 1.0 -.36*** -.12 -.21** .02 
F. Time Driven Alone .05 .03 -.18* .17* -.14 1.0 -.09 -.1 -.06 
G. Mid-age Blocks .13 .19* -.005 .02 -.16* .03 1.0 .01 -.08 
H. Senior-aged Blocks .2** .15* .04 -.03 -.16* -.30*** -.07 1.0 .19* 
I. Female .12 .08 .02 -.04 .24** .01 .08 .1 1.0 
***p≤.001; **p≤.01; *p≤.05 
1 See Index names and coding in Table 2A. 
   2 Correlations above the diagonal of 1.0 refer to Low SES ; Below 1.0 refer to Medium SES. 
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A Community to Call Mine 
Supportive Community Environment and Citizen Actions?  
 
By 
Elizabeth Namakula Kamya1 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
At the heart of communities are the residents who call an area home. Community 
ownership is best encapsulated by an African proverb, “I am because we are.” 
Collectively, individuals indeed make a community rich in beauty, character, and 
diversity. In the words of a Community Psychologist (Interviewee #4), with the idea of 
common goals and purpose, neighborhoods create cohesiveness to work together, 
thrive together, weep together, and celebrate together. The goal for every community 
should be to improve and prosper in the interests of their residents. However, figuring 
out how to build sustainable growth remains a puzzling challenge for many public 
officials, community organizers, and social workers.  
 
                                                        
1 Acknowledgements: I would like to start by thanking my fearless Professor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez who  
  offered me endless guidance and support. I want to express gratitude to the professionals I interviewed  
  that took time out of their day and provided me with strong insightful information.  Lastly, I extend my 
  thanks and appreciation to my parents who have continuously encouraged my growth and exploration. It  
  is because of them that the flame of passion for learning stays lit within me. 
ABSTRACT. To what extent are supportive Community Environments and Citizen 
Actions needed to strengthen community attachment? The answers were 
explored among three distinctive communities across America (Thriving, 
Struggling, and Suffering) using a mixed methods design; analyses of secondary 
survey data from the 2010 Soul of The Community Survey were supplemented 
with qualitative insights from four community development professionals as well 
content analysis of select community development and affluent neighborhood 
initiatives. As predicted using Solari’s Affluent Neighborhood Persistence Model, 
members of thriving communities were more likely to take ownership when there 
was a supportive social environment. But, citizen action, particularly through 
political activism, was most useful for community development mainly in suffering 
communities, partially supporting Powell and DiMaggio’s New Institutionalism. 
These findings, corroborated with the narrative commentaries, contributed to the 
literature in the Sociology of communities as well community development and 
highlighted the need for tailoring tools for communities of different levels of 
affluence. Future research is warranted to identify and prioritize community 
initiatives around social fabric and political activism in community development 
practice. 
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Currently there is not one set of best practices available to improve and transform 
communities into more prosperous environments. Besides, neighborhoods are uniquely 
varied and change is slow occurring over decades. The homology or cohesion between 
people, the built environment, and community symbols are an evolving set of 
processes. For example, changes, as in gentrification of communities, that seem 
apparent, emerge through multiple, uneven steps (Deener, 2012). Communities have 
diverse structures and are dense with opportunities, even if untapped, for fostering 
identity and attachment. Persistently affluent neighborhoods work to protect, maintain 
and renovate their structures to sustain their economic and social resources. In contrast 
poor neighborhoods are at a disadvantage and their capital is very much pulled apart 
through trying to make ends meet. As a result, understanding the complexity of 
communities, in which no two are exactly the same, is challenging.  
 
In this research, an attempt was made to learn more about factors that foster residents’ 
community attachment amongst communities of varied levels of affluence. Specifically, 
the comparative relevance of strength of community social fabric and citizen actions in 
nurturing attachment in thriving, struggling, and suffering communities were assessed. 
While members and activists in suffering communities are typically interested in 
community development those in more affluent communities focus on maintaining the 
status quo. These wealth disaggregated research findings will be of interest not only to 
academics of community development, but also to local government leaders, 
community organizing agencies, and others working in the field to engage communities. 
Because of the diversity of communities, there is need for context specific evidence on 
which to generate new methods and/or strategies tailored to building stronger 
communities.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
A community is a sociological construct in which shared meaning and cultural 
understanding are cultivated through interactions and attachment among its members. 
And communities grow, change, or persist by their own sets of principles. Resident 
participation in the community can be expected to be based on mutual expectation, 
values, beliefs, and shared perceptions within a community. Because of the resulting 
multidimensional complexity of communities, it is not easy to predict specifically how 
each community will respond to challenges they encounter. However, scholars have 
identified some common themes and related strategies in the lives of communities. Be 
they a strong social fabric or citizen participation in community life, the goal has been to 
unpack and understand the multidimensional glue that can hold a community together. 
 
Community Attachment 
 
Community attachment has been an important area of study in which scholars have 
attempted to understand why individuals choose to live in a certain community, choose 
to stay, or sometimes move. The word attachment has become synonymous in its 
definition with satisfaction, sentiment, and bond to the community, and as such has 
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been used interchangeably. Irrespective of the diverse terminology, community 
attachment is viewed as the emotional and personal bond that ties a person to the 
collective. The satisfaction residents have with their neighborhood encompasses 
feelings of kinship, a sense of sodality, and measures community embeddedness 
(Boulianne and Brailey, 2014).  
 
In an effort to conceptualize community attachment, Cross (2013) examined how a few 
dozen residents, in Nevada county, California, described their sentiments about the 
community in which they live. Four aspects stood out as distinguishing features of 
attachment: resources that make for an ideal community, experiencing a sense of 
belonging, identifying with a place or region, and plans for the future. Cross concluded 
that community attachment can be more than having an emotional connection to a 
place; identifying with the place was also key. Of course, not all residents are attached 
to, or identify with, the same dimensions, say social and/or physical, of a community. 
Besides, community attachment is multidimensional; residents, in Hidalgo and 
Hernandez’s (2001) study of 177 people in communities in Spain, were attached to both 
the social and physical dimensions of places as well as their ability to develop different 
degrees of dependence, cognitive preference, satisfaction, and identification with their 
neighborhoods.  
 
But community attachment is not only an outcome but also a process. Jaques (2008), 
who studied citizens in rural communities of Colorado, concluded that binding to a 
community is a basic social process of how people engage and fuse into an 
environment. From the collective experiences of citizens varying in ages 26-82, 
retrieved by Jaques from Glaser & Strauss, 1967, five stages of the social process were 
documented. Two particularly important stages were: first the processes by which 
people became involved and integrated into a community and second, the process by 
which people continued interaction through practicing community norms and rituals. 
 
In short, any substantive exploration of communities should account for subjective and 
objective measures of community attachment. Subjective attachment was described by 
Garland (in a 2013 study of 400 adults) as an individual’s sense of belonging in their 
community, which could be influenced by the individual’s length of residence, 
involvement in their community, and the connections they have with other community 
members. Objective attachment refers to the more physical or tangible items in a 
community, as in police presence or an abundance of parks and areas for outdoor 
activity. 
 
 
Keys to Community Attachment: 
Social Fabric and Citizen Engagement 
 
Although sociologists have tended to describe communities in terms of the strength of 
resident satisfaction or attachment, they have, in their more recent research, expanded 
their analyses to include the social environment of communities as a key to unlocking 
community attachment. The social fabric includes social ties with family, friends, and the 
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degree of integration into other social networks, and a resulting sense of safety that 
support attachment. “The struggle over the direction of the country is not just about 
economics or politics. It is a spiritual struggle over who we are and how we are 
connected” noted a Community Organizer interviewed for this research by the author 
(Interviewee #2). Researchers have also studied the active community residents, be it in 
their engagement in the political and/or civic life of their communities to strengthen and 
reinforce community life. 
 
Strength of Community Social Fabric 
  
There is a fair amount of agreement in the scholarly and activist circles that satisfaction 
with one’s neighborhood is a result of both attitudinal and behavioral connections to the 
area. For example, strong social cohesion within a community has been found to have 
both direct and indirect positive effects on neighborhood attachment. Dassopoulos and 
Monnat (2011), in their analyses of the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, 
suggested that perceptions of cohesion within one’s neighborhood was important 
because solidarity can become a tool to effect positive change through both formal and 
informal community organizing and problem-solving. These researchers, however, did 
not explore the mediating roles of social support and social control in the relationship 
between community participatory action and satisfaction. It would be advantageous to 
explore the type of events, places, and opportunities that allow individuals to socialize 
with one another and deepen their bonds. 
 
Sense of Safety. Community satisfaction is also described as the product of feeling safe 
in the social location where one feels at home (Cross, 2013). For example, 
Dassopoulos and Monnat (2011) captured the link between security and satisfaction as 
follows: Los Angeles residents who reported that they feel safe in their neighborhood 
had 4.5 times the odds of being in a higher community satisfaction category (exp1.540 = 
4.66) than those who reported not feeling safe in their area. In other words, perceptions 
of safety significantly and substantially increased satisfaction with their community. 
Collective levels of satisfaction were also lowest in communities characterized by 
residential mobility, urbanization, a density of youth, a high victimization rate, and most 
importantly high levels of fear and distrust about local safety (Sampson, 1988). Fear of 
crime, among the 10,905 residents from England and Wales that Sampson studied, 
appeared to have negative consequences for collective community attachment and 
social participation. One socially adverse effect of perceived danger was that those who 
perceived crime to be high reduced their active leisure activities.  
 
 
Citizen Actions: Civic Engagement Versus Political Activism 
 
Even if the social fabric and other structural elements of communities are vibrant, the 
many social, environmental, cultural, and safety challenges that communities face 
require the active attention and involvement of residents and their allies. Through citizen 
actions, as in collaborating with others, and getting engaged politically, residents can 
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seek to address challenges, create sustainable communities, and subsequently uplift 
their sense of community ownership.  
 
Of course, not all community members can be expected to be equally engaged in all 
matters of their communities. For example, in a literature review of civic engagement 
and citizen participation in local governance, those with more socio-economic resources 
and personal as well as social capital were more politically active or civically engaged 
(Olimid, 2014). In the same vein of variability in citizen actions, the goals of citizen 
action can also vary. For example, in a study of 577 individuals who sought volunteering 
and community roles, Nix (2011) was able to relate the motivational desires of idealism 
and social status to members’ desire to engage in a community to reaffirm and 
strengthen community values. Similarly, using data from 28 countries in four continents, 
a positive relationship between political activism and self-transcendence values with 
and openness to change were found (Vecchione et al., 2015).  
 
There is also a case to be made for distinguishing between subjective (satisfaction) and 
objective (actions) measures of citizen actions as they contribute to community 
attachment. In a study of community attachment and citizen actions, in a random 
sample of 2000 students enrolled in a Canadian University, objective measures of 
community attachment were found to increase the possibility of voting but not of 
volunteering (Boulianne and Brailey, 2014). But when these researchers used 
subjective measures (agree or disagree responses) of community attachment, along 
with objective criteria, there was a positive relation between resident satisfaction and 
volunteering as well as voting (political actions). They made a case for more 
measurement accuracy by looking at both subjective and objective measures of 
community attachment. In the final analyses, the different mechanisms of resident 
involvement indicated that civic engagement and political activism must be treated as 
separate concepts rather than one unitary concept. As such, distinct initiatives are 
required to combat low rates of civic engagement and political activism. 
 
Civic Engagement. Civic engagement can take many forms, with the two most common 
being volunteering (active engagement) and other passive involvement such as 
monetary donations (Olimid, 2014). Volunteering or doing service around one's 
community is a demanding form of civic engagement (Uslaner, 2002). It asks more of 
the individual than just donating money or being a shirker in an organization. Instead, 
volunteering requires sacrifice of time and dedication to the cause (Garland, 2013). 
Although many people associate their community engagement and work with 
organizations with their religion, researchers, like Uslaner (2002), explain that the most 
critical predictor of volunteering is the perception of a common bond or attachment with 
other people. But, even when accounting for perceptions of social cohesion and 
support, participating in a local business or civic organization was not associated with 
neighborhood satisfaction among 1,912 respondents in the Los Angeles County 
(Dassopoulos & Monnat, 2011). 
 
Active involvement in the local community also provides residents with a sense of 
control (Dassopoulos and Monnat, 2011); individuals in Wales and England who were 
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socially integrated into their communities were more likely to trust other individuals. And 
involvement in community groups and organizations, as well as having a social network 
and attachment to one's community, improved community satisfaction (Wasserman, 
1982). 
 
 
Political Activism. Political activism, another form of citizen action, takes citizen actions 
to a different level, both in its locus as well outcomes. When political activism is 
collective, this form of activism in communities puts pressure on the local government to 
improve the quality of life for all residing in the area, including the less advantaged. 
Political activism can also strengthen collective efficacy, by activating or converting 
social bonds among community members in order to accomplish common goals. 
Communities with a higher average of collective efficacy usually share more of 
consensus about issues and challenges in the local area (Brunton-Smith, Sturgis, and 
Leckie, 2018). As with civic engagement, motivations for political activism also vary. In a 
study of the motivation for political activism in sample of 125 social work students, 
depending on whether they were liberals and conservatives, belonging to a community 
of activist and maintaining activist identities were crucial to different modes of activism. 
However, subjective measures of collective efficacy only influenced activism for 
electoral campaigns in a select sample of students (Swank, 2012).  
  
With a political mind frame, people can be active participants and change agents for 
their constituencies on the issue for their wellbeing, noted a Community Based 
Psychologist who was interviewed for this paper (Interviewee #4). Community concerns 
in a global economy demand solutions, like, among others, political activism and 
collective efficacy, to bring about change (Glaser, Yeager, and Parker, 2006). Their 
comparisons, of responses of 5,970 registered community voters favoring 
Neighborhood-Based organizations with others in favor of Government based solutions, 
suggested that political activism amongst community members was a strong powerful 
way to create change instead of latently waiting on their local leaders to enact it. 
Community members’ actions can work either in line with the government or in 
opposition to government. In any event, because political actions can drastically shift 
the lives of those less fortunate, it is just as important as civic engagement.  
 
 
Summary and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
In conclusion, scholars have argued that creating a vibrant social fabric, political 
activism and civic engagement are effective strategies for communities to address the 
growing stressors they face and strengthen them (Henkin and Zapf, 2006-2007). But 
there was little research found in which citizen actions (political activism and civic 
engagement) were simultaneously evaluated with community social fabric for their 
unique impacts on fostering belongingness, attachment, and satisfaction with 
community. Besides, because of varied socioeconomic contexts of communities, there 
is a need to investigate the differential roles of citizen action and community social 
fabric in improving member satisfaction in communities with varying levels of economic 
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growth. Further, political activism, that very often get categorized as civic engagement, 
need to be treated as a distinct form of citizen action. To this effect, the relative net 
effects of community social fabric, social networks and social cohesion, on community 
satisfaction of residents will be assessed among thriving, struggling, and suffering 
communities. 
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
In this research, I investigated the differential impacts that social fabric, civic 
engagement and political activism have on an individual’s community attachment in 
three distinctive sub groups of communities. These insights will add to previous 
research that showed a positive relationship of residents’ civic engagement (helping 
others, volunteering, etc.) and political activism (voting and exhibiting local leadership) 
with community attachment (as in Boulianne and Brailey, 2014). I want to expand on 
this extant research by investigating how civic engagement, and political actions might 
differentially affect community attachment of residents living under different wealth 
constraints or access as the case might be. In addition, the role of community social 
fabric in shaping or altering this attachment will be explored, an issue that has not 
received full attention.   
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The analyses, presented in this research, of strategies and resources for differential 
community attachment in thriving, struggling and suffering communities was framed 
within Giddens’ Social Structuration (as outlined in Tagarirofa and David, 2013), 
neighborhood persistence, and the new institutionalist (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:150; 
Powell and DiMaggio, 2012: Chapter1) community development paradigms. Community 
environment, in its dimensions of social fabric and sense of security, as well as citizen 
action, as they might color a resident’s level of community satisfaction, are best 
understood within Giddens’ social structuration framework. Giddens posited that the 
bases of structure and agents in social systems are neither absolute nor abiding and 
that social structures limit the actions of individual agents. That is, structure and action 
evolve in a manner that are mutually constraining. However, context specific variations 
in the importance of protecting the social environment and citizen actions to enact 
changes in the community are best addressed using Solari’s Affluent neighborhood 
persistence (2012) and DiMaggio and Powell’s New Institutional (1983:150) models for 
community development.  
 
As per the Affluent Neighborhood Persistence model tested by Solari (2012), thriving 
communities protect and strengthen their affluence through a complex infrastructure of 
resources, protection, and social networks. These structural benefits create a supportive 
community environment that promotes a process of cumulative advantage. As affluent 
residents collectively build their community environment, they protect access to social 
spaces, strengthen neighborhood safety, and improve residents’ overall wellbeing. The 
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resulting supportive community environment in the affluent communities work to elevate 
residents’ feeling ownership of their community.  
 
Ironically, persistent affluence in some neighborhoods comes at the expense of 
economic segregation, growing inequality, and persistent poverty in others at the other 
end of the economic spectrum. In the face of entrenched systemic poverty in 
communities, community development theorists have advocated for social action and 
community participation as potent tools to promote development that ensures more 
inclusive access to and equitable distribution of economic resources and power. 
However, citizens involvement in their local communities has to go beyond an interest in 
local involvement and also require actions that seek to confront, impede, promote or 
raise awareness about an issue or set of issues at different (external to the community) 
levels. DiMaggio and Powell (1983), in their theory of New Institutionalism (elaborated 
from Max Weber’s conceptualization of the iron cage), came to understand that for civic 
actions to be effective they should be founded on an acknowledgement of community 
organizational structures and bureaucratic institutions in the government and state. 
Effective institutional change has to stem from both formal and informal pressures 
exerted on organizations by organizations that also fit the cultural expectations in 
society. To overcome the iron cage like constraints that communities face, organizations 
and communities can find attractive solutions to the problems they face through means 
of collective community effort and even sheer force. That is, coordinated citizen actions 
might be an effective tool available to enact community change and development. The 
resultant improvements in the social, environmental, economic and cultural 
infrastructures within their communities can ignite community members’ passion and 
loyalty toward their place of residency. 
 
Drawing from these theoretical paradigms, two sets of boundary-specifying hypotheses 
were postulated. In Hypothesis #1, a supportive community environment, more than 
citizen action, would be more relevant, on balance, to community attachment in thriving 
communities (Affluence Persistence). On the other hand, following New Institutionalist 
expectations, Hypothesis #2 would be that citizen actions (more than supportive 
community environment) would be the unique key to community attachment in the 
suffering communities. Both hypotheses were evaluated net of community member’s 
socioeconomic status, age, sex, and length of residence.  
   
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
A sequential mixed method design, of secondary quantitative data drawn from a 
secondary data source combined with primary qualitative narratives, were used. These 
mixed methods findings will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the 
research question posed in this paper. Supplemental qualitative information was 
gathered through interviews with professionals knowledgeable about citizen actions and 
a supportive community environment, as well as experiential infield experience working 
to strengthen community attachment.  
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Secondary Data 
 
The secondary quantitative data set I used to answer my research question was called 
the Soul of the Community; this data came from a 2010 study conducted by Gallup, Inc. 
of the 26 Knight Foundation communities across the United States. It was a purposeful 
survey to identify the factors that connect residents to their communities and the role of 
community attachment in an area's economic growth and well-being. Researchers used 
Random Digit Dialing (RDD) to reach a representative selection of private household 
telephone numbers in each of the defined areas; the adult interviewee (aged 18 or over) 
in each sampled household was also randomly selected. A random sample of at least 
400 residents, aged 18 years and old in each of the eight resident communities in 
Akron, OH; Charlotte, NC; Detroit, MI; Macon, GA; Miami, FL; Philadelphia, PA; San 
Jose, CA; and St. Paul, MN. The total number of respondents for 2010 was 20,2712.   
 
Community groups were categorized by Soul of the Community into Thriving, 
Struggling, and Suffering depending on the residents’ rating of their life at the time of the 
survey and in the future. A person was considered to be living in a Thriving community if 
she/he rated both their life at present time and future to be positive. On the other hand, 
if individuals rated both their life at the present time and the future to be very low, they 
were classified as living in a Suffering community. In between were respondents who 
lived in Struggling communities3.  
 
By design, the three communities varied substantially in the socioeconomic standing of 
their members (Appendix A). Residents of Thriving communities were the most 
educated and had the highest incomes. Half of individuals in the thriving communities’ 
group had graduated college, or were pursuing post graduate work, and/or had 
achieved a post graduate degree. In contrast, a 1/3 in the suffering communities listed 
their highest educational achievement as completing high school.  
 
In Thriving communities, over 40% of the respondents had an annual income of 
$75,000 - $99,999 or higher; with 2/3rds of them reporting six figures or more. On the 
other hand, in Suffering communities, almost 37.5% reported annual income below 
$25,000. According to the United States Census Bureau, the 2010 poverty income 
threshold for a family of 4 with no children under 18 years of age was $22,541, while for 
a family of 4 with 2 children under 18 it was $22,162. A sizeable portion of respondents 
                                                        
2 The original collector of the data, NADAC, or ICPSR, or the relevant funding agencies bear no  
   responsibility for use of the data or the interpretations or inferences based on such uses. 
3 A respondent lived in a Thriving community if the ranked response to QN1A (Rating of life at present  
  time: Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to ten at the top. Suppose  
  we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder  
  represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel 
  you stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step the better you feel about your life, and the lower 
  the step the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way you feel? Is 7 or higher and 
  the response to Q1B (Rating of Future Life: Just your best guess, on which step do you think you will  
  stand in the future, say about five years from now?) is 8 or higher. A respondent is considered to be  
  Suffering if the response to both QN1 and QN1B is 4 or lower. A respondent is considered to be  
  Struggling if they have not been classified as thriving or suffering based on the stated criteria (NADAC 
  2010). The response rates were not available for this survey. 
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in suffering communities lived in poverty. Struggling community residents fell in 
between; a plurality (39.5%) of residents in Struggling Communities had incomes in the 
range of 25,000 - 54,999 that matched their education; 53% had completed high school 
or some college. Aside from the deep socioeconomic disparities, the three communities 
did not differ much in their demographic composition. Men and women were equally 
represented in all three communities. The residents of the community tended to be 
older; about 2/3 was 55 and older.  
 
 
Qualitative Data 
 
I conducted four semi structured interviews over the phone with professionals who had 
expertise in the area of community development. The interviews were around 20 
minutes long and as seen in Appendix B, voluntary participation and confidentially were 
assured. The first interviewee (Interviewee #), found through personal connections at an 
East Coast university, is a Social Work Professor who has been teaching the macro 
level of social work for over 20 years. Prior to becoming a professor, she was engaged 
in communities in her work at a public works organization in Boston. It is through this 
organization that she began to grapple with and help with the challenges facing different 
local neighborhoods. The second interviewee is the Director of an international 
community organizing nonprofit and started his career doing faith-based action in 
Oakland. I became acquainted with this Community Organizer through working in this 
nonprofit. As with Sociologist Interviewee #3, they have a vast knowledge in immigrant 
communities and how to create for a healthy environment. The last interviewee #4 was 
a psychologist based in Boston. This psychologist teaches at a local university and is 
specialized in peace and conflict mediation in communities across the globe.  
 
It was important to include content analysis of case studies of different communities, 
personal experiences, and annual reports that were gathered. One case study centered 
in Los Angeles and mapped out the diverse framework of the Venice neighborhood in 
the County (Deener 2012). The author’s personal experiences from time spent in LA 
(Kamya 2017) were another source, although the location was Boyle Heights. The 
annual report reviewed for this paper highlighted a suffering community in Michigan that 
is working to be a thriving neighborhood (UNI 2017). These sources of real and current 
community work helped to strengthen the methodology and theoretical framework in an 
effort to illustrate the impact of community attachment.  
 
 
DATA ANALYSES: SURVEY and QUALITATIVE INSIGHTS 
 
Three levels of analyses, univariate, bivariate and multivariate were utilized to answer 
the research question posed above. In keeping with the research design, I 
disaggregated the analyses by the three types of communities, Thriving, Struggling, and 
Suffering communities, in which residents lived.   
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Operationalization and Descriptive Analyses 
 
A sense of community is important for determining a good and healthy lifestyle, opined 
the Sociologist interviewed for this research (Interviewee #3). Levels of resident 
community attachment, supportive social environment and citizen actions, varied, by the 
type of community in which they lived. Residents in thriving groups were most attached 
to their communities, reported the most supportive social fabric and highest levels of 
participatory activities, be they political action or civic engagement. Suffering 
communities were at the opposite end; not only were residents less attached than the 
more affluent residents, they did not have as supportive of a social fabric nor were as 
engaged in the civic political life of their communities. The descriptive findings pointed to 
clear boundary limiting conditions amongst thriving, struggling, and suffering groups, 
underscoring the need for accounting for conditional limitations of attachment in each 
community. 
 
Community Attachment 
 
Community attachment can be defined as the thoughts and feelings of ownership an 
individual has towards the place in which they reside. The psychology professor 
(Interviewee #4) described it in simpler terms: “Attachment is like glue. When 
communities lack this glue, or their glue is spread too thin, a detachment from a 
common goal that would bring people together is created.” Recommending their 
community to others and one’s pride in their community all indicate satisfaction and 
creates the “glue” leading people to feel attached to their communities.  
 
As see in Table 1.A, American's living in thriving communities, compared to suffering 
communities, were more attached to their community; The thriving communities group 
had the highest index of community attachment with a mean of 16.18 (sd=28.01) on a 
range of 4 – 100, followed by those that resided in struggling communities. The 
Suffering group had the lowest mean attachment index score of 37.01 (sd=31.99). For 
example, almost half the respondents living in thriving communities strongly felt proud to 
live in their community (48.5%), more than double the proportion that reported pride in 
suffering communities (22.4%). Also, more than 2/3s of people in both thriving and 
struggling communities reported high levels of satisfaction living in their communities; 
the corresponding proportion in suffering communities was only 1/3 (36.3%). In short, 
the descriptive data shed light on the disparities among the three communities. A 
plurality (40%) respondents in suffering communities reported extreme dissatisfaction 
and would not at all recommend their community to others (39.1%). 
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Table 1.A. Community Attachment/belonging 
NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community 
Concept Dimensions Indicators  Responses  Statistics  
    Thriving 
(n=9458) 
Struggling 
(n= 5513) 
Suffering 
(n= 379) 
Community 
Satisfaction/
Belonging  
Community 
Loyalty 
QCE1 
recode:  
Community 
as a place 
to live: How 
Satisfied? 
 
1. Not at all                                 
2 
3 
4 
5. Extremely 
(n) 
   3.2%
4.8 
20.1 
39.5 
32.5 
 
   5.7% 
8.2 
25.1 
34.4 
26.6 
(10314) 
    19.3%*** 
19.3 
25.1 
19.6 
16.7 
  QCE2 
recode: 
Recommend 
community 
to others 
 
1. Not likely at all 
2 
3 
4 
5. Extremely likely 
6.9% 
6.3 
17.4 
29.7 
39.7 
15.1% 
11.6 
22.3 
26.2 
24.8 
39.1%*** 
11.9 
16.4 
15.6 
17.2 
 Community 
Passion 
 Q3A 
recode: 
Proud to live 
in this 
community  
1.Strongly disagree 
2 
3 
4 
5.Strongly agree 
4.3% 
4.4 
15.3 
27.4 
48.5 
8.7% 
10.2 
24.0 
25.9 
31.2 
29.8%*** 
15.0 
19.3 
13.5 
22.4 
  Q3B: 
Community 
is perfect for 
me 
 
1.Strongly disagree 
2 
3 
4 
5.Strongly agree 
6.1% 
7.3 
17.5 
30.0 
39.1 
13.3 
14.5 
23.5 
25.4 
23.2 
35.1%*** 
16.5 
17.6 
12.0 
18.9 
  Index of 
Community 
Attachment1 
Mean (𝑥)  
Std. deviation (s)  
Min-Max 
66.18 
28.01 
4 - 100 
52.09 
29.42 
4 – 100 
37.01*** 
31.99 
4 - 100 
1 Index of Community Attachment = (QCE1+QCE2)*(Q3A+Q3B). The correlations among these indicators were:  
  suffering communities between .858*** and .735***; in the struggling communities between .799*** and .668***; in the  
  thriving communities between .802*** and .682***; *** p <=.001. 
 
Community Environment  
One potential explanation for stronger attachment in some communities and less so in 
others considered in this analysis was the social environment. A supportive community 
environment is important for residents to feel satisfied with their local communities. An 
important principle to distinguish in community development work is creating a social 
fabric that fosters self-reliance. For example, an environment that fosters a caring and 
safe group context where residents can come together to exchange knowledge, skills, 
and life experiences allow people to reach their own personal goals is an essential 
building block for attachment. In this supportive environment, community members can 
build connections and not feel isolated.  
 
For example, a community that uplifts community members, regardless of their 
background or varying ability, will address individual and local needs through informal 
interactions. By finding a place where people can actually meet, even if it is just once a 
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week, residents are offered a forum for engagement and is a market place for ideas. A 
community that emphasizes inclusion will address safety issues by acknowledging that 
men and women may feel differently walking home alone. Identifying members’ different 
needs to feel secure is instrumental in informing the planning and development of 
activities and programs.  
 
Social Fabric, the first component of community environment considered here, involves 
formal and informal methods of networking. To develop connections within their local 
communities, residents align, collaborate, and work with individuals, groups and other 
agencies. In addition, the strength of the social fabric can also be distinguished by 
access and equity. A strong community will have centers that are accessible and 
welcoming; accessibility to particular social spaces and social events promotes equity 
and improves the social, environmental and cultural infrastructures within their 
communities. The social fabric of a community can be assessed using these 
distinguishing characteristics and by community participation. 
 
As seen in Table 1.B, availability of events and spaces that allowed for social cohesion 
were of varying rates of quality in the three communities. Some examples are noted to 
identify these community differences. For example, a plurality of residents in the thriving 
communities rated the frequency of social community events offered to the community 
as very good (37.2%). On the other hand, more than half (54.8%) in suffering 
communities thought the availability of social community events to be average or worse. 
About ¼ (25.6%) in struggling communities expressed that the availability was okay.  
 
Another example of the social fabric is the social settings in which people meet one 
another. Almost 2/3rds (63.7%) of residents in thriving community reported that their 
community had an above average vibrant night life and more than 2/3rds (68.3) said their 
community is a good place to meet people and make new friends. Corresponding 
ratings in suffering communities was only 39% (above average night life) and 36.5% 
(good place to meet people) respectively; for struggling communities it was 53% and 
51.8% respectively. On balance, the social fabric was rated by residents to be the 
strongest in Thriving communities (𝑥 on the social fabric index score was 27.79*** 
 on a range of 6.0 - 60.0 while weakest in Suffering communities (𝑥 = 26.39***) 
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Table 1.B. Social Fabric 
NADAC, 2010–  Soul of The Community 
Concept Indicators Responses  Statistics  
   Thriving 
(n=8852) 
Struggling 
(n=5153) 
Suffering 
(n=345) 
Social 
Fabric 
Q7P:Availability 
of social 
community 
events 
1. Very bad 
2 
3 
4 
5. Very good 
2.0% 
5.4 
19.5 
35.9 
37.2 
4.7% 
10.0 
25.6 
33.4 
26.3 
9.3%*** 
17.3 
28.2 
26.3 
18.9 
  
Q7A: Availability 
of parks and 
playgrounds 
 
1. Very bad 
2 
3 
4 
5. Very good 
 
2.0% 
5.4 
15.1 
32.8 
44.6 
4.2 
8.7% 
20.8 
32.7 
33.6 
10.2 
12.4%*** 
23.9 
28.0 
25.5 
 
 
 
 
Q7O: Availability 
of arts and 
cultural 
opportunities 
 
 
1. Very bad 
2 
3 
4 
5. Very good 
 
3.5% 
7.8 
20.7 
33.2 
34.9 
 
6.6% 
11.4 
23.2 
32.4 
26.4 
 
 
14.2%*** 
14.2 
27.9 
20.9 
22.8 
 Q7I: Good place 
to meet people 
and make 
friends 
1. Very bad 
2 
3 
4 
5. Very good 
3.0% 
6.8 
21.9 
37.4 
30.9 
  6.7% 
12.0 
29.5 
31.7 
20.1 
21.2%*** 
14.5 
27.7 
22.3 
14.2 
 Q7H: Vibrant 
nightlife - 
restaurants, 
clubs, bars, etc. 
1. Very bad 
2 
3 
4 
5. Very good 
4.3% 
8.7 
23.4 
33.1 
30.6 
7.3% 
11.9 
27.7 
29.8 
23.2 
17.7%*** 
16.6 
26.2 
20.4 
19.1 
 Q7M: People 
care about each 
other 
 
1. Very bad 
2 
3 
4 
5. Very good 
4.8% 
9.9 
32.2 
36.5 
16.7 
9.5% 
16.7 
35.7 
27.2 
10.9 
20.6%*** 
22.0 
28.5 
19.5 
9.5 
 Q22F: Attended 
a local event 
1.Yes 
2. No 
78.2% 
21.8 
68.1% 
31.9 
56.8%*** 
43.2 
  Mean (𝑥)  
Std. deviation (s)  
Min-Max 
27.79 
10.61 
6.0 - 60.0 
27.48 
11.36 
6.0 - 60.0 
26.39*** 
12.05 
6.0 - 60.0 
1 Index of Social Fabric= Q7O + Q7P + Q7A + Q7H + Q7I + Q7M + DummyQ22F. The correlations among these  
  indicators were: suffering communities between .586*** and .281***; in the struggling communities between .510***and  
  .045***; in the thriving communities between .522*** and .037***; *** p<=.001 
 
 
 
Sense of Safety, is the second component of community environment considered in this 
analyses (Table 1.C). In Thriving communities over a 1/3 of respondents reported 
feeling completely safe walking alone at night near their house (34.2%). But, about a 1/3 
of respondents in suffering communities reported the opposite and shared that they did 
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not feel safe at all (29.3%). While the level of crime in the community generated little 
variance in the responses across the three groups, those in struggling and suffering 
reported a slightly higher level of crime. Other safety characteristics that helped 
distinguish these three groups was the change in local crime rates in the past year. 
While the majority of respondents in each community group said crime rates stayed the 
same, over 1/3 of respondents in both the struggling and suffering groups noticed an 
increase in crime (32.8% and 44.5% respectively). Besides, residents of suffering 
community reported that the effectiveness of the police was very bad (17.6%) which 
was 5 times more than reported in the thriving group (3.3%) and more than two times 
those in the struggling group (6.8%). On balance, the Sense of Safety was rated by 
residents to be the strongest in Thriving communities (𝑥 on the social fabric index score 
was 12.98*** on a range of 4.0 -18.0 while weakest in Suffering communities (𝑥 =10.57***) 
 
Table 1.C. Sense of Safety 
NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community 
Concept Dimensions Indicators Responses  Statistics  
    Thriving 
(n=9242) 
Struggling 
(n=5392) 
Suffering 
(n=365) 
Sense of 
Safety 
 
Feeling safe 
 
Q18: Feel 
safe walking 
alone at night 
near your 
home 
1. Not safe at all 
2 
3 
4 
5. Completely 
safe 
9.2% 
8.7 
17.0 
30.9 
34.2 
 
 
16.0% 
13.4 
20.2 
27.5 
22.9 
29.3% 
13.9 
17.6 
19.7 
19.5 
 Crime 
Activity 
Q19: Level of 
Crime in your 
Community 
1. extremely high 
2 
3 
4 
5 Extremely low 
7.2% 
12.2 
27.1 
30.2 
23.4 
 
8.9% 
15.9 
33.4 
26.7 
15.1 
 
15.1% 
17.5 
30.8 
21.5 
15.1 
  Q20: Change 
in local crime 
level in past 
year 
1. Increased 
2. Stayed the  
3. Decreased 
23.6% 
65.7 
10.7 
 
32.8% 
58.1 
9.1  
44.5% 
48.2 
7.3 
 Law 
Enforcement 
Q7N: 
Effectiveness 
of Local 
Police 
1. Very bad 
2 
3 
4 
5. Very good 
3.3% 
5.9 
20.2 
40.1 
30.5 
6.8% 
10.0 
25.3 
35.5 
22.4 
17.6% 
16.0 
24.1 
25.7 
16.6 
   Mean (𝑥)  
Std. deviation  
Min-Max 
12.98 
2.64 
4.0 -18.0 
11.83 
2.78 
4.0 -18.0 
10.57*** 
3.23 
4.0 - 18.0 
1 Index of Sense of Security = Q7N+Q18+Q19+Q20. The correlations among these indicators were: suffering  
  communities between .391*** and .196***; in the struggling communities between .327*** and .131***; in the thriving  
  communities between .335*** and .156***; *** p<=.001. 
 
Citizen Actions  
 
Human beings are political animals and as such they participate in various forms of civic 
engagement (Interviewee #4). The term citizen action was used to capture civic 
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engagement and political activism; they both involve and require an individual to 
voluntarily participate and collaborate in a social system to create some form of change. 
A person can be involved politically and partake in actions to ignite community growth 
and a person can also be involved civically and use voluntary actions to help others 
around them. With both types of engagement, residents enact their civic duty and are 
called to action, but the type of actions being executed and the types of outcomes will 
be quite different.  
 
Civic Engagement, is an important component of Community Attachment because it is 
through service and dedication that residents can enact changes and make community 
member feel better about and become more connected to their neighborhood. Civic 
engagement is important for any healthy community because it can also strengthen and 
sustain the areas that need attention. For instance, volunteering and working with local 
organizations can be a form of engagement that individual partakes in to help others 
around them (Table 1.D). As might be expected, the thriving communities group had the 
highest levels of civic engagement with an engagement mean of 7.72 (on a range of 4-
15) followed by the struggling communities. Suffering communities showed the lowest 
mean of civic engagement with a mean of 7.39 (sd= 1.38).  
 
Table 1.D. Citizen Action: Civic Engagement 
NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community 
Concept Indicators Values and 
Responses 
 Statistics  
   Thriving 
(n=9400) 
Struggling 
(n=5488) 
Suffering 
(n=373) 
Civic 
Engagement 
Q22A: 
Performed 
local volunteer  
Work 
1.Yes 
2.No 
58.7% 
41.3% 
49.2% 
50.8 
37.3%*** 
62.7% 
 Q22D: 
Worked with 
others to 
change 
community 
1.Yes 
2. No 
44.3% 
55.7 
37.9% 
62.1 
36.8%*** 
63.2 
 DummyQ22G: 
Donated 
money to help 
a local 
organization 
1.Yes 
2. No 
17.9% 
82.1 
26.8% 
73.2 
35.8%*** 
64.2 
 Q22_A: 
Residents' 
impact on 
improving 
community 
1. No impact at all 
2. A small impact 
3. Moderate impact 
4. A big impact 
2.5% 
18.9 
43.9 
34.6 
6.2% 
29.4 
42.7 
21.6 
17.0%*** 
39.0 
28.4 
15.6 
 Index of Civic 
Engagement1 
Mean (𝑥)  
Std. deviation (s)  
Min-Max 
7.72 
1.20 
4.0 - 15.0 
7.60 
1.21 
4.0 - 15.0 
7.39*** 
1.38 
4.0 - 14.0 
1 Index of Civic Engagement = Q22A + Q22D + Q22_A + DummyQ22G. The correlations among these indicators 
  were: suffering communities between .409*** and .130*; in the struggling communities between .344*** and .156***; in  
  the thriving communities between .339*** and .143***; *** p<=.001; * p<=.05. 
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Some specifics on civic engagement activities in the three communities: In Suffering 
communities, residents (37.3%) were far less likely to engage in local volunteer work as 
opposed to those who lived in thriving communities (58.7%). However, in all three 
communities more than half did not attend local public meetings (62.7%, 66.1%, and 
68%). When asked how often they worked with others to enact change in communities, 
more than half indicated infrequently. However, those in Thriving communities were the 
most evenly split, with a little less than half working with others to change the 
communities (yes=44.3% vs. no=55.7%). Besides, more than half the residents in the 
suffering group felt they can make a little to no impact in improving their communities 
(56%). 
 
Political Activism, the second dimension of Citizen Actions, is also human empowered 
and offers people a voice against dominant political and societal structures. Citizen's 
participation and involvement in local government are essential for community 
attachment because it places responsibility both on the individual and on the collective. 
In the process of political activism, people come together, hold each other accountable, 
understand the complexity of problems, and find innovative strategies. Individuals’ 
feelings about their local government and leaders paint a potential picture of past and 
present experiences living in the community. Political activities are ones that get people 
to think about their civic duties and change the dynamics and make-up of the 
community. The type of political activity in which individuals engage may vary 
depending on the individuals’ level of trust and whether or not they have local leaders 
representing their interests. Voting and being registered to vote is one form of activism 
that has the potential to bring about developmental change within communities.  
 
As seen in Table 1.E, political activism, that ultimately shapes the fate of a community, 
varied by whether the community was thriving, suffering or struggling. The thriving 
communities had the highest index of Political Activism at 19.33, on a range of 6 – 68, 
followed by the struggling community group. At the other end was the group of suffering 
communities which had the lowest index of political activism with a mean of 14.59 (sd = 
8.31). But, all three communities had high proportions who had registered to vote (close 
to or over 90%). Additionally, all three groups had a high turnout rates in their local 
election. Those in Thriving communities had the highest turnout rate (80.3%) followed 
by the struggling community group (76.9) and then the suffering group (73.6%). Despite 
the uniformity in voting patterns, perceptions of local government and leaders conjured 
varied openness across communities. The majority of those residing in Suffering 
communities hardly ever had trust (44.8) in the local government, almost 3 times more 
than those in thriving communities who felt the same (14.7%). Also, two thirds in 
suffering communities admitted that local leadership was bad or very bad and a plurality 
strongly felt that their leaders failed to represent their interests (41.2%).  
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Table 1.E. Citizen Action; Political Activism 
NADAC, 2010 –  Soul of The Community 
Concept Dimensions Indicators Values and 
Responses 
 Statistics  
    Thriving 
(n=9302) 
Struggling 
(n=5411) 
Suffering 
(n=370) 
 
Political 
Activism 
 
Assessment 
Q7L: Local 
leadership 
of elected 
officials 
 
1.Very bad 
2 
3 
4 
5. Very good 
10.8% 
15.7 
33.7 
28.5 
11.3 
19.7 
20.0 
31.9 
20.6 
7.8 
40.9%*** 
19.5 
19.2 
14.9 
5.4 
  Q10A: 
Level of 
trust in 
local 
govern-
ment 
1. Hardly ever 
2. Only some of the 
time 
3. Most of the time 
4. Just about 
always 
 
14.7% 
41.3 
 
37.7 
6.4 
23.9% 
47.4 
 
25.8 
3.0 
44.8%*** 
39.8 
 
12.2 
  3.2 
 
  Q15AB: 
Local 
leaders 
represent 
my 
interests 
 
1.Strongly disagree 
2 
3 
4 
5. Strongly Agree 
10.4% 
17.1 
37.2 
26.0 
9.2 
10.4% 
17.1 
37.2 
26.0 
9.2 
 
41.2%*** 
25.0 
19.9 
8.2 
5.6 
 Actions Q21Regist
ered to 
vote 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
92.6% 
7.4 
90.4% 
9.6 
87.9%*** 
12.1 
  Q22C: 
Voted in 
the local 
election 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
80.3% 
19.7 
76.9% 
23.1 
73.6%*** 
26.4 
  Q22B: 
Attended a 
local public 
meeting 
1.Yes 
2.No 
37.3% 
62.7 
33.9% 
66.1 
32.0%*** 
68.0 
  Index of 
Political 
Activism1 
Mean (𝑥)  
Std. deviation (s)  
Min-Max 
19.33 
7.77 
6.0 - 
68.00 
17.29 
7.84 
6.0 - 56.0 
14.59*** 
8.31 
6.0 - 44.0 
1 Index of Political Activism = Q7L + Q15AB + Q10A + DuummyQ22C + DummyQ21 + DummyQ22B. The 
  correlations among these indicators were: suffering communities between .691*** and .197***; in the struggling  
  communities between .580*** and .030*; in the thriving communities between .667*** and -.047***;  
  *** p<=.001; * p<=.05. 
 
 
 
Bivariate Analyses 
 
In the second analytical step in the process of answering the empirical and theoretical 
questions raised in this paper, the empirical relationships of community attachment with 
supportive community environment and citizen actions were evaluated (Table 2 in 
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Appendix C). Based on these preliminary results, community social fabric had the 
strongest likelihood of strengthening residents’ ownership of their communities, 
irrespective of whether they lived in struggling (r=.61***), thriving (r=.61***) or suffering 
communities (r=.61***). Sense of security was possibly a second, even if weaker than 
social fabric, predictor in all three communities; but, security was more important to 
community ownership in suffering communities (r=.45***), followed by residents in 
struggling communities (r=.39***), and least in thriving communities(r=.37***).  
  
Of the two types of citizen actions considered, political activism appeared to have a 
stronger potential for strengthening community attachment than civic engagement. For 
example, political activism was most important to residents’ attachment in suffering 
communities (r=.58***); thriving community residents (.49***) followed by struggling 
communities (r=.52***) seem to have used political activism to strengthen attachment to 
their communities. Civic engagement was also an important tool, even if less so than 
political activism, to strengthen community ownership first in suffering communities 
(r=.17***), followed by struggling (r=.15***) and last in thriving (r= .12***). 
 
But, which of these mechanisms are the most effective in engendering community 
ownership? The unique roles that each of these tools played in strengthening 
community ownership were tested using multivariate analyses and are laid out in the 
next section. In keeping with the research design, the analyses were disaggregated by 
whether residents lived in Thriving, Struggling, or Suffering communities. 
 
 
Multivariate Linear Regression Analyses and Qualitative Insights 
 
A series of one-step multivariate analyses were used, separately for the three 
community subgroups, to test the robustness of the correlational analyses and the 
research hypotheses; see Table 3 below. Overall, a supportive social environment was 
the strongest predictor of how satisfied their residents were in all three communities. 
However, not all environments were equal nor were they equally effective in different 
communities. A vibrant social fabric took precedence over members’ sense of security. 
For example, the more supportive the social fabric was the more attached their 
members of the communities were (β=.45*** in Thriving, β=.41*** in Struggling, and 
β=.34*** in Suffering communities respectively). As per the Psychologist interviewee 
(Interviewee #4), when community members have a supportive environment, full of 
inclusion and security, they feel recognized, have a sense of purpose, and feel that their 
contributions to the community are actually elevated and noticed. These feelings, are a 
buy-in, and has a valuable impact on the communities as it creates a sense of 
commitment. Without a supportive environment, resident don't feel a buy-in and when 
their contributions are dismissed, they feel alienated. Such disjointedness ends up 
hurting the very people that live there.  
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Table 3. Regression Analysis of Community Attachment1 
NADAC, 2010 – Soul of The Community. β Coefficients 
  
Community Attachment 
 
 
Thriving Struggling Suffering 
Community Environment: 
   Social Fabric  
 
.45*** 
 
.41*** 
 
.34*** 
   Sense of Security  .11*** .13*** .14** 
Citizen Actions: 
   Political Activism 
 
.19*** 
 
.23*** 
 
.32*** 
   Civic Engagement .03** .03* .07 
Demographics: 
   Age  
 
.09*** 
 
.09*** 
 
.04 
   Gender .04*** .03* -.05 
   SES -.01 -.04*** -.05 
   Length of residency -.01 -.01 -.03 
Model Statistics: 
   
   Constant 2.36*** 2.87*** 10.68*** 
   Adjusted R2 .43*** .45*** .46*** 
   DF 1 & 2 8 & 7534 8 & 4347 8 & 281 
***p≤.001;**p≤.01;*p≤.05 
1 Index of Community Attachment = Community as a place to live + Recommend community to others + Proud to live 
  in this community + This community is perfect for me. Possible Ranges: 4 -100 for all groups;  
  Index of Social Fabric = Availability of social community events + Availability of parks and playgrounds + Availability 
  of arts and cultural opportunities + Good place to meet people and make friends + Vibrant nightlife - restaurants,  
  clubs, bars, etc. + People care about each other + Attended a local event; 6 - 60 for all groups; 
  Index of Sense of Security = Feel safe walking alone at night near your home + Level of Crime in your Community +  
  Change in local crime level in past year + Effectiveness of Local Police; Possible Ranges: 4-18 for all groups; 
  Index of Political Activism = Registered to vote + Voted in the local election + Leadership of elected officials + Local  
  leaders represent my interests + Level of trust in local government + Attended a public meeting; Possible Ranges: 6  
  - 68 for thriving groups, 6 - 56 for struggling groups, 6 - 44 for suffering groups; 
  Index of Civic Engagement = Performed local volunteer work + Worked with others to change community + Donated  
  money to a local organization + Residents' impact on improving community. Possible Ranges: 4 -15 for struggling  
  and thriving groups, 4 - 14 for suffering groups: 
  Female (1) versus Male (0); 
  Age:  1 = 18-24, 2 = 25-34, 3 = 35-44, 4 = 45-54, 5 = 55-64, 6 = 65 and older; 
  Index of Socio-economic Status = Income Range * Highest level of education completed; Range: 1- 48 for all groups; 
  Length of Residency = 1-97 years. 
 
 
 
Similarly, even though to a lesser extent, the more secure residents felt in their 
communities, the more satisfied they were with their communities (Suffering β=.145**, 
Struggling β=.13*** and Thriving β =.11***). That is, residents felt more ownership in 
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communities that were secure (supported by Interviewee #4). However, community 
context, whether thriving or not, also mattered. Of the different mechanisms considered 
here, a strong social fabric was the most important for residents of thriving 
communities4. And security was more relevant to member attachment in the Suffering 
(β=.145**) and Struggling (β=.13***) communities than in Thriving communities 
(β=.11***).  
 
In addition to a supportive community environment, citizen actions were also a 
necessary set of options for strengthening community attachment. Civic Actions, 
particularly political activism but not civic engagement, was a critical element in 
member’s satisfaction, most in Suffering communities5 (β = .32***). Political activism was 
less relevant in the Struggling (β= .23***) and Thriving (β= .19***) in that order.  
 
Two other noteworthy patterns were evident in the comparisons among the three 
communities. For one, of the three tools for building community attachment, 
strengthening the social fabric was by far the most important to members of Thriving 
(β=.45***) and Struggling (β=.41***) communities. On the other hand, members of the 
Suffering communities equally valued a strong social fabric (β=.34***) and political 
activism (β=.32***). Second, members of all three groups equally valued sense of 
security in their commitment to their communities (Thriving β=.11***, Struggling β=.13***, 
and Suffering β=.14**). But priorities in suffering communities were strong fabric and 
political activism. 
 
While having a supportive social fabric is important for community attachment, 
significant differences across the three communities indicated that an affluent, lack 
thereof, social context matters. While affluent community conditions are prime for more 
social interactions (as in the Thriving Communities), others, as the Suffering group, 
have limited resources and opportunities to engage in social events. No doubt, 
residents in the Suffering communities, that have a large percentage living below the 
poverty line, also desire to cultivate in social connections. Nevertheless, their priorities 
to work and provide for their families might be more pressing. Advocating for their 
material needs and making sure their voices are heard is equally as important as the 
social fabric in their community, whereas in thriving communities there is less of a need 
for political activism perhaps because they are already being listened to. And while 
sense of security is important in all of the communities it is not a primary concern when 
looking at community satisfaction as compared to political activism and social fabric. 
 
Political activism is critical because it is one of the most important ways individuals in a 
community can feel a sense of belonging and knowledge of how to access political 
leadership. It is important for any healthy community to discuss, critic their situation, and 
do some problem solving. In the process of having these conversations, a person is 
able to understand that some of the challenges they face can be addressed with some 
                                                        
4 Z Scores of the differences in unstandardized regression coefficients among all 3 groups were  
  statistically significant at the .05 level.  
5 Z Scores of the differences in unstandardized regression coefficients among all 3 groups were  
  statistically significant at the .05 level.  
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activism. “If you feel you are not alone and have some power to exercise your rights and 
access political influence you will feel better about you self and better about your 
neighborhood when it comes to change (Social Worker, Interviewee #1).” Feeling better 
about your community through political activism is confirmed from the multivariate 
findings. It’s strong positive influence on community attachment comes from the 
demands that political activism places on individuals to collaborate and interact.  
 
The opportunities to interact is present a bit in civic engagement as well, but only in 
thriving (β=.03**)  and struggling (β=.03**) communities. Civic engagement was not a 
viable option to strengthening community attachment in the suffering group; there was 
no empirical relationship to support civic engagement. Inquiring into why civic 
engagement might not be an appropriate strategy for strengthening community 
attachment in suffering communities, the Community Organizer (Interviewee #1) had 
this to say: with a sense alienation in some communities, there is less connection, and 
fewer opportunities, and consequently community attachment stays stagnant. This does 
not necessarily mean that they are avoiding a collective bond; it just indicates that it is 
not a priority amidst the financial stress and challenges of providing for their families. 
Civic engagement strengthened community attachment in thriving and struggling 
communities, but their economic conditions were less dire in these communities. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  
In the concluding sections, a synthesis of the study findings with theoretical premises 
and practical applications were explored. Some suggestions for future research, 
specifying additional conditional boundary limits of communities, were also outlined.  
 
Empirical and Applied Implications 
 
There were clear boundary limiting conditions in what made residents of thriving, 
struggling, and suffering communities felt attached to and took ownership of their 
communities. In thriving communities, a supportive social fabric was the most important 
predictor of community attachment; political activism and sense of security were a 
distant second. In contrast, politically active residents along with a supportive social 
environment were the keys to strong sense of belonging for residents of suffering 
communities. Notable differences were also observed in the respective ranking of the 
three critical priorities in community attachment. In suffering communities, a resident’s 
sense of security can come only after a supportive social environment is established 
and citizens become politically engaged. On the other hand, in both thriving and 
struggling communities’ sense of security is less as priority than a strong social fabric. 
The sociologist (Interviewee #3) interviewed for this research placed these boundary 
limits in perspective thusly: If a community is very tight-knit, in the sense of offering 
ample opportunities for socialization, their residents can “socialize and thrive by 
introducing good lighting on the streets, creating open areas or spaces where people 
talk, and making sidewalks large enough for conversations to occur amidst the foot 
traffic. The way we design cities creates socialization and a deep sense of pride, but 
additionally can control for deviance”. He went on to explain that with a bustling social 
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fabric, it inadvertently reduces crime because criminals are not naïve; they are 
cognizant that if they are visibly seen or can’t assure a quick escape then they will be 
caught. Therefore, security is less of a priority in these thriving communities considering 
that their social fabric mostly insulates residents from crime. 
 
These findings about boundaries of community attachment could be useful to interested 
stakeholders, such as local government officials, social workers, and community 
organizing nonprofits/organizations, in developing tailored strategies for boosting 
community attachment amongst their citizens. Community attachment is conditional; 
one first must identify whether the community is thriving, struggling or suffering because 
the community building strategies or approaches to address any particular issue would 
and should be prioritized differently in each community. In all three groups, but 
particularly in suffering groups, political activism is a tool that stakeholders, including 
community residents, can use. No doubt, encouraging civic engagement by residents in 
struggling and thriving groups is important but until their socioeconomic conditions 
improve, especially in struggling communities, developing attachment through civic 
engagement will be a challenge. For example, in Suffering Communities, where a 
considerable percentage of their population live in poverty, unless their economic 
poverty situations are addressed, attempts at impactful changes will be of limited 
effectiveness.  
 
One community organization that has already been taking efforts to strengthening the 
social fabric of their neighborhood is Michigan’s Urban Neighborhood Initiative (UNI 
Annual Report, 2017). This non-profit’s mission is to work with communities to develop 
safe and thriving environments, in the hopes that everyone will feel attached to the 
place where they work live and play. By taking on various projects in the town of Spring 
Wells and Detroit, Michigan citizens have seen their neighborhoods transform before 
their eyes. In their annual report they address targeting issues of youth development, 
land use economic development, and education. “By collaborating with the resident they 
reveal their attachment to the community and each other. Spring Wells and Detroit 
vacant lots, streets, and sidewalks were filled with memories of joy and love, and by 
tapping these residents on the street knowledge, these places are filled with hope and 
promise! (UNI Annual Report, 2017)” Testimonials like these provide a glance of the 
power that communities have when addressing major impactors of community 
attachment. 
 
 
Theoretical implications 
 
From a theoretical point of view (Figure 1), the affluent persistence model was 
conditionally supported in this analysis; a supportive community environment was the 
most critical tool for attachment in the more affluent communities but not so strong in 
the less affluent neighborhoods. The wealth in a neighborhood shapes the 
opportunities, security, and social networks of the residents, which, in turn, improves 
their quality of life and overall wellbeing (Solari 2012). It is this overall satisfaction, 
independent of personal and family status, that generate and sustain strong ties 
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towards their collective community. Indicators of affluence are expressed not only in the 
high economic status of the neighborhood but also its unattainability for those on the 
outside. One of the clearest visual cues of social exclusion are gates and walls 
bordering wealthy communities. Affluent communities maintain their exclusive position 
and status of their neighborhood through social exclusion (Deener, 2010). In contrast, 
persistently poor neighborhoods, are not primarily concerned with the maintenance and 
renovation of their community. It is to be expected that their residents’ attention is, first 
and foremost, to their families. While deteriorating buildings, increased crime, and 
disinvestment persist in suffering communities, so does the need for members to 
provide for their children. As a result, living in chronically distressed areas creates 
disadvantages that makes it increasingly difficult not only to exit poverty but also to build 
community attachment.  
 
Figure 1. Empirical and Theoretical Model of Community Attachment:  
Impacts on Civic Engagement and Political Activism  
NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community1,2,3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
› 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
1  Key: Thriving =                              Struggling =                              Suffering = 
    2 See Table 3 for index coding. 
 3 Controls and Civic Engagement were not modeled because they did not have significant effect    
    on community attachment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Community 
Attachment 
(β = .41***)
 
 
 
 
 
Supportive Community 
Environment  
(Solari’s Affluent 
neighborhood persistence 
model): 
 
 
 
 
Citizen Actions 
(Powell and DiMaggio’s New 
Institutionalism Theory) 
Social Fabric 
Sense of Security 
Political Activism 
(β = .45***) 
(β = .34***) 
(β = .11***) 
(β = .13***) 
(β = .14**) 
(β = .19***) (β = .23***) 
(β = .32***) 
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Additionally, there was conditional support for the New Institutionalist theory in the most 
disadvantaged communities. Even if citizens in persistently poor neighborhoods might 
lack political power, they may find a collective identity and attachment through engaging 
in political activism. The Boyle Height Los Angeles community offers an excellent 
example (Kamya, 2017). In a community that suffers from a heavy presence and 
concentration of gang violence, the mothers came together as a community to address 
the issue of their children’s safety on the streets. In a community forum, one mother 
recounted her story of spending the night lying on the street with the rest of the 
community. They laid on the ground where a child had previously been shot in a drive 
by and engaged in this protest to demand that the city of Los Angeles paves a speed 
bump on the road (a request that was multiply denied prior). Eventually the demand was 
met, demonstrating that when people connect to a mission, their community attachment 
and sense of ownership can be fostered and deepened. 
 
However, while politically active citizenry was one of two most instrumental in creating  
community attachment in suffering communities (as per the Institutionalists), it might not 
be sufficient. There is also the need for a supportive social environment to foster 
community ownership. Even though residents in suffering communities might be 
interested in volunteering and contributing to the public good, their primary focus is on 
maintaining taking care of their families (e.g., paying the bill, mortgage, and providing 
for family). It is these competing priorities in suffering communities that might explain 
why civic engagement was not a relevant factor to community attachment. 
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
While the theoretical and empirical models of supportive environments and community 
actions considered in this analysis offered a coherent explanation (Adjusted R2 = over 
0.40) of community ownership in communities, irrespective of their affluence or lack 
thereof, there is still much to be learned. Theoretically and programmatically, community 
engagement and ownership are also built on shared beliefs and traditions, both spiritual 
and ethnic. The Social Worker (Interviewee #1), interviewed for this research, noted the 
potential for local churches, neighborhood rituals/practices, and shared traditions to 
strengthen community attachment. More research is called for on how belonging to an 
ethnic niche, rich in traditions or to a community with similar (and divergent) religious 
beliefs and practices can encourage political activism, strengthen social fabric, and in 
the long run, build community attachment. Additionally, professional interviewees also 
pointed to race and immigration in communities; how do individuals of color and 
immigrants connect to their communities and how can those connections be 
strengthened?  
 
Theoretically, further elucidation of the functional and power dynamics involved in 
creating and sustaining conditional boundaries of community ownership can offer 
advances in the field of sociology of communities. If societies and social systems are 
not equally functional or resilient in facing challenges and dealing with conflict (Powers 
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2004), it is a theoretical and programmatic imperative of scholars to clarify the internal 
(to the community) and external dynamics that facilitate or hamper healthy communities.  
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Demographic and Socioeconomic Controls 
 
Demographics: Sex and Age (Controls) 
NADAC, 2010–  Soul of The Community 
Concepts Indicators  Values OR Responses  
 
Statistics 
 
 
   Thriving            Struggling         Suffering 
Demographics 
 
SEX of Respondent 0. Male 
1 Female 
42.5% 
57.5 
44.6% 
55.4 
48.9%*** 
51.1 
   
Age Range of 
Respondent 
 
 
1. 18-24 
2. 25-34 
3. 35-44 
4. 45-54  
5. 55-64 
6. 65 and older 
 
 
7.4% 
9.0 
12.6 
17.3 
21.3 
30.9                                                             
 
2.9% 
5.1 
12.2 
20.0  
23.2   
34.5          
 
3.7%***  
5.0   
7.4 
20.5  
27.1 
33.2
 Educational 
Achievement  
1. Grade school or less.      
2. Some High school 
3. High School 
4. Some College or  
Technical School 
5. College Graduate 
6. Post Graduate work or 
degree 
 
0.8% 
3.4 
16.4 
28.1 
 
26.3 
25.0 
1.5% 
4.2 
21.1 
31.8 
 
23.7 
17.8 
 
3.2%*** 
8.0 
24.1 
32.6 
 
18.7 
13.4 
 Annual Income 1. under 15,000 
2. 15,000 to 24,999                     
3. 25,000 to 34,999 
4. 35,000 to 44,999 
5. 45,000 to 54,999 
6. 55,000 to 74,999 
7. 75,000 to 99,999 
8. 100,000 or over 
5.2% 
6.9
9.7 
9.8 
11.1 
16.2 
13.9 
27.1 
9.6% 
11.9 
14.7 
13.0 
11.8 
14.9 
10.6 
13.5 
19.2%*** 
18.3 
15.5 
11.9 
7.9 
11.3 
6.7 
9.1 
 Index of Socio- 
Economic Status1 
Mean  
Standard Deviation 
Minimum - Maximum 
26.36 
13.74 
1-48 
20.52 
12.98 
1-48 
15.98*** 
12.51 
1-48 
 Length of Residency Mean  
Standard Deviation 
Minimum - Maximum 
32.93 
24.01 
1- All my 
Life 
35.18 
24.53 
1- All my 
Life 
38.28*** 
24.80 
1- All my 
Life 
1 Index of Socio-Economic Status = (QD9 * QD7). Among These indicators correlational values are between .45*** to  
  .48*** (***p <= .001).  
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Appendix B. Interview Protocol and Consent Forms  
 
Letter of Consent 
Dear _______________: 
 
I am a Sociology Senior working on my Research Capstone Paper under the direction of Professor 
Marilyn Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University.  I am conducting my 
research on the differential impacts of community attachment in thriving, struggling and suffering 
communities. 
 
You were selected for this interview, because of your knowledge of and experience working in the area of 
community development. 
 
I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to questions about civic engagement, 
political activism, and community attachment. The interview will last about 20 minutes. Your participation 
in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose to not participate or to withdraw from the interview 
at any time. The results of the research study may be presented at SCU’s Annual Anthropology/Sociology 
Undergraduate Research Conference and published (in a Sociology department publication). 
Pseudonyms will be used in lieu of your name and the name of your organization in the written paper. 
You will also not be asked (nor recorded) questions about your specific characteristics, such as age, race, 
sex, religion. 
 
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please call/email me at ___  or Dr. Fernandez 
at mfernandez@scu.edu 
 
Sincerely, 
Elizabeth Kamya 
 
By signing below, you are giving consent to participate in the above study. (If the interviewee was 
contacted by email or phone, request an electronic message denoting consent). 
______________________         ____________________          ____________ 
Signature                                     Printed Name                             Date 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you 
have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of 
Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591. 
 
Interview Schedule for Supplemental Qualitative Interviews 
Interview Date and Time: ____________ 
Respondent ID#: __  
1. What is the TYPE Agency/Organization/Association/Institution (NO NAME, please) where you 
learned about (and/or worked) with this issue: Establishing community attachment in thriving, 
struggling, and suffering communities? 
2.  What is your position in this organization? ___________________________ 
3.  How long have you been in this position and in this organization? 
____________________________ 
4. Based on what you know of community development, how crucial is attachment of community 
members? That is, typically, how attached are members to their communities?  
5. Based on your experience what are some reasons why some community members are very 
attached while others are not? Could you expand a bit more? 
6. How important are citizens actions to improve community attachment? 
7. Could engagement improve resident’s attachment to their communities? How so? 
8. How important is a supportive community environment in regard to improving attachment? 
9. In your opinion what makes for a supportive community environment? 
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10. In your opinion, what are some reasons that contribute to this problem (issue or concern)?  
(PROBE with: Could you expand a bit more?). 
11. [If the respondent does not bring up your independent concepts as potential causes), PROBE: 
a. How about Social Fabric  
b. How about Sense of Security 
c. How about Political Activism 
d. How about Civic Engagement 
12. Is there anything else about this issue/topic I should know more about? 
 
Thank you very much for your time. If you wish to see a copy of my final paper, I would be glad to share it 
with you at the end of the winter quarter. If you have any further questions or comments for me, I can be 
contacted at ekamya@scu.edu. Or if you wish to speak to my faculty advisor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, she 
can be reached at mfernandez@scu.edu. 
 
Appendix C Table 2. Correlation Matrix (r)   
Table 2A. 
Correlational Matrix of Thriving and Suffering communities: Indices of Community Attachment, 
Supportive Community Environment, Citizens Actions, Gender, Age, and Socio-economic Status, 
Length of Residency1,2 
 Index of 
Community 
Attachment  
Index 
of 
Social 
Fabric 
Index of 
sense of 
security 
Index of 
Civic 
Political 
Activism 
Index of 
Civic 
Engagemen
t  
Sex Age Index 
SES 
Length of 
residency 
Index of 
Community 
Attachment 
 
1.00 
 
.61*** .45*** 
 
.58*** .22*** -.02 .13** .01 
 
.04 
Index of Social 
Fabric 
.61*** 1.00 .44*** .55*** .21*** -.01 .07 .12* .09 
Index of Sense 
of Security 
 
.37*** .40*** 1.00 .43*** .17*** -.20*** .04 .100 .06 
Index of 
Political 
Activism 
.49*** .52*** .39*** 1.00 .20*** .12* .15**  .01 
 
.04 
Index of Civic  
Engagement  
.12*** .13*** .12*** .13*** 
 
 
1.00 .03 .04 .07 -.01 
Female vs. 
Male 
.08*** .07*** -.12*** .09*** .041*** 1.00 .10 -.11* .02 
Age .17*** .12*** .02 .17***  .015 .06*** 1.00 -.02 .13** 
Index of SES -.02 -.03** .13*** 0.0 .02 -.13*** -.07*** 1.00 -.12* 
Length of 
Residency 
.03** .04*** -.04*** .05*** .00 .06*** .30*** -.18*** 1.00 
***p≤.001;**p≤.01;*p≤.05 
1 Index of Community Attachment = Community as a place to live + Recommend community to others + Proud to live in this community  
  + This community is perfect for me. Possible Ranges: 4.0-36.0; 
Index of Social Fabric = Availability of social community events + Availability of parks and playgrounds + Availability of arts and cultural  
opportunities + Good place to meet people and make friends + Vibrant nightlife - restaurants, clubs, bars, etc. + People care about 
each other + Attended a local event. Possible Ranges: 6.0 - 60.0; 
Index of Sense of Security = Feel safe walking alone at night near your home + Level of Crime in your Community + Change in local 
crime level in past year + Effectiveness of Local Police; Possible Ranges: 4.0 -18.0; 
Index of Political Activism = Level of trust in local government + Local leaders represent my interests + Registered to vote + Voted in 
the local election. Possible Ranges: 6.0 - 68.00; 
Index of Civic Engagement = Performed local volunteer work + Donated money to a local organization+ Worked with others to change 
community + Residents' impact on improving community. Possible Ranges: 4.0-12.0; 
Sex: Male = 0, Female = 1; 
Age:  1 = 18-24, 2 = 25-34, 3 = 35-44, 4 = 45-54, 5 = 55-64, 6 = 65 and older; 
Index of Socio-economic Status = Income Range + Highest level of education completed; 1- 48 for all groups; 
Length of Residency = 1= 1-5, 2= 6-10, 3= 11-20, 4= 21-30, 5= 31-40, 6=41-50, 7=51-60, 8=61-75, 9= 76 or more; 
2 Correlations above the value of 1 refer to suffering communities and correlations below the value of 1 refer to suffering groups. 
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Table 2A. 
Correlational Matrix for Struggling communities: Indices of Community Attachment, Supportive 
Community Environment, Citizens Actions, Gender, Age, and Socio-economic Status, Length of 
Residency1,2 
 Index of 
Community 
Attachment  
Index 
of 
Social 
Fabric 
Index of 
sense of 
security 
Index of 
Civic 
Political 
Activism 
Index of Civic 
Engagement  
Sex Age Index 
SES 
Length of 
residency 
Index of 
Community 
Attachment 
 
1.00 
 
  
 
     
 
 
Index of Social 
Fabric 
.61*** 1.00       . 
Index of Sense 
of Security 
 
.39*** .43** 1.00 .  -    
Index of 
Political 
Activism 
.52*** .54*** .38*** 1.00 .     
 
 
 
Index of Civic  
Engagement  
 
.15** 
 
.15*** 
 
.11*** 
 
.15*** 
 
 
 
1.00 
    
Female vs. 
Male 
.06*** .06*** -.13*** .10*** .03* 1.00    
 
Age 
 
.21*** .14*** .05*** .21***  .05** .03** 1.00   
Index of SES 
 
-.04** -.01 .12*** -.00 .02 -.14*** -.00 1.00  
Length of 
Residency 
.05*** .03** -.03* .08*** .00 .03** .29*** -.12*** 1.00 
***p≤.001;**p≤.01;*p≤.05 
1 Refer to table 2.A for Index Coding 
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The Middle Eastern Societies 
Institutional Trust in Political Turmoil and Stasis 
  
By 
Noor Darwish1 
 
ABSTRACT. There is a general lack of citizen trust in governmental 
institutions in the Middle East, especially because of changing of 
governments and resulting turmoil. Sequential Mixed Methodology was 
used, in which data from the 2016 Arab Barometer were supplemented 
with qualitative insights from two professionals knowledgeable about the 
political climate in the Middle East and content analyses of relevant 
journalistic accounts. A comparison of North Africa (characterized by 
political turmoil) and the Levant (political stasis) countries in how 
government functionality (efficacy, stability, and corruption), as 
perceived by their citizens, differentially colored trust in governmental 
institutions was used to illustrate the citizen-government dynamics that 
resulted in citizens questioning the legitimacy of government authority. 
Predictions, based on Max Weber’s theory of Political Legitimacy and 
Gaetano Mosca’s Elite Theory, that, on balance, functional governments 
will garner more citizen’s trust in the Levant than in North Africa, while 
corruption will have a more corrosive effect were supported. A trust 
surplus occurred as a result of governmental functionality, balancing out 
the trust deficit created by government dysfunctionality. These findings 
contributed to existing theoretical and empirical literature on the 
contested relationship between citizens and their governments. 
Additional research on sectarian and ethnic conflicts and types of 
government (monarchy, authoritarian, democratic) in the region as they 
have shaped citizen trust is warranted. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Middle East is a hard region to define, primarily due to the wide range of countries, 
the many languages or dialects, cultures, and traditions, it encompasses. Even though 
the region has no standardized definition, it can generally be split into three groups. The 
first group is comprised of the Gulf countries (Gulf Cooperation Council) which include 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar. The second group, referred to as the 
“Levant”, is comprised of, but not limited to, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan. The 
third is the “North Africa” group which includes Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. 
The latter two is the focus in this research paper. 
  
The Gulf countries have enjoyed economic success in the last few decades and are 
considered powerful Middle Eastern countries on a global scale. But, over the last 
couple of decades, many countries in the North African and Levantine regions of the 
                                                        
1 Acknowledgments. I would like to thank Dr. Marilyn Fernandez for her guidance, encouragement and 
patience. In addition to thanks to my interviewees, who provided valuable insight into my research.  
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Middle East have experienced turmoil as a result of multiple wars, including civil wars 
and revolutions. Others look more static, even if in their extreme class inequality. For 
example, among the Northern African countries, Egypt has gone through a revolution 
and a political coup. Even though Algeria and Morocco have not recently been through 
governmental turmoil, they are characterized by poverty and instability. In the Levant 
camp, Syria is currently fighting a civil war and dealing with a huge refugee crisis, 
Palestine is under military occupation of the Israeli army, and Jordan is in political stasis 
but characterized by class inequality. 
 
The Middle East is a region that is always featured in the news, often under the section 
involving war, disaster and terrorism. Yet there is very little coverage and research 
regarding the effects of the turmoil and dramatic change in governments and war on 
citizens’ lives. Such lacunae are especially acute in the United States whose foreign 
policy in the Middle East has greatly affected the political dynamics of its current 
landscape. Consequently, the level of trust Middle East citizens have in their 
governmental bodies have decreased over the last couple of decades. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
There is much scholarly literature on the politico-historical events that have occurred 
over the last few decades in the Middle East, specifically in the Levant and North 
African regions. Another stream in the Middle East scholarship has been about the 
economics-citizen trust equation, and the relationship between corruption and trust. 
  
The New Arab Order and Political Trust 
  
The 2011 uprisings that occurred across the Middle East created a “New Arab Order.” 
But soon after, the hopes of new democratic reform to replace autocratic regimes 
vanished. The uprisings were a result of citizen frustration with their countries stagnant 
economy and lack of political freedom (Lynch 2018:120). In the end, regimes were 
either overthrown as the byproduct of popular uprisings, or remained standing, as a 
result of the failure of popular uprising, or did not experience any popular uprisings. In 
either event, a shift was created in which traditionally strong powers such as Egypt2 
have collapsed and are now “barely functional states” (Lynch 2018:116). On the other 
hand, Gulf countries, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for 
historical and unique global economic reasons, have been able to maintain a strong 
political and economic presence in both the Middle East and worldwide; these Gulf 
countries were not part of the Arab Barometer survey, and are not included in this 
research. 
  
On the world stage, the Middle East has become a playground for both Western major 
powers and other powers such as Russia, to achieve their own political and economic 
goals. Power in the Middle East operates through “influence peddling and proxy 
                                                        
2 Which were included in the 2016 Arab Barometer Survey, the source of survey data for this paper. 
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warfare” (Lynch 2018:116). As a result, there is great sense of insecurity among the 
citizenry of the Middle East; for example, citizens are unsure of the likelihood of another 
uprising or civil war. In this volatile political climate, academics, politicians and others 
have posed important questions about the impacts of failed states, unresolved crises of 
governance, unrest and the resulting turmoil on the political attitudes of citizens. 
 
For one, the protests that swept through the North African and Levantine regions of the 
Middle East changed “two key civic attitudes, trust and tolerance”, fundamental to well-
functioning democracies (Spierings 2017:4). Niels Spierings synchronized over 40 Arab 
Barometer and World Values Survey conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen, from before and after the uprisings. 
Using macro-level analysis, Spiering associated a fall in political-institutional trust with 
the uprisings in countries that went through democratic reform or regime change. 
Politics became less trustworthy to citizens as a result of “misbehaving” politicians and 
unsuccessful social reform policies. 
 
North Africa and the Origins of the Arab Spring 
 
The North African region of the Middle East includes Morocco, Libya, Sudan, Egypt and 
Tunisia, and Algeria. Tunisia was the birthplace of the Arab Spring in 2011, when 
Mohammed Bouzaizi, a street vendor, set himself on fire as a form of protest. His action 
was a catalyst for the wider Arab Spring. Since then, democracy and reform have 
become the focal point of pride in a region that needed it (Bremmer 2019). Protesters 
demanded that the government tackle rising corruption, reduce income inequality, 
create jobs, and increase wages. However, Bremer claimed that even though a 
democratic regime replaced the former president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, it has not 
been a successful transition. For example, almost ten years later, Tunisia ’s 
unemployment rate is 30%, GDP per capita is low, wages are stagnant, and there is 
heavy dependence on financial support from the International Monetary Fund. Amidst 
such economic chaos, almost 11,000 demonstrations took place in 2018. 
 
Like Tunisia, Egypt, also saw the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and in 2012, 
Mohamed Morsi, who represented the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected president. 
However, the democratic period in Egypt only lasted till 2014, when a military coup, 
spearheaded by Abed Fattah el-Sisi, led to the return of an authoritarian regime. The 
military coup used disorder of the popular protest to assume power (Ketchley 2018). 
Currently, Abdel Fattah el- Sisi's push towards a presidential term extension, by 
changing the constitution, is indicative of the corruption and illegitimacy of his reign. 
  
Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Morocco, the third country in the North African region, did not 
experience a change in government. However, in 2011, a new constitution was 
introduced that aimed to improve democracy and the rule of law (Al Jazeera and 
Agencies 2011). In addition, a stronger separation of powers within governmental 
branches was created, giving the prime minister and parliament more executive 
authority and ultimately reducing the authority of the King Mohammed VI. The 
referendum on constitutional reforms, held on July 1st 2011, was approved by 98.49% 
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of voters, legitimizing the authoritative governing system in Morocco (No Author[a], BBC 
News 2011). Yet, despite the reforms, and increased transparency, corruption remains 
a major problem within the country, and elected officials power to change policy is 
heavily constrained (No Author[b], Freedom House 2019). 
  
Algeria the fourth country in the North Africa region, suffered through a civil war during 
the 1990’s, which resulted in the death of 100,000 Algerians (Algiers, Economist 2012). 
On May 10 1992, a general election was held. However, the electoral change was not 
deemed as revolutionary, especially considering that the 1992 elections were hijacked 
by the army in order to stop the Islamic Salvation Front from winning (Algiers 2012). On 
January 12, 2011 26-year-old Mohamed Aouichia set himself on fire in Algeria. The next 
day, January 13, 2011, Mohsen Bouterfif also set himself on fire. The two suicides were 
followed by many others causing hundreds of protesters to take to the streets. In 
response, a National Coordination for Change and Democracy was created with the aim 
of seeking systemic change. However, these protests notwithstanding, Algeria remained 
unaffected by the Arab Spring, mostly because it was recovering from the civil war and 
Algerians were fearful of further instability (Daoud 2015). 
 
The Levant 
  
The Levantine region of the Middle East, the second considered in this paper, includes 
Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Israel; the region is sometimes extended to include 
Cyprus and Turkey. This region has faced intractable sectarian and ethnocentric 
conflicts, including, but not limited to the Palestinian-Israeli crisis, the independence 
struggle of the Kurds, and the rise of ISIS. The Levant is a volatile region that is deeply 
affected by broader Middle Eastern conflicts. The geopolitical clash between the Iran-
led and Saudi-led camps, the ideological conflict among the Muslim Brotherhood 
groups, and other religious conflicts has led to the internal fragmentation of the Levant 
(Dalacoura 2018:32). Global actors, such as the United States and Russia, have also 
contributed to the prolonged instability and vulnerable state of the region. 
  
Lebanon, with its fairly longstanding constitutional system, was not affected by the Arab 
Spring, much like its Levantine neighbors (Di Peri 2014). Yet, Lebanon experienced its 
own “spring” in 2005, following the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Al 
Hariri. His death was a catalyst of political change, which ultimately led to the end of 
Syrian military occupation of Lebanon and the withdrawal of Syrian troops. Lebanon, 
typified by confessionalism3, faces continued conflict in its civil society primarily because 
of the power imbalance among the various religious, ethnic, and associated political 
communities. But, even though the opportunity to change its political structure of 
                                                        
3 Confessionalism is a consciational system of government that proportionally allocates political 
power among a country's communities according to their percentage of the population (Harb 
2006). Per consciationalist governing principles: there is a proportional (numerical 
representation) allocation of political posts among communities with a grand coalition between 
community leaders on common policies that serve all. But there is communal autonomy and 
freedom for each community to determine its own affairs (as in personal status laws and mutual 
veto power on any decisions deemed detrimental by any community. 
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consciationalism, presented itself during the Arab Spring, it was lost because of 
deepening sectarian divide and politics.  
  
The legitimacy of the rule of Jordan’s monarchy was based on its rentier system 
(Muasher 2018:114). A social contract, imposed from the top down, through public 
spending rather than political participation, secured support for governmental and elite 
rule. “In return for their patronage, states expected citizens to leave governing to a small 
elite, which, over time, became more and more isolated from the general population” 
(p.115). Unlike Lebanon and other Levantine countries, the instability in Jordan is more 
economic than political. For example, the 2011 protests in Jordan began as a fight 
against unemployment, inflation and corruption. A real constitutional monarchy and 
electoral reforms were demanded by the people. In response, economic reforms were 
introduced to address the holes in the social contract. But with no political changes, the 
economic reforms, of privatization of state-run industries and liberalizing trading 
systems, only ended up benefiting the elite as opposed to the general population. In the 
end, the economic reforms were associated with the self-enrichment of elites (p. 116-
18). In the last decade, Jordan’s patronage system has been threatened as a result of 
the declining financial support from oil-producing countries and the United States. While 
Jordan has taken steps to pacify the protestors, such as firing three prime ministers and 
reforming a third of the constitution after the 2011 protests, these measures have not 
led to more power sharing between the monarchy and the judicial and legislative 
branches of the government (Muasher 2018:121). In the long run, by buying the support 
of its elite class, the monarchical government is able to operate, even if inefficiently, and 
maintain is legitimacy. 
  
The Palestine, another Levantine country, has been strife with economic and political 
instability, primarily because of external political actors and internal strife. The 
Palestine-Israeli conflict can arguably be said to be one of the main reasons for regional 
distress in the Middle East. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 has been 
the source instability both in Palestine and in the broader Middle East. The West Bank 
is currently under military occupation; Gaza remains under military siege, and there 
have been numerous bombings in the last decade. Yet, there has been no political 
change, nor was the area directly affected by the Arab Spring in 2011. The Hamas 
government has been the de-facto governmental institution in Gaza since its election in 
2006, with Mohamoud Abbas as the president of the State of Palestine and Palestinian 
National Authority. However, instability and resulting dysfunctionality, both as a result of 
external forces, mainly Israel, and internal corruption, has become almost permanent. 
Elliott Abrams, an American Diplomat, stated that "corruption is an insidious destroyer, 
not only of Palestinian public finance but of faith in the entire political system” in his 
testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle 
East and South Asia (Elliot, CFR 2012).  
  
In short, starting in 2011, the Middle East region has seen an uneasy mix of great 
political turbulence and stasis. Even though the Levantine countries, such as Lebanon, 
Jordan and Palestine, are characterized by political stasis but without major upheavals, 
they were still affected by the neighboring uprisings and wider Middle Eastern instability. 
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On the other hand, Northern African countries, except for Algeria, have witnessed 
immense political turmoil. In either case, whether political stasis or turmoil, citizen trust 
in the political institutions in the region has been shaky at best. In fact, according to 
Global Corruption Barometer, despite half a decade since the Arab Spring, there is still 
“widespread public dissatisfaction with government efforts to curb public sector graft” 
(Pring 2016:5). Sixty-one percent of citizens in the region perceive corruption to have 
increased in the last year. 
 
Economic Vitality and Trust in Government 
   
Aside from political volatilities and the resulting shattered citizen trust, scholars have 
identified economic instability or lack of economic vitality as two other sources of citizen 
discontent and distrust. Two distinct dimensions of economic instability, material 
instability and perceptions of economic instability, have been noted for their eroding 
influences on citizen trust. 
  
Material Economic Instability and Trust Erosion  
  
Economic stability, which has been scarce in the Middle East, particularly since 2011, is 
an important element in the trust equation. Economic stability refers to stable, material 
conditions in which a country offers its citizens job opportunities, opportunities for civil 
and political involvement for its citizens, and flowing economic activity (Hashemi 
2017:87). And sustained economic stability is expected to lead to a higher standard of 
living for citizens. On the other hand, when there is economic instability in a country, the 
socially and economically marginalized, especially its youth, feel frustrated and 
powerless. Often, citizens hold the country’s government and/or its corporations 
responsible for their economic security. Under these unstable conditions, it is not 
surprising that youth participate in insurgency or political militant movements, further 
deepening regional instability (p. 83). 
  
Ironically, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region benefited from the wealth 
created by the increase in oil prices in the1970s. However, failure to create employment 
opportunities for the expanding labor force led to a deterioration in economic conditions. 
Non-oil economies in the region rely heavily on “aid, capital flows, and worker 
remittances” from the oil- producing Middle Eastern countries (Abed and Davoodi, IMF 
2013). “Political fragmentation, recurring conflicts, and authoritarian rule have hampered 
the development of democratic institutions and remain major obstacles to economic 
reform” (Abed and Davoodi, IMF 2013). High-tariff barriers, imbalanced exchange rate 
policies, limited advancement of human capital, and poor provision of basic public 
goods and services are few of the many factors that have contributed to material or 
objective lack of economic growth within the region (Abed and Davoodi, IMF 2013). 
  
The material or objective strength of the economy is widely accepted to be directly 
linked to citizen trust in institutions (Eccles 2015:17). Eccles referenced Nye’s (1997) 
research which showed that governments who were unable to reduce unemployment, 
increase economic growth and provide social services were unable to gain trust from 
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citizens. Increased globalization has provided citizens with access to more information, 
allowing them to be more aware of their rights and demand more from their 
governments (Eccles 2015:19). Also, over the last few decades, “social modernization” 
has led to the transformation of the relationship between citizens of the state and its 
governmental body. The growing distrust and skepticism of younger, more educated 
citizens has led to a new style of politics in which, as quoted by Eccles, there is “… less 
deference to authority, more assertive styles of action, and higher expectations for the 
democratic process” (p. 18). For example, Algerians protested against President 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s decision to delay the April 18 presidential election despite 
announcing that he will not continue his presidency of 20 years for a 5th term. However, 
Bouteflika’s move to step down did not guarantee that the ruling elite, consisting of his 
brother, the army and several industrial bosses, would relinquish their power (Nossiter 
2019). Besides, while Algeria has natural gas reserves, the common citizens have seen 
very little economic gain, leaving the youth very concerned about the lack of job 
opportunities (Adamson and Charlton 2019).  
 
Amidst such economic stagnancy, access to information has allowed citizens to more 
accurately assess the income inequality in their country. If governments are responsible 
for providing regulations that ensure stability, it follows that citizen trust in the efficiency 
of governments will be measured through the type of policies and regulations 
implemented as opposed to simply the quantity (Siems and Schnyder 2014). In fact, 
these authors argued that since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, there has been a 
worldwide call for more government intervention, “ordoliberalism”, to restart the market 
economy so that citizens’ benefits, and interests can be furthered. Citizen awareness of 
the unfair distribution of wealth within the country was commented on by an Executive 
Director who was interviewed for this research (Interviewee #1). There is a pronounced 
difference, she said, between the lifestyle of government officials and that of regular 
working-class citizens. The government officials and leaders are always of the upper 
class while citizens are of the lower or middle class, with notably fewer material 
possessions and wealth. Therefore, citizens are demanding fair processes from their 
governments. On balance, it is not surprising that over the last few decades, public trust 
in government has been declining worldwide, including in the Middle East. 
 
Perceptions of Government (In)Efficacy and Citizen Trust 
  
A second stream in the literature on governments’ responsibility for economic stability 
and trust is the public’s perceptions of government efficacy and of their wellbeing. 
According to Tom van der Meer and Armen Hakhverdian (2016), while trust is based on 
the merit of governmental bodies, it is not based on actual policy performance but on 
the “perceptions of performance, accountability, impartiality, corruption” (p. 82). Meer 
and Hakhverdian, in their study of 42 countries in Europe (51,255 respondents) also 
showed that difference in process (greater accountability and impartiality), as opposed 
to macro-economic outcomes, explained variations in political trust, measured by 
“satisfaction with democracy” and “confidence in national political institutions” (p. 98). 
  
82
Silicon Valley Notebook, Vol. 17 [2019], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol17/iss1/1
83 
 
Other researchers who studied political trust have documented similar themes. 
According to Kong (2013), based on the archival data of 7,182 citizens in the Asia 
Barometer survey (2004), trust in government was contingent on government goodwill, 
namely their intentions and purposes and the extent to which the governmental systems 
operated in the best collective interest of the people. Institutional trust is also 
competence-based, which directly links to the performance and the system's ability to 
deal with problems. Trust in government is vital in order to have economic development 
and progressive public policy (p. 847). Kong found that the more goodwill and 
competence-based trust citizens had in their governments, the more satisfied they were 
(p.854). 
 
Corruption and Trust 
 
Corruption is an extremely negative version of government efficacy. According to the 
authors of the 2016 Arab Barometer (AlKhatib et al. 2018), financial and administrative 
corruption was the second (17.2%) most important challenge that citizens felt their 
country faced. Experts also posited that authoritarianism and corruption were two of the 
three most important challenges facing the region as per the “Arab Voices” survey 
conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Forty-eight out of the 
one-hundred-and-three experts surveyed stated that corruption is among the most 
pressing issue. Corruption takes many forms in the Middle East, including the use of 
security and armed forces to quell uprisings, which helps maintain leaders in their 
positions, derails the fight against political, minority and gender inequality and allows for 
religious and minority oppression and prosecution (Aman 2017:172). Another 2016 
Carnegie report titled “Arab Fractures: Citizens, States, and Social Contracts” also 
underscored the fact that political and economic control is linked to cronyism and 
corruption in the Middle East (Cammack et al. 2016). This linkage, they posited, must 
be broken if sustainable private-sector economic growth is to emerge. 
 
Restoring of Trust 
  
Broken trust (interpersonal and political) can be both a cause and consequence of 
corruption. Researchers have shown that countries characterized by corruption are 
stuck in a circle, where corruption creates a climate of distrust which, in turn, generates 
and nurtures more corruption. Restoring trust can be difficult since distrust “fosters a 
tolerant or acquiescent attitude toward corruption and, by creating the expectation of 
corrupt behavior among others, feeds individual participation in corruption” (Morris and 
Klesner 2010:1260). The normalizing and tolerance of official wrongdoing creates the 
casual expectation of negative conduct. Corruption erodes regime legitimacy, noted 
Morris. According to 2016 Global Corruption Barometer of MENA, nearly one third of 
citizens paid a bribe in the last year, approximately 50 million people. One in 3 people 
paid a bribe to the courts, while 1 in 4 paid a bribe to the police. Despite this, citizens 
feared retaliation if they spoke out about corruption, and 2 in 5 who did report corruption 
suffered retaliation. The unfair distribution of services through bribery, which 
undermines law and order, creates a negative environment that does not incite change. 
Morris went on to argue that the mutual causality between distrust and corruption make 
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it difficult to fight corruption; since distrust undermines citizen’s belief in governmental 
promises to fight corruption and undermines governmental effort to mobilize society to 
fight corruption. As a result, citizens tend to be cynical about politics therefore tend not 
to participate in the political process as they believe that their actions will not have an 
effect. As he Professor who was interviewed by the author (Interview #2) noted, feeling 
of helplessness and the lack of empowerment to fight against government corruption 
leads to not only lack of trust, but unwillingness to change the status quo. 
 
No doubt, it is worthwhile, despite the declining levels of citizen trust, for societies and 
their citizens, to ask how the broken trust can be restored. Chris Eccles (2015), in a 
2005 survey of Canadian Citizens, documented that, in, despite the trend of declining 
trust in governmental institutions, trust can be restored when public organizations 
provide good leadership and management (50–65% impact), equal and ethical 
treatment (10–15% impact), quality services (10–20% impact) and services that meet 
citizens’ and community needs (10–25% impact). In other words, the more citizens 
believed that governmental institutions benefit them, the more trust they had in the 
institutions. 
  
Suggestions for Future Research 
  
Economic Vitality (or lack thereof) and corruption have had tremendous negative 
impacts on citizen trust in the Middle East. The Arab Spring of 2011 dramatically 
changed the political landscape of many countries. While some countries, such as 
Libya, Sudan, Iran and Yemen, were not surveyed in the Arab Barometer, general 
political trends can be found within countries in North Africa versus the Levant regions. 
Many countries in North Africa experienced a change in regime type while in others 
governmental systems remained the same. Further research is needed in order to 
understand why certain governmental types, such as monarchies, despite corruption, 
were able to retain power and legitimacy using top-down social contracts and access to 
natural resources, while other governments and leaders were overthrown. Additionally, 
ethno-sectarian tensions exist within many countries, and across border lines in the 
region. For example, there has been an on-going religious Sunni and Shiite power 
struggle which has divided the populations, challenged political boundaries, and fueled 
terrorism and civil war. The polarization of identity groups has gravely affected stability 
in the region. These factors need to be examined to assess the extent of which internal 
conflict has affected citizen trust in governmental institutions and affected their 
perceptions of their government’s ability to ensure the country’s stability and the 
personal safety of all identity groups. 
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
  
In this research, an attempt was made to compare the level of trust that citizens in North 
Africa and the Levant region had in their governments’ functionality. Three dimensions 
of functionality were measured: perceptions of citizen’s stability, government efficacy, 
and corruption. Stability was indicated by feelings of personal safety and economic 
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stability. Perceptions of government efficacy covered areas of economy, employment, 
security and health. The third factor was corruption, based on perceptions of level 
corruption, government efforts to combat it, and cronyism. The following question was 
posed: “How does government functionality, as perceived by their citizens, differentially 
affect their trust in institutions in North Africa and Levant?” The control variables used in 
this research was level of education and gender to neutralize their potential confounding 
effects on trust in the government. 
  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
  
In order to theoretically explain why and how perceptions of government efficacy and 
stability, in particular personal economic stability and safety, as well as corruption affect 
the level of trust citizens have in their governments in the both North Africa and the 
Levant, political legitimacy and elite theory will be used. This analysis was theoretically 
framed using a synthesis of conceptual ideas offered by Weber (1964) and Dahl’s 
(1971) political legitimacy and Gaetano Mosca’s elite theories (1965). 
  
 
Elite Political Legitimacy and Related Hypotheses 
  
Political legitimacy refers to the right and acceptance of an authority, thereby giving the 
authority figure, or institutions as the case might be, the right to exercise power. The 
legitimacy of rulers or governments is derived from the population’s belief that the 
governing power appropriately uses the country’s laws and the constitution. To quote 
Max Weber “the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of 
willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority 
are lent prestige” (Weber, 1964:382). Robert A. Dahl expanded on Weber and 
compared legitimacy to a reservoir, where as long as the water is at a specific level, 
political stability is maintained, while if it drops below the specific level, political 
legitimacy is endangered (1971:124-88). Therefore, functional institutions, including 
perceptions of government efficacy and stability, will legitimize their authority and 
cultivate a trust surplus among its citizens. 
 
Gaetano Mosca in his elite theory outlined in his “The Ruling Class” (Meisel 1965), 
added more detailed nuances to the political legitimacy of elites. It is a given that 
political legitimacy is needed for governing and that there is always those who are rulers 
and those who are ruled. But, “the first class, always the less numerous” performs all 
political functions, monopolizes power and favour the benefits that accompany such 
power. On the other hand, the masses are directed and controlled by the ruling class, 
“in a manner that is now more or less legal” (p. 50). But, Mosca argued that power is not 
exclusively justified by the de facto possession of it, but states that those in power find a 
moral and legal basis for it, further legitimizing and deeming it a “necessary 
consequence of doctrines and beliefs” that are already recognized and accepted in 
societies (p. 71). However, the isolation of lower classes, and their lack of accessibility 
to the ruling class can lead to political upheaval (107). The consequent pressure arising 
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from the discontent of the masses, who are swayed by their passions, can influence the 
policies of the ruling class (p. 51). In other words, those who rule must garner the 
support of the masses in order to maintain their power (p. 51). Such support is gained 
through the consideration of the majorities’ beliefs and sentiments. Besides, in order for 
the minority to remain in power, they must be organized and efficient so that they can 
overcome the unorganized majority. Following Mosca’s elite political legitimacy 
arguments, it can be argued that when governments are seen to be functional, they will 
garner more citizen’s trust than otherwise. However, corruption can create a trust deficit, 
by corroding the trust that governments have garnered through their efficient provision 
of providing functional services to their citizens. 
  
Applying these theoretical arguments to the citizen-elite dynamics in the Levant and 
North Africa, elites in the Levant could be expected to garner more citizen trust than the 
North African elite because Levantine elites have maintained political stasis or stability, 
even if not economic progress. On the other hand, North African countries are not only 
ridden with economic equalities but also have been in political turmoil, and have 
experienced regime change which despite the hopes of many, did not bring about the 
expected economic and social change. Against this background, the first hypothesis 
tested in this study was: Functional governments will garner more citizen’s trust in the 
Levant than in North Africa, net of corruption, level of education and gender” 
(Hypothesis #1). 
  
However, when citizens perceive corruption in their government their trust will be 
shaken, creating a trust deficit. And given the volatile political histories of the North 
African region (because of the numerous changes in types of governments or rulers), 
the trust deficit caused by corruption is expected to be higher in North Africa than in the 
Levant. The Levant, on the contrary, has been characterized by political stasis, with 
stagnant governments and rulers, despite persistent economic inequality. Countries in 
North Africa, on the other hand, have experienced leader and government changes as a 
result of the Arab Spring yet also are burdened with economic and political turmoil. 
Therefore, we can hypothesize that corruption will have a more corrosive effect on 
citizen trust in North Africa than in the Levant. The many changes in the government 
elite in North Africa and to the extent there continues to dysfunction in each new 
government, there will be more net trust deficit, in North Africa than in the Levant 
(Hypothesis #2). 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Sequential mixed methodology was used, where statistical analyses of survey data 
were followed up with narrative accounting by journalists and other professionals to 
further interpret the statistical findings. Secondary survey data from the Middle East 
were used to measure and test the hypotheses about levels of trust in governmental 
institutions in the North African and the Levantine regions of the Middle East. Two 
narrative assessments provided by an Executive Director of an NGO in Lebanon and an 
international studies professor at an academic institution were supplemented with 
journalistic commentaries on the Middle East. 
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Secondary Data source 
  
The “Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016” was a public survey conducted to 
assess citizen attitudes about public affairs, governance, and social policy in their 
countries of residence in the Middle East. Questions about the political, social, religious, 
and cultural life of respondents were posed throughout the survey. In addition to some 
general questions, respondents were asked to evaluate their political institutions and 
political attitudes, elections and parliament, the media, democracy, social, religious and 
cultural topics, the Arab world and international relations, and current affairs. The Arab 
Barometer is vital to understanding key issues in the lives of ordinary citizens in Arab 
society so that governmental and nongovernmental bodies can use the information to 
base their solutions to the specific problems faced within specific countries and the 
region as a whole. 
  
“Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016” was carried out by eleven principal investigators 
(AlKhatib et al. 2018). Interviews were conducted in Arabic in the respondent’s place of 
residence to ensure a higher response rate and more truthful answers. The sample was 
drawn with the use stratified multi-stage sampling to cover a nationally representative of 
non- institutionalized adults aged 18 and above. In most countries the sample size was 
1,200 citizens. Furthermore, 300 Syrian nationals living in Jordan and Lebanon were 
interviewed. As shown in Appendix A, 49.9 % of the of the respondents were female 
and 50.1% were male in all countries except Egypt and Palestine. In Jordan, Lebanon 
and Tunisia 30.9% of the respondents had completed a secondary level of education 
while in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Palestine 28.9% of the respondents did so. 
  
Narrative Commentaries 
  
Several journalistic accounts in newspaper outlets, that offer commentary on current 
and past news in the Middle East, were used to ascertain on-the-ground perspectives 
on government functioning and citizen responses. The newspaper outlets included “The 
Economist,” “The New York Times” and “Al Jazeera.”  In addition, two interviews were 
conducted with professionals who have deep knowledge about the functioning (or 
dysfunctions) of governmental institutions in North Africa and the Levant. The first 
interviewee (Interviewee #1, Professor) is an international studies professor at a 
university. Her specific focus is the Middle East. The second interviewee was an 
Executive Director (Interviewee #2) at an NGO in Lebanon, and has worked directly with 
the ministry of education to make education accessible to all children. She has 
volunteered for the NGO for 10 years, and has been the executive director for three 
years. 
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DATA ANALYSIS 
  
Three types of statistical analyses, disaggregated by North Africa and Levant, were 
used in order to explore the validity of the hypotheses. Univariate analysis was, first, 
used to describe the sample using trust in institutions, perceptions of government 
efficacy, stability and corruption. Second, to explore the primary empirical relationship of 
level of trust in governmental institution with perceptions of government efficacy, 
stability, and corruption, bivariate correlations were used. Finally, multivariate analysis 
was used to assess the net impact of perceptions of government efficacy, stability and 
corruption on trust in governmental institutions. Illustrative examples of trust surplus and 
deficits in North Africa and the Levant were drawn from the narrative commentaries 
offered by journalists and professionals. 
 
Operationalization and Descriptive Analysis 
  
Overall, there was a low level of trust in governmental institutions in both regions. And 
as might be expected in low citizen trust environments, the governments in both regions 
were also judged to be less functional in their efficacy, their ability in maintaining 
stability and had high corruption ratings. However, there were notable differences in the 
two regions on trust as well as the functionality and dysfunctionality of their 
governments. North Africans perceived their governmental institutions to be more 
efficacious, stable, and less corrupt than their Levantine counterparts. More specifically, 
citizens in North Africa rated their governments to be more efficient in operating three of 
the four sectors considered; the economy, employment and security sector. It was only 
the health sector that Levantine nation citizens found to be more efficacious than the 
North Africans. An interesting note: even though citizens in the Levant believed that 
there was more corruption and cronyism in their respective countries than their 
counterparts in North Africa, the latter (North Africans) believed there was less 
crackdown on corruption and bribes. 
 
Trust in Institutions 
  
Given the recent turmoil in the Middle East, the low trust in institutions in both regions 
was to be expected. According to the Professor (Interviewee #2), economic hardship, 
instability, lack of accountability and high level of corruption amongst government 
institutions are the main factors that create trust deficits. The Executive Director 
(Interviewee #1) added, in order for there to be a surplus of trust, there must be a high 
level of ethics, transparency and accountability. However, for historical reasons 
discussed at the start of this paper, citizens of North African nations trusted their 
institutions a bit more than the Levantine citizens. The lower level of Levantine trust was 
captured in the Trust index mean (𝑥) of 9.01 on a scale of 6-14, in contrast to the mean 
(𝑥) of 10.16 in North Africa. 
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Table 1.A. Trust in Institutions  
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016 
Concept Dimensions Indicators Responses Statistics  
    North Africa 
(n=4277) 
Levant 
(n=3405
) 
Trust in 
Institutions 
Legislative 
System 
  
  
Q2011. Trust 
in government 
(council of 
ministers)? 
1. No trust at all 
2. Not very much trust 
3. Quite a lot of trust 
4. A great deal of trust 
27.8% 
27.7 
29.3 
15.3 
47.1%*** 
21.3 
22.2 
9.4 
  
  
  
Judicial 
Branch 
Q2012. Trust 
in the courts 
and legal 
system? 
  
1. No trust at all 
2. Not very much trust 
3. Quite a lot of trust 
4. A great deal of trust 
23.9% 
27.9 
29.5 
18.7 
32.9%*** 
23.9 
28.2 
15.0 
  Executive 
Branch 
Q2013. Trust 
in the elected 
council of 
representative
s (the 
parliament)? 
1. No trust at all 
2. Not very much trust 
3. Quite a lot of trust 
4. A great deal of trust 
41.7% 
29.0 
20.2 
9.1 
55.1%*** 
23.0 
16.1 
5.8 
 Army Q2016. Trust 
do you have in 
the armed 
forces (the 
army)? 
1. No trust at all 
2. Not very much trust 
3. Quite a lot of trust 
4. A great deal of trust 
3.9% 
9.2 
22.2 
64.8 
12.6%*** 
12.1 
21.7 
53.6 
  Index of Trust 
in Institutions1 
Mean (𝑥) 
(sd) 
Min-Max  
10.16 
(3.01) 
4-16  
9.01*** 
(3.05) 
4-16 
1 Index of Trust in Government: ReversedQ2011 + ReversedQ2012 + ReversedQ2013 + ReversedQ2016; 
correlations among the indicators for North Africa ranged from 0.62*** to 0.18***; Levant 0.64*** to 0.11***; 
*** p<=.001. 
 
 
Some examples of the specific points of regional divergence in trust and mistrust are 
worth noting. Citizens of both regions registered “a great deal of trust” in armed forces; 
64.8% citizens in North Africa even if only 53.6% of Levant citizens. But there was more 
distrust than trust in all the other sectors considered here, particularly in the Levant 
nations. For example, in the Levant, 41.7% had “no trust at all” in the councils of 
ministers as opposed to only 27.8% in North Africa. Citizens in the Levant also 
distrusting of their courts and legal system; 32.9% of the citizens stated they had “no 
trust at all” compared to the 23.9% in North Africa. A similar pattern of low Levantine 
institutional trust (55.1% “no trust at all”) continued to the level of council of 
representatives (in contrast to the 41.7% of North African citizens). 
 
Functional Governments 
 
Trust in governmental institutions was hypothesized to be a product of the 
government’s functionality and dysfunctionality as evaluated by their citizens. 
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Governments were considered to be functional based on how efficacious they were 
perceived to be and how stable the citizens felt their lives were. On the other hand, 
corruption was used to identify dysfunction within governmental institutions. According 
to the Professor (Interviewee #2) there are negative perceptions of government 
efficacy. Limited efficacy is a result of the lack of accountability leaders and 
governmental institutions. In a sense, they are above the law. Whether leaders and 
governmental institutions carry out their responsibilities efficiently or not, they will 
almost never be punished or voted out of office. 
 
Perceptions of Government Efficacy. Perceptions of Government Efficacy was 
measured by how effective the citizens thought their governments were in managing 
their respective countries. Citizen’s evaluated the performance of their own 
government’s ability to effectively grow the economy, creating employment 
opportunities, providing security, and offering health services. As illustrated in Table 
1.B governments were perceived to be less efficacious, than not, in both regions; the 
mean (𝑥) efficacious index score in North Africa was only 10.7 (on a scale from 5-20) 
and 10.2 (𝑥) in the Levant region. With the exception of providing security, both sets of 
governments were rated negatively (bad or very bad) than positively, and more so in 
the Levant. It is only in providing health services that the Levant governments were 
rated to be more effective than the North African governments. 
 
The case of Lebanon is illustrative. In Lebanon, 34.5% of citizens believed that 
government was not effective at managing the economy. Even though “Banque du 
Libyan,” the government run central bank in Lebanon, has strived to preserve the two-
decade old currency peg, the economy remained stagnant. The high interest rates have 
increased the risk within the financial system and is “strangling an already depressed 
economy” (Barrington 2018). Lebanon is currently the world’s third most indebted state 
but needs urgent fiscal reform to help the economy. According to Barrington, regular 
citizens are feeling the effects of the weak economy as annual growth rates has 
decreased to 1-2%, lending is down, business activity is falling, and prices are falling in 
the real estate sector, the pillar of the Lebanese economy.  
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Table 1.B. Perception of Government Efficacy  
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016 
Concept Dimensions Indicators Responses Statistics  
    North 
Africa 
(n=2076) 
Levant 
(n=3350
) 
Perception 
of 
Government 
Efficacy 
Economy How would you evaluate: 
Q2041. The current 
government's 
performance on managing 
the economy? 
1.   Very Bad 
2.   Bad 
3.   Good 
4.   Very 
Good 
25.5% 
37.7 
33.6 
  3.2 
34.5%*** 
35.5 
27.0 
  3.0 
   Q2043. The current 
government's 
performance on narrowing 
the gap between rich and 
poor? 
1.  Very Bad 
2.  Bad 
3.  Good 
4.  Very Good 
44.1% 
37.4 
16.3 
 2.2 
45.7%* 
37.8 
15.1 
1.4 
    Q2042. The current 
government's 
performance on creating 
employment 
opportunities? 
1.   Very Bad 
2.   Bad 
3.   Good 
4.   Very 
Good 
42.0% 
37.5 
18.4 
2.1 
50.1*%** 
35.5 
13.3 
1.0 
  Security Q20421. The current 
government's 
performance on providing 
security in the country? 
1.   Very Bad 
2.   Bad 
3.   Good 
4.   Very 
Good 
7.6% 
12.6 
54.6 
25.2 
23.6%*** 
20.0 
33.4 
23.0 
  Health Q2044. The current 
government's 
performance on improving 
basic health services? 
1.   Very Bad 
2.   Bad 
3.   Good 
4.   Very 
Good 
28.4% 
34.4 
33.7 
3.5 
26.5%*** 
30.9 
38.0 
4.6 
  Index of Perceptions of 
Government Efficacy 1 
Mean (𝑥) 
(sd) 
Min -Max 
10.73 
(2.97) 
5-20 
10.25*** 
(3.32) 
5-20 
1 Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy: ReversedQ2041 + ReversedQ2042 + ReversedQ20421 +  
  ReversedQ2011 + ReversedQ2043; correlations among the indicators for North Africa ranged from 0.49** to  
  0.25***; Levant 0.56** to 0.36*** 
*** p<=.001. 
 
 
 
Stability. Governments in both regions fared a bit better (but not by much) in offering 
their citizens stability (Table 1.C). But, as with trust and efficacy, North African citizens 
felt more stable in their lives; on a summative index scale that ranged from 6-25, the 
North African mean (𝑥) was 14.83 compared to 13.93 in the Levant. Citizen’s based 
their perceptions about their stability on country’s economic stability and their personal 
safety. For example, in North Africa 59.3% believed that their household economic 
situation was “good” in comparison to only 48.9% of citizens in the Levant. Additionally, 
52.4% of citizens in North Africa reported that the future of their own personal as well as 
their family’s safety was ensured; only 35.3% of citizens in the Levant felt the same. 
Additionally, citizens in the Levant were more concerned with a terrorist attack (13.3%) 
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or of being harassed in the street (25.9%) than North African citizens (4.3% and 7.3% 
respectively). In short, even in relatively unstable circumstances, North Africans felt that 
there was more (than the Levantines) economic stability in their country and 
experienced a higher degree of personal safety. 
 
Table 1.C. Stability  
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016 
Concept Dimensions Indicators Responses Statistics  
    North Africa 
(n=4586) 
Levant 
(n=3536) 
Stability Economic 
Stability 
How would you 
evaluate: 
Q101. The current 
economic situation 
in your country? 
1. Very Bad 
2. Bad 
3. Good 
4. Very Good 
29.7% 
35.0 
32.3 
3.1 
31.7%*** 
38.1 
27.6 
2.6 
    Q101a. The 
economic situation 
in your country five 
years ago (before 
the Arab uprisings) 
compared to the 
current situation? 
1. Much worse 
2. Somewhat Worse 
3. Almost the same 
as the current 
situation 
4. Somewhat better 
5. Much better 
8.5% 
11.9 
  
26.8 
 
30.4 
22.4 
8.6%*** 
11.1 
  
18.5 
 
39.3 
22.5 
    Q102b. Your current 
household 
economic situation? 
5. Very Bad 
6. Bad 
7. Good 
8. Very Good 
10.3% 
26.4 
59.3 
4.1 
15.8%*** 
30.2 
48.9 
5.1 
  Personal 
Safety 
Q105. Do you 
currently feel that 
your own personal 
as well as your 
family's safety and 
security are ensured 
or not? 
1. Absolutely not 
ensured 
2. Not ensured 
3. Ensured 
4. Fully ensured 
7.6% 
  
14.9 
52.4 
25.1 
10.6%*** 
  
24.9 
35.3 
29.3 
  
  To what degree are 
you worried about: 
Q1072. A terrorist 
attack in your 
country. 
1. Very much 
2. Much 
3. Not much 
4. Not at all 
79.6% 
11.7 
4.3 
4.3 
 
58.0%*** 
22.4 
6.7 
13.0 
  Q1074. Being 
harassed or 
threatened on the 
street. 
1. Very much 
2. Much 
3. Not much 
4. Not at all 
69.3% 
16.7 
6.6 
7.3 
38.6%*** 
13.3 
22.2 
25.9 
  Index of Stability1 Mean  
(sd) 
Min-Max  
13.93 
(2.78) 
6-25 
14.83*** 
(3.49) 
6-25 
1 Index of Stability: ReversedQ101 + ReversedQ101A + ReversedQ102B + ReversedQ105 + Q1072 + Q1074;  
  correlations among the indicators for North Africa ranged from -0.02*** to 0.60***; Levant -0.01*** to 0.55*** 
*** p<=.001. 
 
While stability is crucial to citizens of the Middle East, democracy is not necessarily 
perceived to be the solution (Interviewee #2). According to the Professor, in a state of 
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instability and lack of personal safety, democracy and civil rights are considered a 
luxury. As a result, citizens are willing to settle for an ineffective government if its leader 
is able to guarantee, verbally at least, safety and economic security. In the Middle East, 
history has shown that citizens have a preference for tough leaders over democratic 
states and are willing to compromise on accountability and democracy in return of 
survival.  
 
 
Government Corruption as Dysfunction 
  
In addition to assess the functionality of governments, citizens were asked to evaluate 
the extent of corruption in their countries. Specifically, their perception of corruption 
within state agencies, cronyism in employment, and the extent to which corruption was 
being remedied was addressed. As shown in Table 1.D, both regions were marked by 
high levels of corruption, but corruption was more rampant in the Levant; the mean (𝑥) 
corruption index score was 10.09 (range of 4-12) in the Levant and 9.61 in North Africa. 
Two examples to illustrate regional differences in corruption levels. One, there was a 
notable difference in the level of cronyism; while 75.3% citizens in the Levant believed 
that obtaining employment through connections is “extremely widespread,” only 61.5% 
of citizens in North Africa thought so. Second, more than half (57.2%) of Levant citizens 
believed that there was corruption in their state agencies to a “large extent” in 
comparison to the 55.2% of North Africans. But, Levantine governments (35%) were 
more likely to be seen as cracking down on corruption than the 25.2% of North Africans. 
That is, even though corruption was more rampant in the Levant than in North Africa, 
the former governments were doing more to combat corruption. 
 
Once again, according to the Professor (Interviewee #2), high levels of corruption stem 
from the ability of politicians, with the use of the country’s resources and the 
international support, to push certain agendas and create divisions within the country. 
Many citizens see governmental institutions as compromised or corrupted, and too tied 
up in politics. For example, the people that are chosen to take high positions within 
governmental institutions are based on political ties, as opposed to merit (Interviewee 
#1). Adeel Malik, a professor at Oxford University, mentioned in Kassab’s article “The 
cost of cronyism under Mubarak,” found significant cronyism between the late 1990’s 
and 2001 in 385 companies in Egypt that had been associated the former president, 
Hosni Mubarak. Similarly, 497 companies in Lebanon and 662 in Tunisia had strong ties 
to the political regimes in place, while 370 in Morocco were owned by holding 
companies indirectly controlled by the King (Kassab 2019). Besides, Kassab noted that 
companies in Egypt that were politically associated with the regime received more 
benefits. For example, they received 92% of the total loans granted to the private 
sector, despite not having higher profitability compared to non-politically connected 
firms.  
 
Corruption, as shown in Table 1.D., had a more corrosive effect on citizen trust, creating 
more trust deficit, in Levant than in North Africa. The empirical data from The Global 
Corruption Barometer are illustrative. According to the Barometer 92% of citizens in 
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Lebanon, 75% of Jordanian citizens and 70% of Palestinian citizens believe corruption 
had increased. On the other hand, citizens in North Africa did not believe corruption had 
increased as drastically as in the Levant. While 64% of citizens in Tunisia and 51% of 
Algerians thought that corruption had increased, this was a stark contrast to the 28% of 
Egyptians and 26%of Moroccans who held the similar belief. 
 
Table 1.D. Corruption  
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016 
Concept Dimensions Indicators Responses Statistics  
    North Africa 
(n=4360) 
Levant 
(n=3334) 
Corruption Perceptions To what extent do 
you think that: 
Q210. There is 
corruption within 
the state agencies 
and institutions in 
your country? 
1. Not at all 
2. To a small extent 
3. To a medium 
extent 
4. To a large extent 
2.7% 
10.0 
32.1 
55.2 
 
3.7%*** 
8.4 
30.6 
57.2 
  Q211.The 
governments 
working to 
crackdown on 
corruption and root 
out brides? 
1. Not at all 
2. To a small extent 
3. To a medium 
extent 
4. To a large extent 
12.9% 
34.1 
27.8 
25.2 
 
10.2%*** 
28.9 
25.9 
35.0 
  Q213. How to get 
a job1.  
1. I do not know of 
any relevant 
experiences  
2. Employment is 
mostly obtained 
without 
connections  
3. Employment is 
sometimes 
obtained through 
connections 
4. Obtaining 
employment 
through 
connections is 
extremely 
widespread 
7.5% 
 
 
3.5 
 
 
27.5 
 
 
 
61.5 
2.0%*** 
 
 
2.6 
 
 
20.0 
 
 
 
75.3 
 
   Index of 
Corruption2 
Mean  
(sd) 
Min-Max 
9.61 
(1.80) 
4-12  
10.09*** 
(1.65) 
4-12  
1 Some people say that nowadays it is impossible to get a job without connections (wasta) while others say that  
  jobs are only available to qualified candidates. Based on a recent experience (or experiences) you are    
  personally aware of, do you think that…? 
2 Index of Corruption: ReversedQ210 + ReversedQ211 + ReversedQ213; correlations among the indicators for 
  North Africa ranged from 0.36*** to- 0.20***; Levant 0.40*** to 0.20*** 
*** p<=.001 
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Bivariate analysis 
  
A preliminary exploration of the connections of citizen trust with government efficacy, 
stability, and corruption were conducted using bivariate correlations (Table 2 in 
Appendix A). In North Africa, the more efficacious the government was perceived to be, 
and the more stable their personal life was, the more likely they were to trust 
governmental institutions (Efficacy r=0.47***, Stability r=0.31***). On the other hand, 
perceived corruption reduced trust in North African societies (r= -0.47***). Similar 
patterns were evident in the Levant region. For example, the more efficacious (r=0.59***) 
and the more stable their lives were (r=0.36***), the more trusting they were of their 
governments, but corruption led to less trust (r= -0.48***). As illustrated in Table 2, the 
level of trust in institutions was more reflective of government efficacy, stability and 
corruption in the Levant than in North Africa. Also, in both regions, the more educated 
citizens were, the less trust they had, particularly in North Africa (North Africa r= -0.15***, 
Levant r= -0.08**). Some gender differences were also evident, with men being more 
trusting than women (North Africa r= -0.06***, Levant r= -0.05**).  
  
 
Linear Regression Analysis 
  
In order to test the robustness of the hypothesized regionalized connections of citizen 
trust with functional-dysfunctional assessments of their governments and consequent 
trust deficits, two linear regressions were run, one each for the two regions. The 
functionality of governments was indicated by perceptions of government efficacy and 
stability, while corruption levels represented dysfunctionality in governmental institutions 
(Table 3). 
 
In North Africa, on balance, perceptions of government efficacy were the main reason 
for increased levels of trust (β= 0.25***). While citizen trust in their governments was 
reduced by the corrosive negative effects of corruption (β=-0.29***), governments were 
able to combat the negative consequences of corruption, with functional services and 
stability. There was a parallel functionality-corruption-trust dynamic in the Levant. That 
is, functional Levantine governments engendered much more citizen trust (β=0.41***) 
than the negative trust consequences of governmental corruption (β=-0.23***). 
 
Two additional trust connections, even if not as prominent as that of efficacy and 
corruption, were noted. Economic and personal stability contributed some to cultivating 
more trust in governments in both regions, even if more so in Northern Africa; Stability β 
in North Africa = 0.10***and 0.07*** the Levant. And educated North African citizens were 
less trusting of their governments (β = -0.12**than their Levantine counterparts (β = -
0.04**). 
  
Another look at the regional differences in the functionality-corruption balance in 
engendering citizen trust revealed interesting lessons in trust surplus and deficits. In the 
Levant, governments were able to cultivate a trust surplus; that is, the trust deficit 
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caused by corruption (β=-0.23***) was more than compensated for by functional 
governments (Efficacy β=0.41***and stability β=0.07**combined). While in North Africa, 
citizen trust that efficacious governments and stability were able to garner (Efficacy 
β=0.25***and stability β=0.10) were just about sufficient to make up for the corrosive 
effects of corruption (β=-0.29***). In other words, the trust surplus created in the North 
African region was significantly smaller than the trust surplus in the Levantine region. 
 
Table 3. Regression Analysis of Trust in Government  
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016; Beta (β) Coefficients1 
  Regression Coefficients (β) 
  North Africa Levant 
Functional Governments: 
1.  Perceptions of Government Efficacy 
2.  Stability 
Dysfunctional Governments: 
1.  Corruption 
  
0.25*** 
0.10*** 
  
-0.29*** 
  
0.41** 
0.07*** 
  
-0.23*** 
Education and Gender: 
1.  Level of education 
2.  Gender 
  
-0.11*** 
-0.02 
  
-0.04** 
0.03 
Model Statistics: 
Constant 
Adjusted R2 
DF 1 & 2 
  
11.19*** 
0.24**** 
5 & 3410 
   
8.79*** 
0.38*** 
5 & 2955 
1 Index of Trust in Government: ReversedQ2011 + RevesexQ2012 + ReversedQ2013 + ReversedQ2016;  
  range 4-16; 
  Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy: ReversedQ2041 + ReversedQ2042 + ReversedQ20421 +      
  ReversedQ2043 + ReversedQ2043; range 5-20; 
  Index of Stability: ReversedQ101 + ReversedQ101A + ReversedQ102B +Reversed Q105 + Q1072 + Q1074;  
  range 6-25; 
  Index of Corruption: ReversedQ210 + ReversedQ211 + ReversedQ213; range 4-12; 
  Level of Education: (1) Illiterate/No formal education - (7) MA and above; 
  Gender: (0) Male - (1) Female.  
*** p<=.001. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
  
In this concluding section, the theoretical and political implications of the empirical 
findings were reviewed. Some suggestions for future research to advance scholarly 
understanding of the contested relationships between Middle Eastern citizens and their 
governments were outlined. 
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Empirical and Theoretical Implications 
  
The quantitative findings indicated that a trust surplus in governmental institutions in the 
Middle East was a result of positive perceptions of government efficacy, and stability. On 
the other hand, corruption eroded citizen trust. However, while both the North African 
and Levantine regions were able to garner an overall trust surplus, said surplus was 
significantly smaller in North Africa than in the Levantine region. Educated Middle East 
citizens were less trusting of their governments in both regions. 
 
Some specifics of the trust dynamics between citizens and their leaders were found in 
the narrative commentaries of professionals and journalistic accounts. For example, The 
Professor (Interviewee #2) offered this scenario. Sectarian leaders are supported by 
foreign leaders and are historically from wealthy families. Therefore, in return for loyalty 
from their voters, they are able to provide tangible services, such as government jobs, 
education to voter’s children in specific prestigious schools. The strong influence of 
leaders on the citizens make it difficult to mobilize against leaders, because voters are 
very dependent on these leaders. According to the Executive Director (Interviewee #1), 
the dependent voter-politician relationship is harmful. Citizens prefer working in the 
government public sector than in the private sector, because staying within the system 
grantees them benefits they would not achieve otherwise. The reinter system, coupled 
with corruption, allows for the elite class in the Middle East to continue controlling 
resources and solidify their power. According to the Executive Director, the economic 
differential between ordinary citizens and elites is vast; the government officials and 
leaders are always of the upper class while citizens are of the lower or middle class, with 
fewer material possessions and wealth.  
  
In the Professor’s experience, there is no motivation for governmental institutions to help 
and support citizens who do not have the ability to change the level of power of leaders, 
because of both the lack of accountability and dependency of Middle Eastern citizens on 
their leaders. Neither are the government agents motivated to facilitate economic 
growth. Lack of accountability also contributes to the little confidence in leaders and 
government agents, and ultimately leads to government inefficacy. Additionally, 
widespread corruption, that goes hand in hand with lack of accountability, is quite 
evident in the Middle East.  
 
Citizens feel that the government is inefficient because they are corrupt. Yet, many do 
not feel they can make a difference, although this sense of powerlessness is not 
widespread throughout the region. As per the Global Corruption Barometer 2016 (Pring 
2016) citizens in Tunisia felt empowered to help fight corruption, and believed ordinary 
people are able to incite change (71%). Citizens in Jordan and Palestine, also had 
positive outlooks on the ability for citizens to make a difference (66%). On the other 
hand, half of the citizens in Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon and Egypt felt disempowered to 
fight corruption. If left unaddressed, as the empirical findings presented in this paper has 
shown, corruption in both regions will erode the trust surplus in government institutions.  
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Theoretical Implications 
  
From a theoretical standpoint, there was support in the linear regression findings (Figure 
1) for predictions that were grounded in Max Weber and Gaetano Mosca’s Elite and 
Legitimacy theories. As expected in first hypothesis, functional governments garnered 
more citizen’s trust in the Levant than in North Africa, net of level of education and 
gender. The economic equalities combined with the political turmoil that has roiled the 
North African region, and the unmet expectations of economic and social change offer 
an explanation. The legitimacy of governments (measured by trust surplus garnered by 
government efficacy and stability versus trust deficits derived from corruption was also 
higher in the Levant (Hypothesis #2) as a result of Levantine elites maintaining political 
stability, even if not economic progress. 
 
Figure 1: Empirical (Beta (β) Coefficients1) and Theoretical Models of the Impacts of Perceptions 
of Government Efficacy, Stability and corruption on Trust in Government Institutions in North 
Africa and the Levant2      
    
    2 Data source: Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,  
     Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016; *** p <=.001. 
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Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
  
Despite the valuable insights presented in this research there is much left to be 
uncovered about citizen trust in government institutions in the Middle East. The fact that 
the adjusted R2 in North Africa was only 0.24*** and the Levantine R2 was 0.38*** 
indicated that there is more to the citizen-government dynamics than citizen perceptions 
of government efficacy, stability, and corruption.  
  
Further research on civil participation in politics of the region will be valuable. In the 
Executive Director’s (Interviewee #2) perspective, citizens expect solutions to social 
problems to come from the government, as opposed to a collaboration between citizens, 
NGO’s and the government. The prevailing ethos in the Middle East is that because the 
leader or government agency was elected, the responsibility lies completely with them, 
without acknowledging the citizens’ role in the challenges they face. For example, 
150,000 children of Syrian refugees have entered Lebanon in the recent years, exerting 
extra pressure on the public schools. A proactive citizenry and support for these schools 
could enhance the efficiency of existing governmental institutions. A bottom up 
approach, through civil empowerment to participate and change the politics in favor of 
citizens, will create a ripple effect, said the Professor (Interview #1).  
  
The ethnocentric and secretariat conflicts that persist in the Middle East is another issue 
that deserves more scholarly attention. According to the Professor, religion is 
manipulated and used by government officials to maintain their position of power. 
Besides, specific ethnic and religious minorities are discriminated against and are kept 
out of political power or autonomy. Ethno-sectarian conflicts are more visible in the 
Levantine region, especially in Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Lebanon. Based on the turmoil of 
the last decade, and the growing insurgency and terrorist groups, such as ISIS, their 
effects on corroding trust in governments in the Levant and North Africa need scholarly 
attention.  
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Demographic Controls: Gender and Level Of Education   
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, and Tunisia, 20161 
 Concepts Indicators  Responses Statistics 
   North Africa Levant 
Gender Male or Female (0)   Male 
(1)   Female 
50.1% 
49.9 
49.7% 
50.3 
 Education Level of 
Education1 
Mean (sd) 
Min-Max 
(n) 
3.42 (1.67) 
1-7 
(4787) 
3.70 
(1.31)*** 
1-7 
(4200) 
 1 Level of Education: (1) Illiterate/No formal education - (7) MA and above. 
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Appendix B: Table 2. Correlation (r)   
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016 1,2 
 Trust In 
Governm
ent 
Perceptions 
of 
Government 
Efficacy  
Stability Corruptio
n 
Level of 
Education 
Gender 
Trust In 
Government 
1 
 
0.589*** 
(n=3201) 
0.358*** 
(n=3350) 
-0.479*** 
(n=3187) 
-0.075*** 
(n=3405) 
0.049** 
(n=3405) 
 
Perceptions 
of 
Government 
Efficacy 
0.471** 
(n=3741) 
1 
 
0.495*** 
(n=3293) 
-0.545*** 
(n=3117) 
-0.060*** 
(n=3350) 
0.050** 
(n=3350) 
Stability 0.305*** 
(n=4127) 
0.413*** 
(n=3944) 
1 -0.319*** 
(n=3284) 
-0.019 
(n=3536) 
-0.063*** 
(n=3536) 
Corruption -0.473*** 
(n=3959) 
-0.535** 
(n=3802) 
-0.310 *** 
(n=4191) 
1 
 
0.004 
(n=3334) 
-0.060** 
(n=3334) 
Level of 
Education 
-0.152*** 
(n=4266) 
-0.052** 
(n=4065) 
0.052*** 
(n=4573) 
0.113*** 
(n=4360) 
1 
 
-0.012** 
(n=4200) 
Gender 0.063*** 
(n=4277) 
0.067*** 
(n=4076) 
-0.024 
(n=4586) 
-0.099*** 
(n=4586) 
-0.164*** 
(n=4586) 
1 
 
1 Correlation below the diagonal of 1 is North Africa, while the correlation above is the Levant  
2 Index of Trust in Government: ReversedQ2011 + RevesexQ2012 + ReversedQ2013 + ReversedQ2016; range     
  4-16; 
  Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy: ReversedQ2041 + ReversedQ2042 + ReversedQ20421 +      
  ReversedQ2043 + ReversedQ2043; range 5-20; 
  Index of Stability: ReversedQ101 + ReversedQ101A + ReversedQ102B +Reversed Q105 + Q1072 + Q1074;  
  range 6-25; 
  Index of Corruption: ReversedQ210 + ReversedQ211 + ReversedQ213; range 4-12 
  Level of Education: (1) Illiterate/No formal education - (7) MA and above 
  Gender: (0) Male - (1) Female.  
*** p<=.001. 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abed, George T. and Hamid R. Davoodi. 2003. “Challenges of Growth and  
Globalization in the Middle East and North Africa.” International Monetary Fund. 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/med/2003/eng/abed.htm#1  
 
Abrahams, Elliot. 2012. “Chronic Kleptocracy: Corruption Within the Palestinian  
 Political Establishment.” Council on Foreign Relations.  
https://www.cfr.org/report/chronic-kleptocracy-corruption-within-palestinian-
political-establishment?cid=rss-fullfeed-chronic_kleptocracy corruptio-071012. 
Adamson, Thomas and Angela Charlton. 2019. “Algerians keep up pressure after  
president’s half-concession.” The Associated Press. https://wtop.com/middle-
east/2019/03/algerians-keep-up-pressure-after-presidents-half-concession/ 
  
Algiers. “Still waiting for real democracy.” 2012. The Economist.  
100
Silicon Valley Notebook, Vol. 17 [2019], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol17/iss1/1
101 
 
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2012/05/12/still-waiting-for 
-real-democracy  
Al Jazeera and Agencies. “Moroccan monarch pledges reform.” 2011. Al Jazeera.  
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/201139204839521962.html  
 
AlKhatib, Walid, Michael Robbins, Musa Shutaywi, Amaney A. Jamal, Mark A.  
Tessler, Khalil Shiqaqi, and Mhammed Abderebbi. 2018. “Arab Barometer:  
Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt,  Jordan, Lebanon,  
Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia.” 2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university  
Consortium for Political and Social Research. 
  
Aman, Mohammed M. 2017. “The Rise and Demise of the Middle East Quest for  
Reforms, 2011-2017.” Digest of Middle East Studies 26(1):170-86. 
 
Barrington, Lisa. 2018. “Lebanon banks suck in dollars to maintain peg, but  
economy stagnates.” Rueters  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-economy/lebanon-banks-suck-i 
n-dollars-to-maintain-peg-but-economy-stagnates-idUSKBN1L11IR  
 
Bremmer, Ian. 2019. “Tunisia’s Fledgling Democracy Shows Signs of Wear and  
Tear.” Time. http://time.com/5511735/tunisia-democracy-ian-bremmer/ 
  
Cammack, Perry and Marwan Muasher. 2016. “Arab Voices on the Challenges of  
the New Middle East.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
   
Cammack, Perry, Michele Dunne, Amr Hamzawy, Marc Lynch, Marwan Muasher,  
Yezid Sayigh, and Maha Yahya. 2016. “Arab Fractures: Citizens, States, and  
Social Contracts”. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
 
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. “Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition” Pp. 124-88. New  
Haven (Connecticut) and London: Yale University Press. 
 
Dalacoura, Katerina. 2018. “Democratic Transitions in the Levant: Prospects for  
Restoring a Regional Order.” International Relations/Uluslararası  
İlişkiler15(60):31-44. 
  
Daoud, Kamel. “The Algerian Exception.” 2015. The New York Times.  
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/opinion/the-algerian-exception.html? 
  
Di Peri, Rosita. 2014. “Introduction. Lebanon Facing the Arab Uprisings. A Lost  
Opportunity?” Oriente Moderno 94(2):277-84. 
 
Eccles, Chris. 2015. “Restoring Trust in Government.” Pp. 17-28 in New  
Accountabilities, New Challenges, edited by John Wanna, Evert A. Lindquist  
and Penelope Marshall. Canberra, Australia: ANU Press. 
101
et al.: Class, Race, and Political BoundaryLimits of Community andPolitic
Published by Scholar Commons, 2019
102 
 
 
Harb, Imad. March 30, 2006. “Lebanon's Confessionalism: Problems and  
Prospects.” United States Institute of Peace. 
https://www.usip.org/publications/2006/03/lebanons-confessionalism-problems-and-
prospects 
  
Hashemi, Manata. 2017. “Aspirations, Poverty and Behavior Among Youth in the  
Middle East: Some Theoretical Considerations.” The Muslim World 107(1):  
83-99. 
  
Interviewee #1. 11.10.18. Executive Director. 
 
Interviewee #2. 11.14.18. Professor. 
 
Ketchley, Neil. 2017. “Egypt in a Time of Revolution: Contentious Politics and the  
Arab Spring”. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kong, Dejun Tony. 2013. “Intercultural Experience as an Impediment of Trust:  
Examining the Impact of Intercultural Experience and Social Trust Culture  
on Institutional Trust in Government.” Social Indicators Research  
113(3):847-58. 
 
Kassab, Baseesan. 2019. “The cost of cronyism under Mubarak.” AhramOnline.  
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/328164/Business/Economy/The-
cost-of-cronyism-under-Mubarak.aspx.   
 
Lynch, Marc. “The New Arab Order: Power and Violence in Today’s Middle  
East.” 2018. Foreign Affairs 97(5): 116–26. 
 
Meer, Tom Van Der and Armen Hakhverdian. 2016. “Political Trust as the  
Evaluation of Process and Performance: A Cross-National Study of 42  
European Countries.” Political Studies 65(1):81-102. 
 
Meisel, James H. 1965. “The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the  
Elite.” Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
 
Morris, Stephen D. and Joseph L. Klesner. 2010. “Corruption and Trust:  
Theoretical Considerations and Evidence from Mexico.” Comparative Political  
Studies 43(10):1258–85. 
 
Muasher, Marwan. 2018. “The Next Arab Uprising The Collapse of  
Authoritarianism in the Middle East.” Foreign Affairs 97(6):113-24. 
 
No Author [a]. 2011. “Morocco approves King Mohammed's constitutional reforms.”  
BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13976480 
 
102
Silicon Valley Notebook, Vol. 17 [2019], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol17/iss1/1
103 
 
No Author [b]. 2019 “Morocco. Freedom in the World 2019” Freedom House.  
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/morocco 
 
Nossiter, Adam. 2019. “Algeria’s President Yields to Protests, Saying He Won’t  
Pursue Fifth Term.” The New York Times.  
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/world/africa/algeria-president-election.ht 
ml.  
 
Pring, Coralie. 2016. “People and Corruption: Middle East & North Africa Survey 
 2016. Global Corruption Barometer.” Transparency International.    
 
Siems, Mathias, and Gerhard Schnyder. 2014. “Ordoliberal Lessons for Economic  
Stability: Different Kinds of Regulation, Not More Regulation.” Governance 
27(3):377-96. 
 
Spierings, Niels. 2017. “Trust and Tolerance across the Middle East and North 
Africa: A Comparative Perspective on the Impact of the Arab  
Uprisings.” Politics and Governance 5(2):4-14. 
   
Weber, Max. 1964. “The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.” Talcott  
Parsons (ed.), New York: Free Press. 
  
103
et al.: Class, Race, and Political BoundaryLimits of Community andPolitic
Published by Scholar Commons, 2019
104 
 
 
  
104
Silicon Valley Notebook, Vol. 17 [2019], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol17/iss1/1
105 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Racial Boundaries of Success in the U.S 
105
et al.: Class, Race, and Political BoundaryLimits of Community andPolitic
Published by Scholar Commons, 2019
106 
 
Racialized Resource Models of Socioeconomic Success: 
A Mixed Methods Analysis of White and African American High School Students 
 
By 
 
Anna Heider1 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT. Racial differences in the types of social resources that White and African 
American students need to complete high school and be successful in young adulthood 
were assessed using the 10-year longitudinal data on 10th graders from the 2002-2012 
NELS survey. Racial limits of home and school resources for socioeconomic success 
were theorized using Bourdieu, Coleman, and Lareau’s social capital theories in the 
context of Massey and Denton’s residential segregation. Qualitative interviews and 
content analyses of journalistic and of select documentary evidence were used to 
illustrate the statistical analysis. Not only was completing high school essential, for both 
groups, to succeed socioeconomically as adults, access to resources in their homes was 
a critical element of early success in high school. But only Whites were able to activate 
academic and home resources to their benefit in their later success. African Americans 
continued to rely only on their home resources in their adulthood. These racialized 
resource models added to the social capital literature on the racialized pathways to 
economic success, but more research attention is warranted on the future success 
pathways of African Americans. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
That a critical tool for economic success in modern America, high school completion 
and even a college degree, is not equally available to all youth has been well 
documented. It is also well established in the field of education that supportive 
resources in the home and at school can help students on their way to finishing high 
school and becoming economically successful in their adulthood. Educated parents 
often expect their children to follow them in their educational trajectories, guide them in 
high school and even in their later lives. Schools, their resources, teachers, and school 
peers, are additional important assets to children in their high school and later careers. 
Unfortunately, the contours of educational opportunities and success in the U.S. are 
racially defined.  
 
Part of the racialized success is due to differences in access to resources in the home and 
in schools. But, even when resources are available to both African American and White 
students, how useful or accessible are they at different points in their socioeconomic 
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careers? What are the racial differences in the career supportive resources? Pinpointing 
the types of supportive resources and the career points at which they are most useful 
could highlight inequalities in the education system as well in later economic success, 
and offer evidence for identifying ways of bridging the gaps in options available to 
African American and White students. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Scholars have explored racial/ethnic differences in the roles that families, teachers, 
schools, and communities play in the academic aspirations and achievements of youth. 
The plethora of resources hypothetically available to young students can be categorized 
into those in the home and in the school. On the home front, parents’ educational and 
economic backgrounds are two well established assets that guide their children for 
success in high school and later in their lives. Once children enroll and attend schools, 
race/ethnic variations in perceptions of school climate and of teacher-student 
relationships, as well as school resources, have found to shape their academic 
achievements. 
 
 
Support for Education in the Home 
 
Parents and other family members are key to the educational trajectories of their 
children. More often than not, parents model the value of education for their children, 
are involved in shaping their aspirations, goals and school activities, and continue to 
support them as they pursue their careers. 
 
Parents: Academic Expectations and Involvement 
 
Scholars have recognized numerous ways families influence and support their 
children’s academic achievements. For example, students whose parents were very 
involved with the school, did better academically, in a sample of 15,240 from NELS of 
surveys (Benner, Boyle, and Sadler 2016). Gordon and Cui (2012) also drew a similar 
conclusion, from two waves of the Add Health longitudinal study (Wave I sample: 20,745 
and wave IV: 15,701). In the Gordon and Cui analyses, parents’ high educational 
expectations for their children and general support were what led to their children’s 
academic achievement.   
 
Structural  Class  Resources  in  the  Home 
 
In addition to parent activities and motivations for their children’s future, social class can 
affect how parents support their children. Socioeconomic structural assets available to 
parents and children in the home have been documented to be salient for their children’s 
academic success. For example, Lareau (2014) noted differences between how middle 
class and lower class/poor parents approached educational support, expectations, and 
general support for their children. Lareau, who observed a sample of 88 families (White 
and African American), found that middle class parents were involved in the school and 
were also more willing to challenge the teachers. In contrast, lower class/poor parents 
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were less involved with the school, listened to everything the teachers said about their 
child’s education, and did not try to change what goes on at the school (even if they 
disagreed). In fact, in a survey study done by Dixson, Roberson, and Worrell (2017), 
with a sample of 105 high achieving (GPA > 3.0) African American students, family 
socioeconomic background was a stronger predictor (accounted 17% of academic 
variance) of academic achievement than student psychosocial status. 
 
Race, a  moderator. The connections between the resources at home and school 
success are mediated by the racial background of children and their families. For 
example, in a study of parenting behavior and financial stress by Dotterer, Iruka and 
Pungello (2012) with 164 mother-child dyads of African American and White ethnicity, 
the effectiveness of parenting behaviors was found to be different according to racial 
group. Maternal sensitivity did play a role in the link between SES and school readiness 
only for White families. But, the maternal negative/intrusive behaviors link operated 
similarly for both African Americans and whites; for example, lower SES was associated 
with negative/intrusive maternal behaviors, and in turn, the children had lower pre- 
academic knowledge than their counterparts. 
 
 
 
Academic Resources: Structural, Engagement, and Race 
 
Schools and teachers, with race/ethnicity and gender as central organizing principles, 
are additional areas around which the complex interplay of academic expectations and 
outcomes of high school students are played out. Race/ethnic variations in perceptions 
of school climate, of teacher-student relationships, and school resources, as they 
affected academic achievements, has been another central theme in the extant 
research. 
 
 
School Climate 
 
Much research has been done on racial variations in how school climate is perceived by 
students and the connections to student academic success. In one study, teachers in 
schools with positive climate and strong discipline had positive relationships with their 
students and high expectations for their students (Konold, Cornell, Shukla and Huang 
2016). In turn, these students, who participated in an anonymous survey of 48,027 
students in 323 schools, were highly engaged in their academics. Yet, African American 
students in the survey (in contrast with White students) perceived the teachers to be 
less supportive, but more demanding academically. African American students also 
perceived the discipline at the school to be less structured and less fair. In yet another 
longitudinal study (from the 7th grade in 1991 all the way through 11th  in1996), Diemer, 
Marchand, Mckellar, and Malanchuk (2016) looked more specifically at relationships 
between teachers and African American students and the effects on students’ 
achievement in math. Not only did teacher’s differential treatment negatively predict 
relevant math instruction during 8th grade, it also acted to “corrode the salutary benefits 
of relevant instruction on students’ self-concept of math ability and task value” (p.1221). 
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Similar racialized findings were available in a study done by Voight, Hanson, O’Malley, 
and Adekanye (2015), using multilevel regression analyses of “school climate.” In a 
middle school, the African American and Hispanic students, in contrast to their White 
classmates, had less favorable experiences of connectedness, safety, opportunities for 
participation, and relationships with adults. Besides, when the racial climate gaps were 
wider, the racial achievement gap was also larger and vice versa. An example of this 
racial divide in the Denver public school system was highlighted by an online journalist, 
Asmar (2019), in “Black student excellence: Denver school board directs district to 
better serve black students.” Illustrating the disproportionate treatment of African 
American students in public schools, Asmar quoted one student: “Teachers, specifically 
white teachers, don’t know how to act around me…do not know how to have respectful 
conversations because they’re afraid of being offensive or because they’re not educated 
in the right terminology” (https://chalkbeat.org/posts/co/2019/02/22/black-student-
excellence-denver-school-board-directs-district-to-better-serve-black-students/).  
 
Another aspect of school climate is teacher support as perceived by the students, 
particularly students of color. Mary, Calhoun, Tejada, and Jenson (2018), in their 
phenomenological study of 25 African American students, found that despite negative 
messages and stereotypes, African American students living in low-income 
communities, had high academic expectations when they were surrounded by 
supportive teachers, parents, and community programs/afterschool programs. At the 
other end of the spectrum was academic dis-identification or a disconnect between 
academic self-concept and achievement. African American youth, particularly males, in 
Cokley, Mcclain, Jones, and Johnson’s (2012) research with 96 African American 
students, had better academic performance when they had strong academic self-
concept. These authors found that African American males, more than female youth, 
were likely to perceive school as a hostile environment associated with discipline and 
corporeal punishment. 
 
SES  and Minority Composition of Schools 
 
In addition to school climate, in its many dimensions, the class and race contexts of 
schools is another important element in student success. In a meta-analysis of research 
on the socioeconomic status-academic achievement connection published over a ten- 
year span (1990-2000), Sirin (2005) found that school SES, defined by parent’s 
education, parental income, and parental occupation, was positively connected to 
student achievement, but primarily for white, and less so for minority, students; their 
sample included 101, 157 students at 6,871 schools from 128 different school districts. 
On balance, Sarin concluded that SES of neighborhoods and schools exerted more of a 
powerful negative effect on minority students than on white students. 
 
Student Responsibility: Free Time Use 
 
When all is said and done, students also have responsibility for their success. Wolf, 
Aber, and Morris (2015) focused on how 504 African American and Latino students 
used their discretionary time and its connections to their academic achievement. 
Students grouped in the academic cluster (in discretionary time use) had higher levels 
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of academic achievement compared to those in the social cluster; that is, students who 
focused less on academics in their outside time were more likely to do worse 
academically. 
 
 
Success in Later Life 
 
Unlike the plethora of research on student success in high school, there is not much 
attention that has been paid to the connection between high school education and 
success in later life. Most scholars have focused on adult socioeconomic attainment 
as it has been shaped by life-time educational achievements, occupational status, and 
family/community backgrounds. For example, Wilson (2017) looked at birth cohorts, of 
Whites versus African Americans and men versus women, from the successive 
decades from 1910 to 1979. The scholar defined occupational attainment as 
“occupational returns to education and “earnings returns to occupation” (p. 387). 
African American and Whites, both men and women, did improve their occupational 
attainment over those of previous birth cohorts. However, African American men, of 
both the baby-boom and generation X, were not as successful in moving forward in 
their occupational trajectories as White men of the same age. Yet, African American 
women did seem to have made occupational gains relative to White women, even if the 
gains fluctuated over decades. 
 
Another stream of research on the economic success trajectories has addressed the 
socioeconomic and privilege contexts in which student grew up. For example, the 
connections between family/community background, race/ethnicity and young adult 
socioeconomic attainment was explored by Wickrama, Simons, and Baltimore (2012) 
using the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health. African American youth 
that came from a low SE (socioeconomic) background and lived in disadvantaged 
communities were more likely to have significantly lower levels of earnings, assets, and 
job quality as young adults. However, educational attainment of young adults helped to 
buffer the limiting influences of family SE background on later achievements and 
helped accentuate the positive influences of family resources. There is also a “success 
sequence” with nuanced racial differences in the outcomes. In their reexamination of 
Isabel Sawhill and Ron Haskins’ data, Reeves, Rodrigue, and Gold (2015) used a 
similar definition of the “success sequence”, namely graduating high school, 
maintaining a full-time job or having a partner who does and having children while 
married and after age 21, should they choose to become parents. While Sawhill and 
Haskins’ found the African Americans who followed these three “norms” to the middle 
class were still worse off than their white counterparts, the reanalysis went even more 
in-depth: “…blacks and white who follow the three norms have about the same 
likelihood of ending up near the middle, with incomes three to five times the federal 
poverty line…But white norm-followers have better odds than their black equivalents of 
ending up in a more affluent household” (https://www.brookings.edu/research/following-
the-success-sequence-success-is-more-likely-if-youre-white/). 
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Summary and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
Numerous valuable lessons were identified in the scholarly research reviewed above on 
the racial dimensions of high school academic success as it was impacted by support, 
or lack thereof, in the home and school. It was clear that a high school diploma is critical 
for later success. However, there was little longitudinal assessment found of how 
resources that were effective in students’ success in high school completion continued 
to be available to youth to be tapped into later in life and whether there are racial 
dimensions to the resources accessible and activated by youth. The researchers 
reviewed above also expressed the need for larger sample sizes, especially ones that 
include more African American students. 
 
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
To address some these gaps in the extant research, a mixed method approach was 
used to outline, first, the potentially racialized social capital resource (academic and 
home) models of high school completion of White and African American youth. Second, 
if high school completion is a key to future socioeconomic success, which of these early 
resources continued to help White and African American youth in their adult 
socioeconomic success? The formal research question posed was, “How were 
academic and home resources differently activated by White and African American youth 
in their progress toward high school completion and, in turn, their future socioeconomic 
achievement in young adulthood?” These findings will contribute to an ongoing 
conversation about mechanisms to reduce racial inequalities in early life chances and 
later success. 
 
 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
An understanding of racialized resource models for high school completion and later 
success explored in this study were framed within Bronfenbrenner’s (1974) ecological 
approach and social capital theoretical frameworks (Bourdieu 1977, Bourdieu and 
Passeron 1990, Coleman 1987, and Lareau 2014). Of the many ecologies that affect 
youth as they grow and develop their academic and economic self- concepts, the home 
(micro system) and school (meso system) are the most relevant. It is the economic and 
socio-cultural capital that these two systems offer and are potentially activated by youth 
that could theoretically demonstrate how these ecologies shaped youth as they worked 
toward their early academic later socioeconomic (flexible self) success, Mead 1934). 
However, because of racial inequalities in access to critical resources (Bourdieu and 
Lareau), racialized resource success models were anticipated for whites and African 
Americans. 
 
Ecological Systems and Social Capital 
 
Two important ecologies in which a person grows, develops, and succeeds are the 
home micro-system and the school meso-system (Bronfenbrenner 1974). It is in these 
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two ecologies that children first develop their core self-concept (Kuhn and Mcpartland 
1954) and it is through these two ecologies that children learn how to access the 
economic, social and cultural capital resources that will have to be activated for later life 
success. It is well known that family economic resources are a major determinant of the 
quality of schools in which American children are educated (Smelser, Wilson, and 
Mitchell 2001). In addition, the home and schools are critical sources of sociocultural 
capital resources. Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) outlined the cultural beliefs, traditions, 
and the norms that one learns at home and in environments outside the home, such as 
at school, that play an important role during youth development. These resources were 
linked by Coleman (1987) to successful outcomes for children. To Coleman, parent’s 
value, expectations, beliefs, and their own behavior play a role in a child’s life outcomes; 
that is, the ways they parent their children shape children’s academic and later 
socioeconomic achievement.  
 
Race  and  Socio-Cultural  Capital 
 
However, Bourdieu (1977, 1990) and later Lareau (2014) also theorized access to 
resources to be unequal by race and by other inequality markers. White Americans hold 
a clear advantage over African Americans in terms of income, wealth, health, education, 
and many other important resources. A compelling social capital explanation for this 
white advantage is how social and cultural resources are used or activated by a 
dominant white group in order to exclude others from jobs, social resources, and other 
life chances (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). Whiteness itself is a form of cultural 
capital; that is, as the dominant racial group in American society, whites are able to set 
the normative standards for appropriate values, beliefs, and behaviors necessary for 
success. Besides, cultural capital often leads to valuable additional social capital, as in 
the resources and knowledge, gained through one’s social networks. It is these forms of 
knowledge, behaviors, and preferences that help individuals, Whites in this case, gain 
an advantage in the specific social contexts of education, employment, and wealth. For 
example, Massey and Denton (2003) demonstrated how residential segregation in the 
US has become one of the main perpetuators of urban poverty among African 
Americans. They spoke about how segregation has created the “black ghetto”.  
 
There is much scholarly writing on the origins of racial segregation in the US and how 
the social isolation of African Americans was intensified by social policies that supported 
red-lining in the real estate markets and associated home financing industries. Massey 
(2003; Chapter 2) located the beginnings of racial segregation, and the formation of the 
“black ghetto” in the early 20th century, when African Americans left the south and 
moved to northern cities. However, partly because of the racial violence that erupted, 
neighborhood organizations and other institutions instituted policies that had the de 
facto effect of confining African Americans to ghettos and socially insolating them from 
the white communities. For example, neighborhood improvement organizations got 
white landowners to sign convenants that specifically prohibited African Americans from 
owning, or occupying, or leasing properties. Also, an earlier code of ethics of the 
National Association of Real Estate Brokers stipulated that “ ‘…a Realtor should never 
be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood….members of any race or 
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nationality…whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in that 
neighborhood…’” (p. 37). Confined to such institutionalized segregated contexts, African 
Americans were limited in, and unable to accumulate for future generations, the types of 
transferrable social, cultural, and economic capital that need to be accessed to enter 
and succeed in the broader dominant (White) educational system and workplace. 
 
Lareau (2014) specifically connected the racial inequalities in social and cultural capital 
faced by black families to educational inequalities. She found that social capital, derived 
from class status of middle class and working/poor class parents, mediated the 
connection between parenting style and school performance. Concerted Cultivation was 
the parenting style used by most in middle-class families; in the concerted cultivation 
style, parents teach their children to question authority, develop a large vocabulary, and 
make them comfortable enough to have discussions with authority figures. In contrast, 
children in lower or working-class families were exposed to a more natural growth 
parenting. In this type of parenting, parents tell their children what to do rather than 
negotiate with them; they also encourage putting trust into authority figures and 
encouraged children to play on their own. While such natural parenting practices 
encouraged children to be independent at a younger age they also set them up for jobs, 
mainly working-class jobs, where those in authority were to be followed and respected. 
These two differing approaches to parenting shaped the types of socio-cultural capital 
that children could or could not access, depending on their class and/or racial origins. 
 
As youth grow intro young adulthood, these racial differences, and even inequalities, in 
socio-cultural capital continue to play key roles in the types of social networks that they 
can activate in the requisite social interactions and connections for finding and 
succeeding in the workplace. Such racialized social connections more often than not 
tend to segregate African Americans into certain jobs. Even when they find jobs, Bell, 
Nkomo, and Hammond (1994) documented the stereotypes that African American 
workers encounter in workplace settings, leading to feelings of isolation and alienation. 
In fact, much of the social divide in the workplace has been attributed to differences in 
the social and cultural capital between African Americans and their coworkers. Such 
unequal evaluations of racialized capital, that initiated the divide, also continued into the 
workplace and shaped the types of jobs African Americans were assigned. 
 
Given the racially segregated living, learning, and working environments in the U.S., it is 
logical to expect that race does shape the kinds of, and access to, resources -- 
economic, social, and cultural capital – that would be helpful for success in schools and 
later in in the workplace. If societal evaluation of the value of home and school 
resources are racialized in favor of white students, it can be predicted that home 
(economic and sociocultural) and academic resources would be more useful, on 
balance, to White students in their chances of high school completion than of African 
American students (Hypothesis #1). Under this white privilege scenario, home and 
academic resources will continue to be net beneficial to Whites (more than African 
American youth) in their later SE success (Hypothesis #2). Besides, faced with a 
racialized landscape that has disadvantaged African Americans outside their homes, 
home resources were predicted to help African American students complete high school, 
but not succeed necessarily socioeconomically in their adulthood (Hypothesis #3). 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to capture a more holistic picture of the racialized resource models, a 
sequential mixed methods design was employed. First, quantitative secondary survey 
data was utilized to test the hypotheses. In the second step, narrative insights from 
experts in education inequality as well documentary evidence about racial inequalities were 
used to illustrate and to explain the statistical results. 
 
Secondary Survey Data Analysis 
 
 
The survey data set used in this paper were drawn from the NCES (National Center for 
Education Statistics), collected from 2002 until 2012. At the beginning of the study 
(Base Year) in 2002, the youth (n=16,197) were in the 10th grade. The first follow up in 
2004 was done when the youth were in 12th grade. And two additional follow ups were 
conducted, one in 2006 and six years later in 2011-12. The NELS data included 
interviews and surveys with the school administrators, parents and students; test scores 
and transcripts were also documented. The NELS sample in the base year was made 
up of 50.5% men and 49.5% women; and 81.1 % were White and 18.9 % African 
American. In keeping with the research design of racialized resources models, the 
analyses were disaggregated by White and African American youth; sex of the 
respondent was controlled.  
 
 
Qualitative Methodology  
 
In order to gain first-hand insights on how home and academic resources influenced 
socioeconomic achievement, qualitative interviews were conducted with two education 
professionals. The first interviewee is an Associate Provost for Research (Interviewee 
#1) and the second a Senior Associate and Head of Faith Formation Interviewee #2); 
both have worked in and on education issues for their whole careers. These educators 
were selected for their well-recorded views of education and home resources that 
contribute to academic success and socioeconomic success. The Interview Protocol 
and Consent Forms are available in Appendix A. To set an additional context for the 
quantitative analyses and expand on the interview comments, content analysis of select 
journalistic and documentary evidence were also conducted. Some examples were: 
“Following the success sequence? Success is more likely if you’re white”2;“Black 
student excellence: Denver school board directs district to better serve black students” 
by Asmar 20193; “Columbus State wins award for boosting student success, reducing 
gaps”4; and the HBO documentary, “Class Divide” by Levin (2015)5  
                                                        
2 https://www.brookings.edu/research/following-the-success-sequence-success-is-more-likely-if-youre-
white/ 
3 https://chalkbeat.org/posts/co/2019/02/22/black-student-excellence-denver-school-board-directs-district-to-better-
serve-black-students/ 
4 https://www.dispatch.com/news/20190220/columbus-state-wins-award-for-boosting-student-success-reducing-gaps. 
5https://play.hbogo.com/feature/urn:hbo:feature:GV7xUvQFq08JfPwEAAAFa?reentered=true&userProfileType=liteUs
erProfile&autoplay=true. 
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DATA ANALYSES 
 
Three different levels of analyses, disaggregated by White and African American 
backgrounds, were conducted for this research.  First, univariate analyses were   
used to build a profile of the students sampled at the time they were in 10th grade and 
again 10 years later when they were young adults. Bivariate analyses were then used to 
search for the preliminary differential (by race) associations of socioeconomic 
achievement and high school completion with home resources and academic 
resources. These relationships were then tested once again by using a two-step 
multiple regression analyses, to assess the net effects of resources (home and 
academic) first on high school completion and then on SE achievement. In keeping with 
the research design, the regression analyses were disaggregated by White and African 
American students. Finally, comments from the qualitative interviews and content 
analyses were used to illustrate the multivariate analysis findings. 
 
 
Descriptive Analysis 
 
White young adults were more economically successful and were more likely to have 
completed high school than African Americans, despite having approximately similar 
access to academic resources. As for home resources, African American youth had 
fewer (than whites) economic resources, but were advantaged in some types of 
sociocultural resources vis-á-vis their White counterparts. 
 
Socioeconomic (SE) Achievement 
 
Socioeconomic achievement, the first success indicator used in this research, was 
measured using a scale that included educational achievement and employment 
income 10 years after completing high school. As seen in Table 1.A, on balance, White 
students (Mean SES = 0.16 on a range of -1.41 – 9.17) had overall higher 
socioeconomic achievement than African American students (Mean SES = -0.17 on a 
range of -1.41 – 5.99).  
 
Table 1.A Socio-Economic Achievement as of 3rd Follow-up (2012) 
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012 
Concept Dimensions Variables Values Statistics                 
 
White               
African 
American 
SE 
Achievement 
SES F3SES Sample 
member’s 
socioeconomic 
status as of F31 
Mean 
(Sd) 
 Min-Max 
0.16 
 
0.74 
 
-1.41 – 9.17 
-0.17*** 
 
0.68 
 
-1.41 – 5.99 
1 F3SES is the average of 3 standardized components, namely 2011 earnings from employment, the  
prestige score associated with the respondent's current/most recent job, and educational  
attainment. For more details, please refer to: hhtps://nces.ed.gov/OnlineCodebook/Session/Codebook/d61960c5-
287f-4edc-812a-3d5326a325d4.  
*** p<= .001. 
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High School Completion 
 
High school completion, the second indicator of success, presented in Table 1.B indicated 
the following: A vast majority, over 75% of both groups had completed high school on 
time. However, slightly more White students (89%) were likely than African Americans 
(78.7%) to have completed High school on time. And, although in small proportions, 
African Americans (9.4%) were more likely to have had no GED or equivalency than 
Whites (5%). In short, there was a difference between African American and Whites in 
their achievement; African American students were less likely to achieve high school 
education at the same level as White students. 
 
Table 1.B High School Completion as of 2nd Follow-up (2006) 
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012 
Concept Dimension Variable Responses            Statistics 
White African 
American 
High 
School 
Completion 
Completion F2HSSTAT 
High School 
Completion 
status in 
2006 
  
1. No GED or equivalency, no 
plans to pursue 
2. Working towards GED or 
equivalency 
3. received GED or equivalency 
4. completed HS summer post 
2004 
5. completed HS on time, 2004 
(n) 
5.0% 
 
1.5 
 
2.9 
1.3 
 
89.3 
(8682) 
9.4%*** 
 
5.5 
 
3.5 
2.9 
 
78.7 
(2020)  
 
 
Academic Resources 
 
Two types of academic resources, school resources and peer academic culture, were 
considered as potential explanations for success in high school completion. As seen in 
Table 1.C, both African American (AA) and White (WA) students felt supported in their 
schools and had resources available to them; the index of school resources was high at 
about 28 (on a range of 17 – 34) for both African Americans and Whites. For example, a 
majority of schools did have libraries for both African American and White students (at 
about 95%) and both groups of students rated the libraries as mostly useful (AA:52.8%; 
WA:58.7%). But both sets of students were split between disagree (AA:25.8%; 
WA:34.1%) and agree (AA: 44.2%; W:46.4%) on whether their teachers expected 
success of kids in school. 
 
Interestingly, the racial differences in school resources, when noted, were in favor of 
African American students. For example, more White students (56.9%) were likely to 
feel put down by professors in the classroom than African Americans (50.6%). And, 
school counselor’s expectations for students to go to college were slightly higher for 
African American students (88.3%) than for White students (84.9%); with less than 20% 
saying their students would do anything but go to college (AA: 11.7%; WA: 15.1%). On 
balance though, both groups were fairly equal in the available academic resources and 
support felt in their schools, even if African American students registered more support. 
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Table 1.C School Resources of Base Year (2002) 
 Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012 
Concept Dimensions Variables Responses         Statistics 
White African 
American 
Academic 
Resources 
Expectations BYS66E 
School Counselor’s 
desire for 10th grader 
after high school 
0. anything but college 
1. go to college 
(n) 
15.1% 
84.9 
(5757) 
11.7% 
88.3 
(9677) 
BY27H 
Teachers expect 
success in school 
1.strongly disagree 
2. disagree 
3. agree 
4. strongly agree 
(n) 
7.6% 
34.1 
46.4 
11.8 
(8258) 
6.7% 
25.8 
44.2 
23.3 
(1890) 
Resources BYS50 
School has library 
media/resource 
center 
0. no 
1. yes 
(n) 
4.2% 
95.8 
(8192) 
5.0% 
95.0 
(14238) 
BYS52  
How useful are 
school library 
reference materials 
1. don’t use the school 
library 
2. not useful 
3. useful 
4. very useful 
(n) 
11.4% 
 
8.3 
58.7 
21.7 
(7687) 
14.5% 
 
6.2 
52.8 
26.5 
(1656) 
BYS20F 
Teachers are 
interested in students 
1. strongly disagree 
2. disagree 
3. agree 
4. strongly agree 
(n) 
3.0% 
18.5 
59.4 
15.2 
(8682) 
5.6% 
23.4 
52.7 
13.5 
(1966) 
BYS20H 
In class often feels 
put down by teachers 
1. strongly disagree 
2. disagree 
3. agree 
4. strongly agree 
(n) 
27.4% 
56.9 
9.4 
2.2 
(8621) 
31.8% 
50.6 
9.9 
2.9 
(1994) 
BYS27A 
Classes are 
interesting and 
challenging 
1. strongly disagree 
2. disagree 
3. agree 
4. strongly agree 
(n) 
7.7% 
37.2 
44.7 
6.5 
(8631) 
5.6% 
29.4 
46.5 
13.9 
(1995) 
  Index of School1 
Resources 
Mean 
(sd) 
min-max 
28.17 
2.45 
16-34 
28.60 
2.48 
17-34 
 1 Index of School Resources=Teacher Expectations Recoded + Library Usefulness Recoded + School Counselor    
   Recoded + BYS50 + BYS20H + Teachers are Interested in Students Recoded + Classes are Interesting and  
   Challenging Recoded; Range: 16-34; Correlations among these indicators ranged from 0.033**- 0.456**(p<0.01**) for  
   Whites and from 0.008*-0.385**(p<0.01**) for African Americans 
 
 
As for the peer academic culture that students were immersed in, the following 
similarities and racial differences were noted. African American students’ friends were 
more academically influential than friends of their White counterparts. For example, 
when asked if it was very important to their friends to get good grades, 60.8% of African 
American students said so compared to only 48% of White students. Even though it was 
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equally very important to friends of both groups (76.1% WA and 77.1% AF) to finish 
high school, more African American youth (62.7%) compared to Whites (57.8%) had 
friends who wanted to continue their education past high school. 
  
Table 1.D Peer Academic Influence of Base Year (2002)  
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012 
Concepts Dimensions Variables Responses        Statistics 
White African 
American 
Academic 
Resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peer 
Academic 
Influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BYS90A 
Important to friends 
to attend classes 
regularly 
1. not important 
2. somewhat important 
3. very important 
(n) 
3.5% 
31.1 
40.2 
(6489) 
2.5% 
22.0 
30.7 
(1116) 
BYS90B 
Important to friends 
to study 
1. not important 
2. somewhat important 
3. very important 
(n) 
11.2% 
55.8 
33.0 
(6519) 
9.1% 
49.6 
41.3 
(10713) 
BYS90D 
Important to friends 
to get good grades 
1. not important 
2. somewhat important 
3. very important 
(n) 
5.8% 
46.2 
48.0 
(2223) 
6.1% 
33.1 
60.8 
(1117) 
BYS90F 
Important to friends 
to finish high school 
1. not important 
2. somewhat important 
3. very important 
(n) 
3.4% 
20.5 
76.1 
(6454) 
5.6% 
17.3 
77.1 
(1114) 
BYS90H 
Important to friends 
to continue 
education past high 
school 
1. not important 
2. somewhat important 
3. very important 
(n) 
  6.2% 
36.0 
57.8 
(1917) 
6.1% 
31.1 
62.7 
(1108) 
Index of Peer1 
Academic  
Influence 
Mean 
(sd) 
min-max 
12.38 
2.35 
5-15 
12.61** 
2.47 
5-15 
1 Index of Peer Academic Influence=BYS90A+BYS90B+BYS90D+BYS90F+BYS90H; Range: 5-15; Correlations 
  among these indicators ranged from 0.335**- 00.596** (p<0.01**) for Whites and from 0.297** - 0.693** (p<0.01**) for 
  African Americans. 
  
Home Resources 
 
Home resources, the second type of social capital considered in this analysis, were 
measured by two sets of indicators: socioeconomic and socio-cultural resources. Based 
on families’ total income (in 2001), White families had more economic resources than 
African American families (Table 1.E). The majority in both groups made between 
$25,001 and $200,000, both African American (63%) and White families (87.7%); but 
there was a 24.7% difference in favor of White families. White parents were also more 
educated than their African American counterparts. For example, 46% of white parents 
had completed college and even go beyond. The comparable proportion of college 
educated African American parents was 32.8%. On the other hand, more African 
American parents had either graduated high school or had earned a GED than White 
parents (AA: 23.3%; WA:19.4%). On balance, white youth had access to more 
economic resources in their homes than African American youth. 
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Table 1.E Home Resources of Base Year (2002)  
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS 2002- 2012 
Concepts Dimensions Variables Responses Statistics 
 
White 
African 
American 
Home 
Resources 
SE 
Resources 
(SER) 
BYINCOME 
Total Family 
Income from 
all sources 
2001-
composite 
1. None 
2. $1,000 or less 
3. $1,001 - $5,000 
4. $5,001-$10,000 
5. $10,001-$15,00 
6. $15,001-$20,000 
7. $20,001-$25,000 
8. $25,001-$35,000 
9. $35,001-$50,000 
10. $50,001-$75,000 
11. $75,001-$100,000 
12. $100,001-$200,000 
13. 200,001 or more 
0.2% 
0.3 
0.7 
1.1 
2.5 
3.2 
4.3 
9.6 
18.8 
24.0 
16.3 
14.1 
4.9 
0.8% 
3.1 
4.3 
4.4 
7.3 
8.6 
8.5 
15.3 
19.0 
14.0 
8.4 
5.4 
0.9 
BYPARED 
Parents’ 
highest level 
of education 
1.Did not finish high school 
2. Graduated from high school/GED 
3. Attended 2-year school, no degree 
4. Graduated from 2-year school 
5. Attended college, no 4-year deg.  
6. Graduated from college 
7. Completed Master’s degree or eq.  
8. Completed PhD, MD, other 
advanced degree 
2.0% 
19.4 
10.8 
11.0 
11.0 
24.6 
13.8 
 7.4 
4.5% 
23.3 
13.3 
12.0 
14.2 
19.8 
  7.7 
  5.3 
 
 Index of SE1 
Resources 
Mean 
(sd) 
min-max 
(n) 
14.43 
3.46 
3-21 
(8682) 
12.12 
3.80 
3-21 
(2020) 
Socio-
cultural 
Resources 
BYHOMLIT 
Home 
literacy 
resources 
1.Family has none of the resources 
2. Family has one of these resources 
3. Family has two of these resources 
4. 50+ book/daily paper/regular mag  
(n) 
2.8% 
11.8 
28.6 
56.9 
(7905) 
7.6% 
18.8 
32.8 
40.9 
(1562) 
BYP81 
How far in 
school 
parent 
expects 10th-
grader’s will 
go 
1. Less than high school graduation 
2. High school graduation/GED only 
3. Attend or complete 2-year 
college/school 
4. Attend 4-year degree incomplete 
5. Graduate from college 
6. Obtain Master’s degree or equi. 
7. Obtain PhD, MD, other advanced 
degree 
(n) 
0.3% 
6.7 
13.6 
 
3.9 
47.2 
17.2 
11.2 
 
(7370) 
0.5% 
7.7 
11.3 
 
3.9 
36.2 
18.6 
21.7 
 
(1421) 
Index of 
Socio-
cultural2 
Resources 
Mean 
(sd) 
min-max 
(n) 
5.05 
1.32 
1-8 
(6738) 
5.43 
1.53 
1-8 
(1128) 
1 Index of SER= BYINCOME*BYPARED*BYP84; Range: 3-21; Correlations between the two indicators were 0.300**-  
  0.450** (p<0,01**) for whites, and from 0.242** - 0.431** (p<0.01**) for African Americans. 
2 Index of Socio-Cultural Resources= By Home Lit Recoded*BYP81; Correlations between the two indicators were  
  0.184** (p<0.01**), and 0.075* (p<0.05*) for African Americans. 
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The class resource divide among neighborhoods and homes that are accentuated by 
gentrification are illustrated in the documentary, “Class Divide” in the Chelsea 
neighborhood of New York (Levin 2015). On one side of the street are the expensive 
schools, buildings, restaurants, while just across the street are housing projects. They 
are only separated by one street, but coexist in the same area. One woman interviewed 
in the film noted, “I feel like they’re trying to push everybody out of New York City. I 
don’t care what color you are, if you don’t have the big dollars they want you out.” 
Gentrification is a part of residential segregation, just because you have been living in 
one place for a long time, does not mean you will always be able to afford to live there.  
 
As for socio-cultural resources in the home, the second dimension of home resources, 
the following similarities and differences were evident in Table 1. E. Parents of both 
groups of students had very high expectations for their educational future. More than 
three quarters of (WA= 75.6% and AA = 76.5%) parents expected their children to 
complete college and even go beyond. Similarly, both sets of parents offered their 
children rich literacy options in their homes; White homes were a bit more so than 
African American homes. A majority (51.6%) of African American homes had 1-2 
reading materials (versus 49.4% WA homes); a majority (56.9%) of White homes had 
more than 50 resources for reading while the corresponding percentage in AA homes 
was 40.9%. 
 
 
Summary Profile 
 
On balance, White youth grew up in families that had more socioeconomic resources 
than African American youth; the mean (𝑥) index of socioeconomic resources was 14.3 
for White families and 12.1 (𝑥) for AA (on a range of 3 – 21). Their socio-cultural home 
background was similar, in their richness, and yet different. Both groups of families had 
high expectations for their children’s education. But White youth had a more in their 
exposure to literacy in the homes. 
 
 
Bivariate Analyses 
 
In the second analytical step, bivariate correlation analyses were run between the 
socioeconomic achievement and high school completion with both home and academic 
resources (Appendix B: Table 2). As seen in Table 2, several preliminary differences 
were noted in the experiences of White and African American youth. For one, both both 
White and African American students with good home resources did moderately better 
when it came to completing high school. Specifically, socioeconomic resources were 
equally helpful to both groups (SE resources: White r=0.18*** & African American r = 
0.17***). But, sociocultural capital played a moderately bigger role in high school 
completion for African American students than it did for White youth (Sociocultural: 
African American r=0.27***  versus White r=0.21***). Racialized resource differences were 
also noted in the utility of academic resources (school resources and peer academic 
influence), the second type of resource, in high school completion. Both types of school 
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resources were more salient for White students than they were for African American 
students (School resources: White r=0.11*** vis-a-vis African American r= 0.05*; Peer 
Academic resources: White r=0.15*** contrast with African American r=0.07**). In 
addition, more White male (r=-0.09***) and African American male youth (r=-0.06***) 
were likely to have completed high school than their female counterparts.  
 
Once they graduated high school, the high school completion certificate was very 
helpful to both African American and White student’s future socioeconomic success. 
But, the benefits of high school completion were more striking for African American 
youth (African American r=0.32***) than for Whites (r=0.27***). And just as with high 
school completion, home and academic resources continued to be assets to both 
groups of youth in their future socioeconomic achievement. However, there were the 
expected racial undertones in the extent of resource usefulness. Even though both 
White and African American students were able to continue to activate their home 
resources for later socioeconomic success, White students (SE resources r=0.34*** 
and Sociocultural r= 0.35***) were able to do so much more than African Americans 
(r=0.24*** & r=0.24***). Along similar racialized lines, high school academic resources 
continue to be an asset for White students’ socioeconomic success (School 
Resources r=0.13*** and Peer Academic Resources r=0.20***) but that was not the 
case for African Americans (r not significant).  
 
Overall, home and school resources played an important role, both in high school 
completion and in the future socioeconomic success of White youth. But African 
American students could activate their home and academic resources only for their 
high school completion, but not in their pursuit of later socioeconomic success. The 
robustness of these preliminary racialized associations between resources and 
success in high school and later in life were evaluated using mutilate regression 
analyses.  
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
The racial differences in the associations of home and school resources with high 
school completion and later socioeconomic success were reevaluated using a two-step 
multiple regression analysis for White and African American students separately (Table 
3). In the first step, high school completion was regressed on home and school 
resources. In the second step, future socioeconomic was predicted using high school 
completion as well as home and school resources. Gender was controlled for in all four 
analyses models.  
 
Several racialized and non-racialized patterns were evident in Table 3 in both high 
school completion and later socioeconomic achievement (SEA). As might be expected, 
both groups of youth needed similar types of resources for success at the high school 
and adult phases of their lives. But the resources needed for socioeconomic success in 
the later life stage were more racialized than for high school completion. Racial 
differences were also evident within each trajectory. 
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Table 3 
Regression Analysis of School Resources and Academic Resources on 
High School Completion & Socioeconomic Achievement1 
(Sex as control): β Coefficients 
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012 	 Model	1	
HS	Completion	
Model	2	
SES	Achievement		 African	
American	
White	 African	
American	
White	
Home	Resources:	Index	of	Family	SE	Resources	 	0.22***	 	0.08***	 	0.17***	 	0.13***	Index	of	Socio-Cultural	Resources	 0.23***	 0.15***	 0.01	 0.14***	
	
Academic	Resources:	Index	of	School	Resources	 		0.08**	 		0.05**	 		-0.01	 		0.04*	Index	of	Peer	Academic	Influence	 0.04	 					0.06**	 0.01	 0.03	
High	School	Completion	 	 	 			0.13***	 0.13***	
Control:	Female	(1)	vs.	Male	(0)	 	-0.05	 	-0.02	 				-0.17***	 	-0.08***	
Modal	Statistics:	Constant	 	2.03***	 	3.38***	 	-2.55***	 	-4.86***	Adjusted	R2	 0.13***	 0.05***	 0.08**	 0.09***	DF	1	and	2	 5	&	486	 5	&	3658	 6	&	486	 6	&	3658	
***p<=.001; **p<=.01; *p<=.05. 
1 Socioeconomic achievement: F3SES is the average of standardized 3 inputs, namely 2011  
earnings from employment, the prestige score associated with the respondent's current/most 
recent job, and educational attainment. 
  High School Completion: Range: 1 (No GED) - 5 (completed HS on time, 2004); 
      Index of Family SES = BYINCOME*BYPARED*BYP84; Range: 3-21;  
      Index of Socio-Cultural Resources = BYHOMELIT*BYP81; Range: 1-8; 
      Index of School Resources = Teacher Expectations Recoded + Library2 Usefulness Recoded +  
School Counselor Recoded + BYS50 + BYS20H +Teachers are interested in Students Recoded +  
Classes are Interesting and Challenging Recoded; Range: 16-34; 
      Index of Peer Academic Influence =BYS90A + BYS90B+BYS90D+BYS90F+BYS90H; Range: 5-15; 
     Female (1) vs. Male (0). 
 
 
First, for the racialized resource models needed for high school completion (Models 1.A 
and 1B): both types of resources were more useful to African American students than to 
Whites. For example, socioeconomic resources were of more assistance to African 
American youth (β=0.15*** in Model 1.A) than white youth (β=0.08*** in Model 1.B). 
Similarly, sociocultural resources also favored African American youth (β=0.23***) more 
than Whites (β=0.15***) in completing high school. In addition, there were racial 
differences in the effectiveness of academic resources, albeit less than home 
resources. School resources were a bit more useful to African American (β=0.08**) 
than White (β = 0.05**) high school students. And peer support assisted, even if weakly, 
only White youth in their high school completion prospects (β=.06**). 
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The second noteworthy sets of findings in Table 3 were the non-racialized resources. 
For one, irrespective of whether the youth were African American or White, home 
resources were more useful than academic resources to high school students in terms 
of high school completion (Models 1 in Table 3). And, both types of home resources, 
sociocultural and economic, were useful in the high school completion trajectories of 
students (Models 1 in Table 3). For example, sociocultural resources were the most 
critical (than socioeconomic resources) in the high school success of both sets of 
students (Model 1A and 1B); sociocultural effects were β=0.23*** for African Americans 
and β=0.15*** for Whites. In contrast, the effects of socioeconomic resources were only 
β=0.08*** for White youth, even if β=0.22*** for African Americans. 
 
In sum, youth, whether white or African American, needed sociocultural and 
socioeconomic resources to complete high school. But both family and academic 
resources gave more of a boost to African American students than to their white 
counterparts. In other words, African American youth needed more sociocultural and 
economic family support as well as school resources in their journey toward high school 
completion than White youth. 
 
Once, the youth completed high school, there continued to be even more pronounced 
racial differences in the useful resources they could activate for their socioeconomic 
success, the second question posed in this paper. No doubt, completing high school 
was a necessary condition for later socioeconomic success, whether one is African 
American (AA: β=0.13*** in Model 2A) or White (WA: β=0.13*** in Model 2B). But, after 
African American youth completed high school, it was family socio-economics 
(β=0.17***, Model 2.A) and not sociocultural or for that matter academic resources, that 
helped them succeed as adults. On the other hand, both family SE resources (β=0.13*** 
Model 2.B) and socio-cultural resources (β=0.14***, Model 2B) continued to play a role 
in the adult economic lives of White youth. School resources ceased to be relevant for 
both groups in their later socioeconomic success. 
 
A last note about of racialized gender differences. Males and female high school 
students were equally likely to complete high school (Models 1A and 1B). However, 
once they completed high school, not only did gender differences become apparent in 
adult socioeconomic success but the gender differences were racialized (Models 
2.A and 2B). For example, net of resources, African American and White women 
achieved less than men. But the gender gap in achievement was much more 
pronounced among African American young adults (β= -0.17***) than among White 
youth (β=-0.08***). In other words, even with social capital, African American women 
were doubly disadvantaged in their adult socioeconomic success. 
 
At first glance, it seemed as if the first hypothesis (#1), which stated that home and 
school resources would be more beneficial to White, than African American, students in 
their high school completion prospects, was not supported. However, another angle on 
these racialized high school completion findings could also be that African students 
needed more support (than White students) in the home, both economically and 
culturally, to achieve the same level of success in completing high school. White 
privilege was more noticeable in the resource models for later socioeconomic 
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achievement. As predicted in Hypotheses #2, home resources, economic and cultural, 
continued to be useful to White adults. But, African American adults could translate only 
their family’s socioeconomic, not cultural or school, resources, into later economic 
success (Hypothesis #3). 
 
Both education professionals (interviewed for this paper) emphasized the importance 
of family socioeconomic background as important contributing factors to high school 
completion and future socioeconomic achievement. However, it was also clear that the 
value of school resources for African American students, unlike their White 
counterparts, stopped at the high school gate and were not transferable to their later 
achievements. That African American students could not rely on their high schools once 
they left school might be products of the limits of the support high schools can offer to 
their alum. If the schools from which African American students graduated were mostly 
located in low income communities, there were also likely to have fewer resources (than 
well-endowed schools) available to them (Interviewee #1).  Interviewee #2 added, 
there is a revolving door of teachers and staff that don’t stay longer than 5 years in low-
income schools. If experienced teachers are hard to find at low- income school, new 
teachers, who are generally less prepared, have no role models from whom to learn and 
they too end up leaving after a short amount of time. Under these scenarios of limited 
school resources, it is not surprising that low-income high schools, which many African 
American students attend, are not able to continue assisting their alum. It is also 
possible that the limited school resources that African American students have access 
to are not transferable to work and success in the wider society.  
 
The White students’ experiences offered a stark contrast between well-resourced and 
under-resourced schools. Not only were white students able to capitalize on their high 
school resources as they graduated from school but they could continue to do so even 
later in life. But, that these racial gaps in education are not insurmountable was 
demonstrated by a community college in Ohio which took concerted action to assist 
students who needed extra support. Smola (2019) in their “Columbus State wins 
award for boosting student success, reducing gaps,” highlight a school that won an 
award for their programs to reduce gaps not only between white and minority 
students, but also students who needed financial aid. The school implemented 
programs such as, “mandatory student orientation, a student success course, an early-
alert system to identify and communicate with students who might be falling behind, and 
the development of a student resource hub and mentorship groups. Many of those 
measures have had particularly positive effects on low-income and minority students…” 
(https://www.dispatch.com/news/20190220/columbus-state-wins-award-for-boosting-
student-success-reducing-gaps). 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In these concluding sections, the theoretical and policy implications of the empirical 
findings were explored. In addition, a few suggestions for future research, derived from 
the limitations of the study, were outlined. 
 
Theoretical and Policy Implications 
 
Overall, based on both the quantitative and qualitative empirical findings, 
socioeconomic resources in the home were most effective in ensuring not only high 
school completion but also future socioeconomic progress of youth; this resource-
success connection was true for both African American and White youth. However, only 
White youth were able to continue accessing their high school resources once they 
completed high school, endorsing the Bourdieu-Lareau-Massey/Denton theoretical 
reasoning (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Empirical Model of the Impacts of Home and 
Academic Resources on Socioeconomic Achievement of White (WA) and African American (AA) 
Youth Beta (β) Coefficients1  
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 Refer to Table 3 for index coding.  
 
 
Socio-
economic 
Achievement 
High School 
Completion 
Home Resources: 
SE Background 
---------------------  
Socio-cultural 
capital 
Control: 
Female 
(1) vs 
Male (0) 
Academic 
Resources: 
School 
Resources 
---------------- 
Peer 
Academic 
Support 
 
 
WA: 0.13*** 
AA:  0.17*** 
 
WA: ß= .04* 
 
WA: 
0.13*** 
AA:  
0.13***  
 
WA: 
0.06** 
WA: 
-0.08*** 
AA:  
-0.17*** 
 
WA: 0.08*** 
AA:  0.22*** 
 
WA: 
0.15*** 
AA: 
0.23*** 
 
WA: 
0.05** 
AA:  
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Further, racial differences in the utility of family socio-cultural resources to young adults 
as they pursue socioeconomic success as young adults were also theoretically relevant. 
Family socio-cultural capital were no longer helpful for the future socioeconomic 
success of African American young adults. The sociocultural differences between 
Whites and African Americans are deeply rooted in our racial history and these 
differences have shaped the social structures and institutions. Since Whites are the 
majority and dominant group, they have been the ones to build and influence the many 
structures and related cultural expectations, putting their offspring in advantageous 
positions. For the rest of society, including African Americans, their institutional 
disadvantages represent major systemic hurdles that lead to inequalities in life 
outcomes, be they in education, wealth, health, income, or other life choices. A recent 
news story about wealthy parents paying for spots at elite colleges for their 
underqualified children is illustrative of systemic advantages for the dominant 
communities. Inequality in college admissions is not a new notion; with “college test 
prep companies, academic tutors, personal sports coaches and college admissions 
consultants, the family with resources can often improve their child's odds of 
acceptance” into an elite college reported Bahney in a recent story (2019). Donations to 
the school and legacy admissions suffice even if a child does not have the academic 
aptitude to pursue higher education. These advantages are not something that African 
American students typically have access to because of the history of discrimination in 
America and because they are disproportionately represented in lower class and poor 
communities. 
 
To the extent that the hurdles faced by African Americans and other minority groups are 
systemic, major policy changes are needed to combat the pernicious inequalities that 
have been present in America since its founding. No doubt, institutional changes are 
difficult to achieve and will take a lot of time and effort, particularly because reform 
policies will have to be broad based, covering not only educational reform, but also 
financial (as banking reforms to curb lending biases and redlining practices) and 
housing practices, among others.  
 
Educational reform in poor schools will have to ensure enough resources and better 
infrastructure, so that educators have the resources to help the children succeed. 
Teachers will also have to be incentivized to stay longer and be role models for the 
younger teachers. Residential reforms will also have to be an integral part of the 
package to address inequalities. As was noted earlier, funding for the American school 
system is heavily dependent on its community tax base. Desegregation of 
neighborhoods might need to be achieved using a mixed income model of housing, with 
high income homes interspersed with affordable housing. If gentrification needs to 
become a part of the neighborhood solution, concerted efforts will have to be made not 
to push low income families out of their homes and communities. These policies need to 
be put in place in order to help not only African Americans, but those who are in the 
lower/working class and in poverty (which is disproportionately African American). 
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Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
As with any research, while new lessons were gleaned about the high school 
completion and future socioeconomic achievement paths of White and African American 
youth, there is much left unexplained. For example, while the home (and to a lesser 
extent school) resource model worked much better for African American youth in their 
high school completion success (adjusted R2 = 0.13***) than for White youth (adjusted 
R2 was only 0.05***), there is still much to be known. Similar limitations were noted in the 
Socioeconomic Achievement Models (adjusted R2 for whites was only 0.09*** and 0.08*** 
for African Americans), although the racial disparities in models were less muted.  
 
A fuller understanding of both educational and later economic success of youth can be 
achieved by examining the role that racial differences in community resources, or lack 
thereof, play in supporting as well presenting challenges for their youth. According to 
both interviewees, socioeconomic background of both home and communities play an 
important role in academic and socioeconomic achievement of their youth. Given the 
current community-based funding structures of schools in the U.S., students in well-
resourced areas can be expected to do much better in high schools as well be able to 
tap into those community resources as they move on in their lives. More research 
attention is also needed on community challenges, such as neighborhood crime and 
violence, and how they hinder the smoother socioeconomic progress of African 
American and White youth. For example, a comparison of low-income, middle-income, 
and upper-class income schools and communities on the socioeconomic achievement 
of their students could shed light on the effect of structural forces that inhibit or facilitate 
access to certain resources required for socioeconomic success. In the final analyses, a 
clearer understanding is needed about of how institutional structures (communities, 
schools, and workplaces) facilitate or inhibit youth access to different resources as they 
chart their lives as adults. 
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APPENDICES  
 
Appendix A 
Letter of Consent and Interview Schedule 
Dear ____________ 
 
I am a Sociology Senior working on my Research Capstone Paper under the direction of Professor 
Marilyn Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University.  I am conducting my 
research on socioeconomic achievement. 
 
You were selected for this interview, because of your knowledge of and experience working in the area of 
research and education. I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to questions 
about education inequality and will last about 20 minutes. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You 
have the right to choose to not participate or to withdraw from the interview at any time. The results of the 
research study may be presented at SCU’s Annual Anthropology/Sociology Undergraduate Research 
Conference and published (in a Sociology department publication). Pseudonyms will be used in lieu of 
your name and the name of your organization in the written paper. You will also not be asked (nor 
recorded) questions about your specific characteristics, such as age, race, sex, religion. If you have any 
questions concerning the research study, please call/email me at ______ or Dr. Fernandez at 
_______________ 
 
Sincerely, Anna Heider 
By signing below you are giving consent to participate in the above study. (If the interviewee was 
contacted by email or phone, request an electronic message denoting consent). 
 
Signature Printed Name Date 
 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have 
been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of 
Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591. 
 
Interview Schedule for Supplemental Qualitative Interviews  
 
Interview Date and Time: ___ Respondent ID#: ____ 
 
1. What is the TYPE Agency/Organization/Association/Institution (NO NAME, please) where you 
learned about (and/or worked) with this issue: 
2. What is your position in this organization? 
3. How long have you been in this position and in this organization? 
4. Based on what you know of education inequality, how common is this problem (issue or concern)? 
5. In your opinion, what are some reasons that contribute to this problem (issue or concern)? (PROBE 
with: Could you expand a bit more?). 
6. [If the respondent does not bring up your independent concepts as potential causes), PROBE: a. How 
about home resources, such as family’s socioeconomic status and parent’s education, and their 
potential connection to academic achievement and socioeconomic achievement. 
b. How about school resources, such as teacher’s expectations, if they have computers, a library, etc. or 
not; and their potential connection to academic achievement and socioeconomic achievement. 
7. Is there anything else about this issue/topic I should know more about? 
 
Thank you very much for your time. If you wish to see a copy of my final paper, I would be glad to share it 
with you at the end of the winter quarter. If you have any further questions or comments for me, I can be 
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 A B  C  D E  F  G 
A. F3SES: 1 0.27*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.20*** 0.13*** -0.01 
B. F2HSSTAT 0.32*** 1 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.11*** -0.06*** 
 
C. Index of  
Family SES 
 
 
0.24*** 
 
0.16*** 
 
1 
 
0.32*** 
 
0.16*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.02 
 
D. Index of 
Sociocultural 
Resources  
 
E. Index of 
Peer 
Academic 
Influence  
F. Index of 
School 
Resources 
 
 
 
0.24*** 
 
 
 
0.03* 
 
 
 
0.04* 
 
0.27*** 
 
 
 
0.07** 
 
 
 
0.05* 
 
0.198*** 
 
 
 
-0.001 
 
 
 
-0.09*** 
 
1 
 
 
 
0.12*** 
 
 
 
0.04 
 
0.17*** 
 
 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
0.24*** 
 
0.18*** 
 
 
 
0.33*** 
 
 
 
1.0 
 
-0.10*** 
 
 
 
-0.17*** 
 
 
 
-0.08*** 
 
G. Female  
 
-0.02 
 
-0.09*** 
 
0.02 
 
-0.18*** 
 
-0.13*** 
 
0.001 
 
1.0 
 
contacted at  . Or if you wish to speak to my faculty advisor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, she can be 
reached at mfernandez@scu.edu 
 
Appendix B 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix of SES, High School Completion, Indices of Home (Socioeconomic and 
Socio-Cultural), Academic (School and Peer) Resources, and Sex: 
(White correlations above the diagonal of 1 and African American below the diagonal of 1)1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
***p<=.001;**p<=.01;*p<=.05 
1   A. F3SES: F3SES is the average of 3 standardized components, namely 2011 earnings from employment,  
the prestige score associated with the respondent's current/most recent job, and educational attainment; 
ranges: WA: -1.41 – 9.17; AA: -1.41 – 9.17  
B. High School Completion: 1 (No GED) - 5 (completed HS on time, 2004); 
C. Index of Family SES = BYINCOME*BYPARED*BYP84; Range: 3-21;  
         D. Index of Socio-Cultural  Resources = BYHOMELIT*BYP81; Range: 1-8; 
         E. Index of School Resources = Teacher Expectations Recoded + Library2 Usefulness Recoded + School   
         Counselor Recoded + BYS50 + BYS20H +Teachers are interested in Students Recoded + Classes are  
         Interesting and Challenging Recoded; Range: 16-34; 
         F. Index of Peer Academic Influence = BYS90A + BYS90B+BYS90D+BYS90F+BYS90H; Range: 5-15; 
         G. Female (1) vs. Male (0). 
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